Catálogo de publicaciones - libros

The first part of the introduction gives an overview of the main research questions and shortcomings of the research about the interdependencies of knowledge, action, and space from different interdisciplinary perspectives. It deals with key questions, such as: How does knowledge function as a prerequisite for action? How much knowledge is necessary for action? How do different representations of knowledge shape action? What impact do social environments have on the formation of knowledge and on the relations between knowledge and space? What is the relationship between social and geographical space? Why did social theory long neglect the spatial dimension? Which concepts of space and place are appropriate for analyzing relations between knowledge, action and space? On what aggregation level (individual, organization, spatial units) can relations between knowledge, action and space be documented by which indicators and empirical methods? The second part summarizes the content of the 14 chapters written by authors of various disciplines.

Geographical inquiries are normally concerned with the study of spatial patterns, regions, or spaces. By contrast, the turn toward sociotheoretical approaches in recent decades has creatively shifted the focus from spatial representation to the actions and practices of geography-making. This endeavor implies an action- or practice-centered perspective. But what does this perspective imply about the status of space? However, this question was foremost underestimated. Mostly, a kind of Newtonian concept of space remained the underlying, unquestioned concept encompassing everything humans do. From the perspective of social action and practices, space itself must be understood as a conceptual element of knowledge rather than as a material vessel containing knowledge. As a conceptual element of knowledge, space is an important tool of the production of geographical realities as historically dynamic realities, each with distinct modes of production, also—even primarily—for the interrelation of knowledge and space.

In the debate on action-theoretic and the poststructuralist approaches in human geography, the former relies on a theory of modernity; the latter, on praxis theory. Action-theoretic approaches rest on the assumption of the effectivity of various kinds of rational and deliberative decision-making and actions. Proponents of poststructuralist approaches, their critical stance notwithstanding, often tend to refrain from deliberative interventions and emphasize the structural aspects of discourse, especially power structures. Laclau and Mouffe (Hegemony and socialist strategy: towards a radical democratic politics. Verso, London, 1985), by contrast, try to retain and restore the possibility of deliberative interventions in these discursive structures by inverting Foucault’s power/knowledge equation. The author of this chapter explores the extent to which this inversion reinstates responsible and rational spatial decisions and actions as a focus of research in human geography. Rationality could be reconstituted as a culturally contingent phenomenon, and critical geographical analysis could again contribute to concrete problem-solving, though in a culturally much more informed and embedded way than if one maintains critical distance.

This chapter offers glimpses of a life-long struggle with ontological transformations, the abracadabra through which untouchable ideology is stirred into a concoction of material things and social relations—“Let there be…: and there [is],” creativity effectively a speech act, understanding a power-filled exercise in translation. The lessons learned take the author back first to central place theory and its role in the spatial organization of the Swedish welfare state—the affinities between totalitarian thinking and social engineering impossible to deny; then to the structural similarities between tragedy and intentional action—in the beginning everything right, at the end everything wrong, no one to blame in between; finally to the triangulation of cartographic reason and Gunnael Jensson’s —a sculptured study of the trinity , , and , a Duchampian laying bare of what it means to be human, even.

At the confluence of knowledge and action lies expertise, by which is meant high-quality, specialized, theoretical, and practical knowledge. The process producing this sophisticated knowledge I call “perverse expertise.” It is expertise in that some of the world’s finest minds do the intellectual and practical construction and are well paid and respected for doing so. It is perverse in that knowledge is accumulated in order to continue augmenting the incomes of already wealthy people, the capitalist class. And when the mass mind loses its capacity to think rationally, the outcome is social unconsciousness. Critical mass reaction to the pending world environmental catastrophe is prevented by hegemonic control over imaginaries by a combination of perverse expertise and mass social unconsciousness. This situation gives rise to the movement of capitalist society into an era of perpetual crisis.

The relation between knowledge and action is a delicate one. Is acting possible without knowledge? Can people act against their knowledge? Action produces knowledge, but at the same time knowledge is required for action. This chapter provides a review of different conceptions concerning the relation between knowledge and action. Three theoretical frameworks are presented: the , the , and the . The relation between knowledge and action is illustrated with an example from problem-solving research.

The author offers a sociological critique of the prevalent argument that the increasing polarization of knowledge and non-knowledge (or ignorance) has become a distinguishing feature of modernity. He acknowledges that significant asymmetries of knowledge result from differences between the positions that individuals and groups occupy in societies, but he rejects the interpretation that non-knowledge is the opposite of knowledge. Seeking to avoid that either-or polarity as an arbitrary, misleading, tedious, and theoretically and empirically unproductive traditional European antithesis between rational and irrational, as an unnecessary differentiation between believers and infidels, he posits knowledge instead as a context-dependent anthropological constant representing a continuum. From his perspective the key sociological question is how to address the issue of knowledge asymmetry and knowledge gaps in various spheres of modern society, such as the economy, politics, the life-world, and governance.

Before choosing to act, people often try to acquire knowledge about the possible consequences of their actions and associated likelihoods. In some cases they can refer to convenient descriptions of actions and their consequences—such as a medicine’s accompanying information of possible side effects and their probabilities. People thereby make decisions from description. However, when deciding whether to back up their computer hard drive, cross a busy street, or go out on a date, people do not enjoy the convenience of stated outcomes and probabilities. They make such decisions in the twilight of their sampled—and often limited—experience. That is, they make decisions from experience. Recent research has consistently demonstrated that decisions from description and decisions from experience can lead to substantially different choices. This chapter offers a review of this description–experience gap and its potential causes and explanations.

The authors posit the Reflective-Impulsive Model (RIM, Strack F, Deutsch, R Personal Soc Psychol Rev 8: 220–247, 2004) to explain the apparent duality of actions planned by reflective, deliberate thought and actions caused by spontaneous impulses. Building on existing theories of rational thought, impulse, impulse control, and implicit attitudes, they propose an integration of this research and its incorporation into the RIM’s dual-process structure. The reflective system operates according to propositional principles. It is flexible and effortful, it requires motivation, and its operation is typically conscious. The impulsive system operates according to associative principles. It is inflexible, effortless, always active, and capable of operating unconsciously. The systems interact. In particular, the reflective system activates and propositionally transforms elements of the impulsive system. Both systems may affect behavior through the common pathway of behavioral schemata (i.e., a behavior’s associative clusters, its perceptual antecedents, and the representation of its consequences). The execution of behavior may associatively activate related concepts in the impulsive system, enabling behavior to influence cognition directly. When the systems activate conflicting behavioral tendencies, motivation, opportunity, and the availability of self-regulatory resources determine which system will prevail. The authors discuss the model’s implications for research on negation and implicit self-esteem.

This chapter examines the role of spontaneous and strategic planning in turning an individual’s knowledge into action. The authors introduce specific if-then plans regarding when, where, and how to act and discuss how such implementation intentions (IIs) support goal attainment. They then differentiate two ways in which IIs can be formed on the basis of goal-related knowledge. For spontaneously formed IIs they highlight the importance of the accessibility of goal-relevant knowledge. For strategically formed IIs they point to the importance of systematically selecting relevant goal-relevant knowledge and translating it into IIs by using the Mental Contrasting with Implementation Intentions (MCII) self-regulation strategy. The interplay of automatic and reflective processes is a focus of discussion. The authors suggest that strategic planning of the automatic activation of goal-relevant knowledge can support reflective decision-making and goal-directed actions through use of context-sensitive reminders.