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Psychopharmacogenetics

Philip Gorwood ; Michel Hamon (eds.)

Resumen/Descripción – provisto por la editorial

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Palabras clave – provistas por la editorial

Psychopharmacology; Neurosciences

Disponibilidad
Institución detectada Año de publicación Navegá Descargá Solicitá
No detectada 2006 SpringerLink

Información

Tipo de recurso:

libros

ISBN impreso

978-0-387-30793-0

ISBN electrónico

978-0-387-34577-2

Editor responsable

Springer Nature

País de edición

Reino Unido

Fecha de publicación

Información sobre derechos de publicación

© Springer 2006

Tabla de contenidos

Genetics of monoamine metabolizing enzymes: psychopharmacogenetics

Rolando Meloni; Olfa Khalfallah; Nicole Faucon Biguet

I have elsewhere argued that contemporary philosophy of technology has arisen and grown out of the ‘ praxis ’ traditions, particularly those of a concretist orientation, and thus stand in contrast to the earlier, dominant strands of a theoretically biased philosophy of science. And, even if much contemporary philosophy of science has been late to arrive at such praxis phenomena as experiment, instrumentation and technologization, in science, it, too, has begun to take a similar direction. This has some implication for the role of the philosopher of technology or of as current coin would have it.

First, there is some degree to which the philosopher of technology must ≪ go native ≫, by this I mean become more than a distant observer, to become an informed . Without this participant-observation, the philosopher could never deal with the developmental phases of technologies, which I have argued are as, if not more, important than the response phases which deal with already extant technologies and their effects.

Second, a praxis orientation is necessarily more ‘pragmatic’ and area or regionally focused than a high altitude and general theory might be. I see nothing wrong with focused specialization directed towards the various areas of the technologies of the times.

Third, as indicated above, a classical role for philosophers of technology remains conceptual in the sense of re-conceiving or redescribing phenomena. In this sense one positive feature arising from postmodern sensibility is the appreciation for alternative frameworks and the ≪ fusing of horizons ≫ in a Gadamerian fashion.

Finally, philosophy of technology is necessarily concretist or ‘ materially ’ oriented insofar as the technologies operate materially at whatever level. Such material operations display patterned, structured, and while multistable, sets of possibilities. It is this structure that philosophers may examine and analyse.

All of this characterizes a certain style of philosophical approach which is beginning to show itself in the new sub-field of the philosophies of technology.

Pp. 265-287

Transduction mechanisms: G proteins

Katerina J. Damjanoska; Louis D. Van de Kar

I have elsewhere argued that contemporary philosophy of technology has arisen and grown out of the ‘ praxis ’ traditions, particularly those of a concretist orientation, and thus stand in contrast to the earlier, dominant strands of a theoretically biased philosophy of science. And, even if much contemporary philosophy of science has been late to arrive at such praxis phenomena as experiment, instrumentation and technologization, in science, it, too, has begun to take a similar direction. This has some implication for the role of the philosopher of technology or of as current coin would have it.

First, there is some degree to which the philosopher of technology must ≪ go native ≫, by this I mean become more than a distant observer, to become an informed . Without this participant-observation, the philosopher could never deal with the developmental phases of technologies, which I have argued are as, if not more, important than the response phases which deal with already extant technologies and their effects.

Second, a praxis orientation is necessarily more ‘pragmatic’ and area or regionally focused than a high altitude and general theory might be. I see nothing wrong with focused specialization directed towards the various areas of the technologies of the times.

Third, as indicated above, a classical role for philosophers of technology remains conceptual in the sense of re-conceiving or redescribing phenomena. In this sense one positive feature arising from postmodern sensibility is the appreciation for alternative frameworks and the ≪ fusing of horizons ≫ in a Gadamerian fashion.

Finally, philosophy of technology is necessarily concretist or ‘ materially ’ oriented insofar as the technologies operate materially at whatever level. Such material operations display patterned, structured, and while multistable, sets of possibilities. It is this structure that philosophers may examine and analyse.

All of this characterizes a certain style of philosophical approach which is beginning to show itself in the new sub-field of the philosophies of technology.

Pp. 289-332

Monoamine transporters

Mohamed Jaber

I have elsewhere argued that contemporary philosophy of technology has arisen and grown out of the ‘ praxis ’ traditions, particularly those of a concretist orientation, and thus stand in contrast to the earlier, dominant strands of a theoretically biased philosophy of science. And, even if much contemporary philosophy of science has been late to arrive at such praxis phenomena as experiment, instrumentation and technologization, in science, it, too, has begun to take a similar direction. This has some implication for the role of the philosopher of technology or of as current coin would have it.

First, there is some degree to which the philosopher of technology must ≪ go native ≫, by this I mean become more than a distant observer, to become an informed . Without this participant-observation, the philosopher could never deal with the developmental phases of technologies, which I have argued are as, if not more, important than the response phases which deal with already extant technologies and their effects.

Second, a praxis orientation is necessarily more ‘pragmatic’ and area or regionally focused than a high altitude and general theory might be. I see nothing wrong with focused specialization directed towards the various areas of the technologies of the times.

Third, as indicated above, a classical role for philosophers of technology remains conceptual in the sense of re-conceiving or redescribing phenomena. In this sense one positive feature arising from postmodern sensibility is the appreciation for alternative frameworks and the ≪ fusing of horizons ≫ in a Gadamerian fashion.

Finally, philosophy of technology is necessarily concretist or ‘ materially ’ oriented insofar as the technologies operate materially at whatever level. Such material operations display patterned, structured, and while multistable, sets of possibilities. It is this structure that philosophers may examine and analyse.

All of this characterizes a certain style of philosophical approach which is beginning to show itself in the new sub-field of the philosophies of technology.

Pp. 333-355

Dopamine receptors: structure, function and implication in psychiatric disorders

Pierre Sokoloff; Ludovic Leriche; Bernard Le Foll

I have elsewhere argued that contemporary philosophy of technology has arisen and grown out of the ‘ praxis ’ traditions, particularly those of a concretist orientation, and thus stand in contrast to the earlier, dominant strands of a theoretically biased philosophy of science. And, even if much contemporary philosophy of science has been late to arrive at such praxis phenomena as experiment, instrumentation and technologization, in science, it, too, has begun to take a similar direction. This has some implication for the role of the philosopher of technology or of as current coin would have it.

First, there is some degree to which the philosopher of technology must ≪ go native ≫, by this I mean become more than a distant observer, to become an informed . Without this participant-observation, the philosopher could never deal with the developmental phases of technologies, which I have argued are as, if not more, important than the response phases which deal with already extant technologies and their effects.

Second, a praxis orientation is necessarily more ‘pragmatic’ and area or regionally focused than a high altitude and general theory might be. I see nothing wrong with focused specialization directed towards the various areas of the technologies of the times.

Third, as indicated above, a classical role for philosophers of technology remains conceptual in the sense of re-conceiving or redescribing phenomena. In this sense one positive feature arising from postmodern sensibility is the appreciation for alternative frameworks and the ≪ fusing of horizons ≫ in a Gadamerian fashion.

Finally, philosophy of technology is necessarily concretist or ‘ materially ’ oriented insofar as the technologies operate materially at whatever level. Such material operations display patterned, structured, and while multistable, sets of possibilities. It is this structure that philosophers may examine and analyse.

All of this characterizes a certain style of philosophical approach which is beginning to show itself in the new sub-field of the philosophies of technology.

Pp. 357-419

The neurobiology of GABA receptors

Enrico Sanna; Paolo Follesa; Giovanni Biggio

I have elsewhere argued that contemporary philosophy of technology has arisen and grown out of the ‘ praxis ’ traditions, particularly those of a concretist orientation, and thus stand in contrast to the earlier, dominant strands of a theoretically biased philosophy of science. And, even if much contemporary philosophy of science has been late to arrive at such praxis phenomena as experiment, instrumentation and technologization, in science, it, too, has begun to take a similar direction. This has some implication for the role of the philosopher of technology or of as current coin would have it.

First, there is some degree to which the philosopher of technology must ≪ go native ≫, by this I mean become more than a distant observer, to become an informed . Without this participant-observation, the philosopher could never deal with the developmental phases of technologies, which I have argued are as, if not more, important than the response phases which deal with already extant technologies and their effects.

Second, a praxis orientation is necessarily more ‘pragmatic’ and area or regionally focused than a high altitude and general theory might be. I see nothing wrong with focused specialization directed towards the various areas of the technologies of the times.

Third, as indicated above, a classical role for philosophers of technology remains conceptual in the sense of re-conceiving or redescribing phenomena. In this sense one positive feature arising from postmodern sensibility is the appreciation for alternative frameworks and the ≪ fusing of horizons ≫ in a Gadamerian fashion.

Finally, philosophy of technology is necessarily concretist or ‘ materially ’ oriented insofar as the technologies operate materially at whatever level. Such material operations display patterned, structured, and while multistable, sets of possibilities. It is this structure that philosophers may examine and analyse.

All of this characterizes a certain style of philosophical approach which is beginning to show itself in the new sub-field of the philosophies of technology.

Pp. 421-442

Cytochromes P450

Marja-Liisa Dahl; Maria Gabriella Scordo

I have elsewhere argued that contemporary philosophy of technology has arisen and grown out of the ‘ praxis ’ traditions, particularly those of a concretist orientation, and thus stand in contrast to the earlier, dominant strands of a theoretically biased philosophy of science. And, even if much contemporary philosophy of science has been late to arrive at such praxis phenomena as experiment, instrumentation and technologization, in science, it, too, has begun to take a similar direction. This has some implication for the role of the philosopher of technology or of as current coin would have it.

First, there is some degree to which the philosopher of technology must ≪ go native ≫, by this I mean become more than a distant observer, to become an informed . Without this participant-observation, the philosopher could never deal with the developmental phases of technologies, which I have argued are as, if not more, important than the response phases which deal with already extant technologies and their effects.

Second, a praxis orientation is necessarily more ‘pragmatic’ and area or regionally focused than a high altitude and general theory might be. I see nothing wrong with focused specialization directed towards the various areas of the technologies of the times.

Third, as indicated above, a classical role for philosophers of technology remains conceptual in the sense of re-conceiving or redescribing phenomena. In this sense one positive feature arising from postmodern sensibility is the appreciation for alternative frameworks and the ≪ fusing of horizons ≫ in a Gadamerian fashion.

Finally, philosophy of technology is necessarily concretist or ‘ materially ’ oriented insofar as the technologies operate materially at whatever level. Such material operations display patterned, structured, and while multistable, sets of possibilities. It is this structure that philosophers may examine and analyse.

All of this characterizes a certain style of philosophical approach which is beginning to show itself in the new sub-field of the philosophies of technology.

Pp. 443-478

Sexual dysfunction: neurbiological, pharmacological, and genetic consideration

Brian Mustanski; John Bancroft

I have elsewhere argued that contemporary philosophy of technology has arisen and grown out of the ‘ praxis ’ traditions, particularly those of a concretist orientation, and thus stand in contrast to the earlier, dominant strands of a theoretically biased philosophy of science. And, even if much contemporary philosophy of science has been late to arrive at such praxis phenomena as experiment, instrumentation and technologization, in science, it, too, has begun to take a similar direction. This has some implication for the role of the philosopher of technology or of as current coin would have it.

First, there is some degree to which the philosopher of technology must ≪ go native ≫, by this I mean become more than a distant observer, to become an informed . Without this participant-observation, the philosopher could never deal with the developmental phases of technologies, which I have argued are as, if not more, important than the response phases which deal with already extant technologies and their effects.

Second, a praxis orientation is necessarily more ‘pragmatic’ and area or regionally focused than a high altitude and general theory might be. I see nothing wrong with focused specialization directed towards the various areas of the technologies of the times.

Third, as indicated above, a classical role for philosophers of technology remains conceptual in the sense of re-conceiving or redescribing phenomena. In this sense one positive feature arising from postmodern sensibility is the appreciation for alternative frameworks and the ≪ fusing of horizons ≫ in a Gadamerian fashion.

Finally, philosophy of technology is necessarily concretist or ‘ materially ’ oriented insofar as the technologies operate materially at whatever level. Such material operations display patterned, structured, and while multistable, sets of possibilities. It is this structure that philosophers may examine and analyse.

All of this characterizes a certain style of philosophical approach which is beginning to show itself in the new sub-field of the philosophies of technology.

Pp. 479-494

Drug-induced movement disorders

Christopher G. Goetz

I have elsewhere argued that contemporary philosophy of technology has arisen and grown out of the ‘ praxis ’ traditions, particularly those of a concretist orientation, and thus stand in contrast to the earlier, dominant strands of a theoretically biased philosophy of science. And, even if much contemporary philosophy of science has been late to arrive at such praxis phenomena as experiment, instrumentation and technologization, in science, it, too, has begun to take a similar direction. This has some implication for the role of the philosopher of technology or of as current coin would have it.

First, there is some degree to which the philosopher of technology must ≪ go native ≫, by this I mean become more than a distant observer, to become an informed . Without this participant-observation, the philosopher could never deal with the developmental phases of technologies, which I have argued are as, if not more, important than the response phases which deal with already extant technologies and their effects.

Second, a praxis orientation is necessarily more ‘pragmatic’ and area or regionally focused than a high altitude and general theory might be. I see nothing wrong with focused specialization directed towards the various areas of the technologies of the times.

Third, as indicated above, a classical role for philosophers of technology remains conceptual in the sense of re-conceiving or redescribing phenomena. In this sense one positive feature arising from postmodern sensibility is the appreciation for alternative frameworks and the ≪ fusing of horizons ≫ in a Gadamerian fashion.

Finally, philosophy of technology is necessarily concretist or ‘ materially ’ oriented insofar as the technologies operate materially at whatever level. Such material operations display patterned, structured, and while multistable, sets of possibilities. It is this structure that philosophers may examine and analyse.

All of this characterizes a certain style of philosophical approach which is beginning to show itself in the new sub-field of the philosophies of technology.

Pp. 495-514

Cardiac side effects of psychotropic medication: focus on QTc prolongation and TdP

Cherry Lewin; Peter M. Haddad

I have elsewhere argued that contemporary philosophy of technology has arisen and grown out of the ‘ praxis ’ traditions, particularly those of a concretist orientation, and thus stand in contrast to the earlier, dominant strands of a theoretically biased philosophy of science. And, even if much contemporary philosophy of science has been late to arrive at such praxis phenomena as experiment, instrumentation and technologization, in science, it, too, has begun to take a similar direction. This has some implication for the role of the philosopher of technology or of as current coin would have it.

First, there is some degree to which the philosopher of technology must ≪ go native ≫, by this I mean become more than a distant observer, to become an informed . Without this participant-observation, the philosopher could never deal with the developmental phases of technologies, which I have argued are as, if not more, important than the response phases which deal with already extant technologies and their effects.

Second, a praxis orientation is necessarily more ‘pragmatic’ and area or regionally focused than a high altitude and general theory might be. I see nothing wrong with focused specialization directed towards the various areas of the technologies of the times.

Third, as indicated above, a classical role for philosophers of technology remains conceptual in the sense of re-conceiving or redescribing phenomena. In this sense one positive feature arising from postmodern sensibility is the appreciation for alternative frameworks and the ≪ fusing of horizons ≫ in a Gadamerian fashion.

Finally, philosophy of technology is necessarily concretist or ‘ materially ’ oriented insofar as the technologies operate materially at whatever level. Such material operations display patterned, structured, and while multistable, sets of possibilities. It is this structure that philosophers may examine and analyse.

All of this characterizes a certain style of philosophical approach which is beginning to show itself in the new sub-field of the philosophies of technology.

Pp. 515-531

Glossary: genetics and parmocogenetics related terms

Philip Gorwood; Michel Haman

I have elsewhere argued that contemporary philosophy of technology has arisen and grown out of the ‘ praxis ’ traditions, particularly those of a concretist orientation, and thus stand in contrast to the earlier, dominant strands of a theoretically biased philosophy of science. And, even if much contemporary philosophy of science has been late to arrive at such praxis phenomena as experiment, instrumentation and technologization, in science, it, too, has begun to take a similar direction. This has some implication for the role of the philosopher of technology or of as current coin would have it.

First, there is some degree to which the philosopher of technology must ≪ go native ≫, by this I mean become more than a distant observer, to become an informed . Without this participant-observation, the philosopher could never deal with the developmental phases of technologies, which I have argued are as, if not more, important than the response phases which deal with already extant technologies and their effects.

Second, a praxis orientation is necessarily more ‘pragmatic’ and area or regionally focused than a high altitude and general theory might be. I see nothing wrong with focused specialization directed towards the various areas of the technologies of the times.

Third, as indicated above, a classical role for philosophers of technology remains conceptual in the sense of re-conceiving or redescribing phenomena. In this sense one positive feature arising from postmodern sensibility is the appreciation for alternative frameworks and the ≪ fusing of horizons ≫ in a Gadamerian fashion.

Finally, philosophy of technology is necessarily concretist or ‘ materially ’ oriented insofar as the technologies operate materially at whatever level. Such material operations display patterned, structured, and while multistable, sets of possibilities. It is this structure that philosophers may examine and analyse.

All of this characterizes a certain style of philosophical approach which is beginning to show itself in the new sub-field of the philosophies of technology.

Pp. 533-541