Catálogo de publicaciones - libros
Psychopharmacogenetics
Philip Gorwood ; Michel Hamon (eds.)
Resumen/Descripción – provisto por la editorial
No disponible.
Palabras clave – provistas por la editorial
Psychopharmacology; Neurosciences
Disponibilidad
Institución detectada | Año de publicación | Navegá | Descargá | Solicitá |
---|---|---|---|---|
No detectada | 2006 | SpringerLink |
Información
Tipo de recurso:
libros
ISBN impreso
978-0-387-30793-0
ISBN electrónico
978-0-387-34577-2
Editor responsable
Springer Nature
País de edición
Reino Unido
Fecha de publicación
2006
Información sobre derechos de publicación
© Springer 2006
Cobertura temática
Tabla de contenidos
Genetics of monoamine metabolizing enzymes: psychopharmacogenetics
Rolando Meloni; Olfa Khalfallah; Nicole Faucon Biguet
I have elsewhere argued that contemporary philosophy of technology has arisen and grown out of the ‘ praxis ’ traditions, particularly those of a concretist orientation, and thus stand in contrast to the earlier, dominant strands of a theoretically biased philosophy of science. And, even if much contemporary philosophy of science has been late to arrive at such praxis phenomena as experiment, instrumentation and technologization, in science, it, too, has begun to take a similar direction. This has some implication for the role of the philosopher of technology or of as current coin would have it.
First, there is some degree to which the philosopher of technology must ≪ go native ≫, by this I mean become more than a distant observer, to become an informed . Without this participant-observation, the philosopher could never deal with the developmental phases of technologies, which I have argued are as, if not more, important than the response phases which deal with already extant technologies and their effects.
Second, a praxis orientation is necessarily more ‘pragmatic’ and area or regionally focused than a high altitude and general theory might be. I see nothing wrong with focused specialization directed towards the various areas of the technologies of the times.
Third, as indicated above, a classical role for philosophers of technology remains conceptual in the sense of re-conceiving or redescribing phenomena. In this sense one positive feature arising from postmodern sensibility is the appreciation for alternative frameworks and the ≪ fusing of horizons ≫ in a Gadamerian fashion.
Finally, philosophy of technology is necessarily concretist or ‘ materially ’ oriented insofar as the technologies operate materially at whatever level. Such material operations display patterned, structured, and while multistable, sets of possibilities. It is this structure that philosophers may examine and analyse.
All of this characterizes a certain style of philosophical approach which is beginning to show itself in the new sub-field of the philosophies of technology.
Pp. 265-287
Transduction mechanisms: G proteins
Katerina J. Damjanoska; Louis D. Van de Kar
I have elsewhere argued that contemporary philosophy of technology has arisen and grown out of the ‘ praxis ’ traditions, particularly those of a concretist orientation, and thus stand in contrast to the earlier, dominant strands of a theoretically biased philosophy of science. And, even if much contemporary philosophy of science has been late to arrive at such praxis phenomena as experiment, instrumentation and technologization, in science, it, too, has begun to take a similar direction. This has some implication for the role of the philosopher of technology or of as current coin would have it.
First, there is some degree to which the philosopher of technology must ≪ go native ≫, by this I mean become more than a distant observer, to become an informed . Without this participant-observation, the philosopher could never deal with the developmental phases of technologies, which I have argued are as, if not more, important than the response phases which deal with already extant technologies and their effects.
Second, a praxis orientation is necessarily more ‘pragmatic’ and area or regionally focused than a high altitude and general theory might be. I see nothing wrong with focused specialization directed towards the various areas of the technologies of the times.
Third, as indicated above, a classical role for philosophers of technology remains conceptual in the sense of re-conceiving or redescribing phenomena. In this sense one positive feature arising from postmodern sensibility is the appreciation for alternative frameworks and the ≪ fusing of horizons ≫ in a Gadamerian fashion.
Finally, philosophy of technology is necessarily concretist or ‘ materially ’ oriented insofar as the technologies operate materially at whatever level. Such material operations display patterned, structured, and while multistable, sets of possibilities. It is this structure that philosophers may examine and analyse.
All of this characterizes a certain style of philosophical approach which is beginning to show itself in the new sub-field of the philosophies of technology.
Pp. 289-332
Monoamine transporters
Mohamed Jaber
I have elsewhere argued that contemporary philosophy of technology has arisen and grown out of the ‘ praxis ’ traditions, particularly those of a concretist orientation, and thus stand in contrast to the earlier, dominant strands of a theoretically biased philosophy of science. And, even if much contemporary philosophy of science has been late to arrive at such praxis phenomena as experiment, instrumentation and technologization, in science, it, too, has begun to take a similar direction. This has some implication for the role of the philosopher of technology or of as current coin would have it.
First, there is some degree to which the philosopher of technology must ≪ go native ≫, by this I mean become more than a distant observer, to become an informed . Without this participant-observation, the philosopher could never deal with the developmental phases of technologies, which I have argued are as, if not more, important than the response phases which deal with already extant technologies and their effects.
Second, a praxis orientation is necessarily more ‘pragmatic’ and area or regionally focused than a high altitude and general theory might be. I see nothing wrong with focused specialization directed towards the various areas of the technologies of the times.
Third, as indicated above, a classical role for philosophers of technology remains conceptual in the sense of re-conceiving or redescribing phenomena. In this sense one positive feature arising from postmodern sensibility is the appreciation for alternative frameworks and the ≪ fusing of horizons ≫ in a Gadamerian fashion.
Finally, philosophy of technology is necessarily concretist or ‘ materially ’ oriented insofar as the technologies operate materially at whatever level. Such material operations display patterned, structured, and while multistable, sets of possibilities. It is this structure that philosophers may examine and analyse.
All of this characterizes a certain style of philosophical approach which is beginning to show itself in the new sub-field of the philosophies of technology.
Pp. 333-355
Dopamine receptors: structure, function and implication in psychiatric disorders
Pierre Sokoloff; Ludovic Leriche; Bernard Le Foll
I have elsewhere argued that contemporary philosophy of technology has arisen and grown out of the ‘ praxis ’ traditions, particularly those of a concretist orientation, and thus stand in contrast to the earlier, dominant strands of a theoretically biased philosophy of science. And, even if much contemporary philosophy of science has been late to arrive at such praxis phenomena as experiment, instrumentation and technologization, in science, it, too, has begun to take a similar direction. This has some implication for the role of the philosopher of technology or of as current coin would have it.
First, there is some degree to which the philosopher of technology must ≪ go native ≫, by this I mean become more than a distant observer, to become an informed . Without this participant-observation, the philosopher could never deal with the developmental phases of technologies, which I have argued are as, if not more, important than the response phases which deal with already extant technologies and their effects.
Second, a praxis orientation is necessarily more ‘pragmatic’ and area or regionally focused than a high altitude and general theory might be. I see nothing wrong with focused specialization directed towards the various areas of the technologies of the times.
Third, as indicated above, a classical role for philosophers of technology remains conceptual in the sense of re-conceiving or redescribing phenomena. In this sense one positive feature arising from postmodern sensibility is the appreciation for alternative frameworks and the ≪ fusing of horizons ≫ in a Gadamerian fashion.
Finally, philosophy of technology is necessarily concretist or ‘ materially ’ oriented insofar as the technologies operate materially at whatever level. Such material operations display patterned, structured, and while multistable, sets of possibilities. It is this structure that philosophers may examine and analyse.
All of this characterizes a certain style of philosophical approach which is beginning to show itself in the new sub-field of the philosophies of technology.
Pp. 357-419
The neurobiology of GABA receptors
Enrico Sanna; Paolo Follesa; Giovanni Biggio
I have elsewhere argued that contemporary philosophy of technology has arisen and grown out of the ‘ praxis ’ traditions, particularly those of a concretist orientation, and thus stand in contrast to the earlier, dominant strands of a theoretically biased philosophy of science. And, even if much contemporary philosophy of science has been late to arrive at such praxis phenomena as experiment, instrumentation and technologization, in science, it, too, has begun to take a similar direction. This has some implication for the role of the philosopher of technology or of as current coin would have it.
First, there is some degree to which the philosopher of technology must ≪ go native ≫, by this I mean become more than a distant observer, to become an informed . Without this participant-observation, the philosopher could never deal with the developmental phases of technologies, which I have argued are as, if not more, important than the response phases which deal with already extant technologies and their effects.
Second, a praxis orientation is necessarily more ‘pragmatic’ and area or regionally focused than a high altitude and general theory might be. I see nothing wrong with focused specialization directed towards the various areas of the technologies of the times.
Third, as indicated above, a classical role for philosophers of technology remains conceptual in the sense of re-conceiving or redescribing phenomena. In this sense one positive feature arising from postmodern sensibility is the appreciation for alternative frameworks and the ≪ fusing of horizons ≫ in a Gadamerian fashion.
Finally, philosophy of technology is necessarily concretist or ‘ materially ’ oriented insofar as the technologies operate materially at whatever level. Such material operations display patterned, structured, and while multistable, sets of possibilities. It is this structure that philosophers may examine and analyse.
All of this characterizes a certain style of philosophical approach which is beginning to show itself in the new sub-field of the philosophies of technology.
Pp. 421-442
Cytochromes P450
Marja-Liisa Dahl; Maria Gabriella Scordo
I have elsewhere argued that contemporary philosophy of technology has arisen and grown out of the ‘ praxis ’ traditions, particularly those of a concretist orientation, and thus stand in contrast to the earlier, dominant strands of a theoretically biased philosophy of science. And, even if much contemporary philosophy of science has been late to arrive at such praxis phenomena as experiment, instrumentation and technologization, in science, it, too, has begun to take a similar direction. This has some implication for the role of the philosopher of technology or of as current coin would have it.
First, there is some degree to which the philosopher of technology must ≪ go native ≫, by this I mean become more than a distant observer, to become an informed . Without this participant-observation, the philosopher could never deal with the developmental phases of technologies, which I have argued are as, if not more, important than the response phases which deal with already extant technologies and their effects.
Second, a praxis orientation is necessarily more ‘pragmatic’ and area or regionally focused than a high altitude and general theory might be. I see nothing wrong with focused specialization directed towards the various areas of the technologies of the times.
Third, as indicated above, a classical role for philosophers of technology remains conceptual in the sense of re-conceiving or redescribing phenomena. In this sense one positive feature arising from postmodern sensibility is the appreciation for alternative frameworks and the ≪ fusing of horizons ≫ in a Gadamerian fashion.
Finally, philosophy of technology is necessarily concretist or ‘ materially ’ oriented insofar as the technologies operate materially at whatever level. Such material operations display patterned, structured, and while multistable, sets of possibilities. It is this structure that philosophers may examine and analyse.
All of this characterizes a certain style of philosophical approach which is beginning to show itself in the new sub-field of the philosophies of technology.
Pp. 443-478
Sexual dysfunction: neurbiological, pharmacological, and genetic consideration
Brian Mustanski; John Bancroft
I have elsewhere argued that contemporary philosophy of technology has arisen and grown out of the ‘ praxis ’ traditions, particularly those of a concretist orientation, and thus stand in contrast to the earlier, dominant strands of a theoretically biased philosophy of science. And, even if much contemporary philosophy of science has been late to arrive at such praxis phenomena as experiment, instrumentation and technologization, in science, it, too, has begun to take a similar direction. This has some implication for the role of the philosopher of technology or of as current coin would have it.
First, there is some degree to which the philosopher of technology must ≪ go native ≫, by this I mean become more than a distant observer, to become an informed . Without this participant-observation, the philosopher could never deal with the developmental phases of technologies, which I have argued are as, if not more, important than the response phases which deal with already extant technologies and their effects.
Second, a praxis orientation is necessarily more ‘pragmatic’ and area or regionally focused than a high altitude and general theory might be. I see nothing wrong with focused specialization directed towards the various areas of the technologies of the times.
Third, as indicated above, a classical role for philosophers of technology remains conceptual in the sense of re-conceiving or redescribing phenomena. In this sense one positive feature arising from postmodern sensibility is the appreciation for alternative frameworks and the ≪ fusing of horizons ≫ in a Gadamerian fashion.
Finally, philosophy of technology is necessarily concretist or ‘ materially ’ oriented insofar as the technologies operate materially at whatever level. Such material operations display patterned, structured, and while multistable, sets of possibilities. It is this structure that philosophers may examine and analyse.
All of this characterizes a certain style of philosophical approach which is beginning to show itself in the new sub-field of the philosophies of technology.
Pp. 479-494
Drug-induced movement disorders
Christopher G. Goetz
I have elsewhere argued that contemporary philosophy of technology has arisen and grown out of the ‘ praxis ’ traditions, particularly those of a concretist orientation, and thus stand in contrast to the earlier, dominant strands of a theoretically biased philosophy of science. And, even if much contemporary philosophy of science has been late to arrive at such praxis phenomena as experiment, instrumentation and technologization, in science, it, too, has begun to take a similar direction. This has some implication for the role of the philosopher of technology or of as current coin would have it.
First, there is some degree to which the philosopher of technology must ≪ go native ≫, by this I mean become more than a distant observer, to become an informed . Without this participant-observation, the philosopher could never deal with the developmental phases of technologies, which I have argued are as, if not more, important than the response phases which deal with already extant technologies and their effects.
Second, a praxis orientation is necessarily more ‘pragmatic’ and area or regionally focused than a high altitude and general theory might be. I see nothing wrong with focused specialization directed towards the various areas of the technologies of the times.
Third, as indicated above, a classical role for philosophers of technology remains conceptual in the sense of re-conceiving or redescribing phenomena. In this sense one positive feature arising from postmodern sensibility is the appreciation for alternative frameworks and the ≪ fusing of horizons ≫ in a Gadamerian fashion.
Finally, philosophy of technology is necessarily concretist or ‘ materially ’ oriented insofar as the technologies operate materially at whatever level. Such material operations display patterned, structured, and while multistable, sets of possibilities. It is this structure that philosophers may examine and analyse.
All of this characterizes a certain style of philosophical approach which is beginning to show itself in the new sub-field of the philosophies of technology.
Pp. 495-514
Cardiac side effects of psychotropic medication: focus on QTc prolongation and TdP
Cherry Lewin; Peter M. Haddad
I have elsewhere argued that contemporary philosophy of technology has arisen and grown out of the ‘ praxis ’ traditions, particularly those of a concretist orientation, and thus stand in contrast to the earlier, dominant strands of a theoretically biased philosophy of science. And, even if much contemporary philosophy of science has been late to arrive at such praxis phenomena as experiment, instrumentation and technologization, in science, it, too, has begun to take a similar direction. This has some implication for the role of the philosopher of technology or of as current coin would have it.
First, there is some degree to which the philosopher of technology must ≪ go native ≫, by this I mean become more than a distant observer, to become an informed . Without this participant-observation, the philosopher could never deal with the developmental phases of technologies, which I have argued are as, if not more, important than the response phases which deal with already extant technologies and their effects.
Second, a praxis orientation is necessarily more ‘pragmatic’ and area or regionally focused than a high altitude and general theory might be. I see nothing wrong with focused specialization directed towards the various areas of the technologies of the times.
Third, as indicated above, a classical role for philosophers of technology remains conceptual in the sense of re-conceiving or redescribing phenomena. In this sense one positive feature arising from postmodern sensibility is the appreciation for alternative frameworks and the ≪ fusing of horizons ≫ in a Gadamerian fashion.
Finally, philosophy of technology is necessarily concretist or ‘ materially ’ oriented insofar as the technologies operate materially at whatever level. Such material operations display patterned, structured, and while multistable, sets of possibilities. It is this structure that philosophers may examine and analyse.
All of this characterizes a certain style of philosophical approach which is beginning to show itself in the new sub-field of the philosophies of technology.
Pp. 515-531
Glossary: genetics and parmocogenetics related terms
Philip Gorwood; Michel Haman
I have elsewhere argued that contemporary philosophy of technology has arisen and grown out of the ‘ praxis ’ traditions, particularly those of a concretist orientation, and thus stand in contrast to the earlier, dominant strands of a theoretically biased philosophy of science. And, even if much contemporary philosophy of science has been late to arrive at such praxis phenomena as experiment, instrumentation and technologization, in science, it, too, has begun to take a similar direction. This has some implication for the role of the philosopher of technology or of as current coin would have it.
First, there is some degree to which the philosopher of technology must ≪ go native ≫, by this I mean become more than a distant observer, to become an informed . Without this participant-observation, the philosopher could never deal with the developmental phases of technologies, which I have argued are as, if not more, important than the response phases which deal with already extant technologies and their effects.
Second, a praxis orientation is necessarily more ‘pragmatic’ and area or regionally focused than a high altitude and general theory might be. I see nothing wrong with focused specialization directed towards the various areas of the technologies of the times.
Third, as indicated above, a classical role for philosophers of technology remains conceptual in the sense of re-conceiving or redescribing phenomena. In this sense one positive feature arising from postmodern sensibility is the appreciation for alternative frameworks and the ≪ fusing of horizons ≫ in a Gadamerian fashion.
Finally, philosophy of technology is necessarily concretist or ‘ materially ’ oriented insofar as the technologies operate materially at whatever level. Such material operations display patterned, structured, and while multistable, sets of possibilities. It is this structure that philosophers may examine and analyse.
All of this characterizes a certain style of philosophical approach which is beginning to show itself in the new sub-field of the philosophies of technology.
Pp. 533-541