Catálogo de publicaciones - libros
Psychopharmacogenetics
Philip Gorwood ; Michel Hamon (eds.)
Resumen/Descripción – provisto por la editorial
No disponible.
Palabras clave – provistas por la editorial
Psychopharmacology; Neurosciences
Disponibilidad
Institución detectada | Año de publicación | Navegá | Descargá | Solicitá |
---|---|---|---|---|
No detectada | 2006 | SpringerLink |
Información
Tipo de recurso:
libros
ISBN impreso
978-0-387-30793-0
ISBN electrónico
978-0-387-34577-2
Editor responsable
Springer Nature
País de edición
Reino Unido
Fecha de publicación
2006
Información sobre derechos de publicación
© Springer 2006
Cobertura temática
Tabla de contenidos
Introduction on psychopharmacogenetics
Philip Gorwood; Elizabeth Foot
I have elsewhere argued that contemporary philosophy of technology has arisen and grown out of the ‘ praxis ’ traditions, particularly those of a concretist orientation, and thus stand in contrast to the earlier, dominant strands of a theoretically biased philosophy of science. And, even if much contemporary philosophy of science has been late to arrive at such praxis phenomena as experiment, instrumentation and technologization, in science, it, too, has begun to take a similar direction. This has some implication for the role of the philosopher of technology or of as current coin would have it.
First, there is some degree to which the philosopher of technology must ≪ go native ≫, by this I mean become more than a distant observer, to become an informed . Without this participant-observation, the philosopher could never deal with the developmental phases of technologies, which I have argued are as, if not more, important than the response phases which deal with already extant technologies and their effects.
Second, a praxis orientation is necessarily more ‘pragmatic’ and area or regionally focused than a high altitude and general theory might be. I see nothing wrong with focused specialization directed towards the various areas of the technologies of the times.
Third, as indicated above, a classical role for philosophers of technology remains conceptual in the sense of re-conceiving or redescribing phenomena. In this sense one positive feature arising from postmodern sensibility is the appreciation for alternative frameworks and the ≪ fusing of horizons ≫ in a Gadamerian fashion.
Finally, philosophy of technology is necessarily concretist or ‘ materially ’ oriented insofar as the technologies operate materially at whatever level. Such material operations display patterned, structured, and while multistable, sets of possibilities. It is this structure that philosophers may examine and analyse.
All of this characterizes a certain style of philosophical approach which is beginning to show itself in the new sub-field of the philosophies of technology.
Pp. 1-24
Genetics of anxiety and related disorders: implications for pharmacogenetics
Klaus-Peter Lesch
I have elsewhere argued that contemporary philosophy of technology has arisen and grown out of the ‘ praxis ’ traditions, particularly those of a concretist orientation, and thus stand in contrast to the earlier, dominant strands of a theoretically biased philosophy of science. And, even if much contemporary philosophy of science has been late to arrive at such praxis phenomena as experiment, instrumentation and technologization, in science, it, too, has begun to take a similar direction. This has some implication for the role of the philosopher of technology or of as current coin would have it.
First, there is some degree to which the philosopher of technology must ≪ go native ≫, by this I mean become more than a distant observer, to become an informed . Without this participant-observation, the philosopher could never deal with the developmental phases of technologies, which I have argued are as, if not more, important than the response phases which deal with already extant technologies and their effects.
Second, a praxis orientation is necessarily more ‘pragmatic’ and area or regionally focused than a high altitude and general theory might be. I see nothing wrong with focused specialization directed towards the various areas of the technologies of the times.
Third, as indicated above, a classical role for philosophers of technology remains conceptual in the sense of re-conceiving or redescribing phenomena. In this sense one positive feature arising from postmodern sensibility is the appreciation for alternative frameworks and the ≪ fusing of horizons ≫ in a Gadamerian fashion.
Finally, philosophy of technology is necessarily concretist or ‘ materially ’ oriented insofar as the technologies operate materially at whatever level. Such material operations display patterned, structured, and while multistable, sets of possibilities. It is this structure that philosophers may examine and analyse.
All of this characterizes a certain style of philosophical approach which is beginning to show itself in the new sub-field of the philosophies of technology.
Pp. 25-43
Major depressive disorders: depressive disorders
Alessandro Serretti; Paola Artioli
I have elsewhere argued that contemporary philosophy of technology has arisen and grown out of the ‘ praxis ’ traditions, particularly those of a concretist orientation, and thus stand in contrast to the earlier, dominant strands of a theoretically biased philosophy of science. And, even if much contemporary philosophy of science has been late to arrive at such praxis phenomena as experiment, instrumentation and technologization, in science, it, too, has begun to take a similar direction. This has some implication for the role of the philosopher of technology or of as current coin would have it.
First, there is some degree to which the philosopher of technology must ≪ go native ≫, by this I mean become more than a distant observer, to become an informed . Without this participant-observation, the philosopher could never deal with the developmental phases of technologies, which I have argued are as, if not more, important than the response phases which deal with already extant technologies and their effects.
Second, a praxis orientation is necessarily more ‘pragmatic’ and area or regionally focused than a high altitude and general theory might be. I see nothing wrong with focused specialization directed towards the various areas of the technologies of the times.
Third, as indicated above, a classical role for philosophers of technology remains conceptual in the sense of re-conceiving or redescribing phenomena. In this sense one positive feature arising from postmodern sensibility is the appreciation for alternative frameworks and the ≪ fusing of horizons ≫ in a Gadamerian fashion.
Finally, philosophy of technology is necessarily concretist or ‘ materially ’ oriented insofar as the technologies operate materially at whatever level. Such material operations display patterned, structured, and while multistable, sets of possibilities. It is this structure that philosophers may examine and analyse.
All of this characterizes a certain style of philosophical approach which is beginning to show itself in the new sub-field of the philosophies of technology.
Pp. 45-73
Pharmacogenetics of bipolar disorders
Pierre Oswald; Daniel Souery; Julien Mendlewicz
I have elsewhere argued that contemporary philosophy of technology has arisen and grown out of the ‘ praxis ’ traditions, particularly those of a concretist orientation, and thus stand in contrast to the earlier, dominant strands of a theoretically biased philosophy of science. And, even if much contemporary philosophy of science has been late to arrive at such praxis phenomena as experiment, instrumentation and technologization, in science, it, too, has begun to take a similar direction. This has some implication for the role of the philosopher of technology or of as current coin would have it.
First, there is some degree to which the philosopher of technology must ≪ go native ≫, by this I mean become more than a distant observer, to become an informed . Without this participant-observation, the philosopher could never deal with the developmental phases of technologies, which I have argued are as, if not more, important than the response phases which deal with already extant technologies and their effects.
Second, a praxis orientation is necessarily more ‘pragmatic’ and area or regionally focused than a high altitude and general theory might be. I see nothing wrong with focused specialization directed towards the various areas of the technologies of the times.
Third, as indicated above, a classical role for philosophers of technology remains conceptual in the sense of re-conceiving or redescribing phenomena. In this sense one positive feature arising from postmodern sensibility is the appreciation for alternative frameworks and the ≪ fusing of horizons ≫ in a Gadamerian fashion.
Finally, philosophy of technology is necessarily concretist or ‘ materially ’ oriented insofar as the technologies operate materially at whatever level. Such material operations display patterned, structured, and while multistable, sets of possibilities. It is this structure that philosophers may examine and analyse.
All of this characterizes a certain style of philosophical approach which is beginning to show itself in the new sub-field of the philosophies of technology.
Pp. 75-100
Psychopharmacogenetics of schizophrenia and psychosis
Joachim Scharfetter
I have elsewhere argued that contemporary philosophy of technology has arisen and grown out of the ‘ praxis ’ traditions, particularly those of a concretist orientation, and thus stand in contrast to the earlier, dominant strands of a theoretically biased philosophy of science. And, even if much contemporary philosophy of science has been late to arrive at such praxis phenomena as experiment, instrumentation and technologization, in science, it, too, has begun to take a similar direction. This has some implication for the role of the philosopher of technology or of as current coin would have it.
First, there is some degree to which the philosopher of technology must ≪ go native ≫, by this I mean become more than a distant observer, to become an informed . Without this participant-observation, the philosopher could never deal with the developmental phases of technologies, which I have argued are as, if not more, important than the response phases which deal with already extant technologies and their effects.
Second, a praxis orientation is necessarily more ‘pragmatic’ and area or regionally focused than a high altitude and general theory might be. I see nothing wrong with focused specialization directed towards the various areas of the technologies of the times.
Third, as indicated above, a classical role for philosophers of technology remains conceptual in the sense of re-conceiving or redescribing phenomena. In this sense one positive feature arising from postmodern sensibility is the appreciation for alternative frameworks and the ≪ fusing of horizons ≫ in a Gadamerian fashion.
Finally, philosophy of technology is necessarily concretist or ‘ materially ’ oriented insofar as the technologies operate materially at whatever level. Such material operations display patterned, structured, and while multistable, sets of possibilities. It is this structure that philosophers may examine and analyse.
All of this characterizes a certain style of philosophical approach which is beginning to show itself in the new sub-field of the philosophies of technology.
Pp. 101-148
Alzheimer's disease and other dementias
Lucie Maréchal; Isabelle Le Ber; Didier Hannequin; Dominique Campion; Alexis Brice
I have elsewhere argued that contemporary philosophy of technology has arisen and grown out of the ‘ praxis ’ traditions, particularly those of a concretist orientation, and thus stand in contrast to the earlier, dominant strands of a theoretically biased philosophy of science. And, even if much contemporary philosophy of science has been late to arrive at such praxis phenomena as experiment, instrumentation and technologization, in science, it, too, has begun to take a similar direction. This has some implication for the role of the philosopher of technology or of as current coin would have it.
First, there is some degree to which the philosopher of technology must ≪ go native ≫, by this I mean become more than a distant observer, to become an informed . Without this participant-observation, the philosopher could never deal with the developmental phases of technologies, which I have argued are as, if not more, important than the response phases which deal with already extant technologies and their effects.
Second, a praxis orientation is necessarily more ‘pragmatic’ and area or regionally focused than a high altitude and general theory might be. I see nothing wrong with focused specialization directed towards the various areas of the technologies of the times.
Third, as indicated above, a classical role for philosophers of technology remains conceptual in the sense of re-conceiving or redescribing phenomena. In this sense one positive feature arising from postmodern sensibility is the appreciation for alternative frameworks and the ≪ fusing of horizons ≫ in a Gadamerian fashion.
Finally, philosophy of technology is necessarily concretist or ‘ materially ’ oriented insofar as the technologies operate materially at whatever level. Such material operations display patterned, structured, and while multistable, sets of possibilities. It is this structure that philosophers may examine and analyse.
All of this characterizes a certain style of philosophical approach which is beginning to show itself in the new sub-field of the philosophies of technology.
Pp. 149-176
Pharmacogenetics of alcohol-dependence
Philip Gorwood; Gunter Schumann; Jens Treutlein; Jean Adès
I have elsewhere argued that contemporary philosophy of technology has arisen and grown out of the ‘ praxis ’ traditions, particularly those of a concretist orientation, and thus stand in contrast to the earlier, dominant strands of a theoretically biased philosophy of science. And, even if much contemporary philosophy of science has been late to arrive at such praxis phenomena as experiment, instrumentation and technologization, in science, it, too, has begun to take a similar direction. This has some implication for the role of the philosopher of technology or of as current coin would have it.
First, there is some degree to which the philosopher of technology must ≪ go native ≫, by this I mean become more than a distant observer, to become an informed . Without this participant-observation, the philosopher could never deal with the developmental phases of technologies, which I have argued are as, if not more, important than the response phases which deal with already extant technologies and their effects.
Second, a praxis orientation is necessarily more ‘pragmatic’ and area or regionally focused than a high altitude and general theory might be. I see nothing wrong with focused specialization directed towards the various areas of the technologies of the times.
Third, as indicated above, a classical role for philosophers of technology remains conceptual in the sense of re-conceiving or redescribing phenomena. In this sense one positive feature arising from postmodern sensibility is the appreciation for alternative frameworks and the ≪ fusing of horizons ≫ in a Gadamerian fashion.
Finally, philosophy of technology is necessarily concretist or ‘ materially ’ oriented insofar as the technologies operate materially at whatever level. Such material operations display patterned, structured, and while multistable, sets of possibilities. It is this structure that philosophers may examine and analyse.
All of this characterizes a certain style of philosophical approach which is beginning to show itself in the new sub-field of the philosophies of technology.
Pp. 177-201
Eating disorders and obesity
Mariken de Krom; Annemarie van Elburg; Pierre M. Zelissen; Roger A. H. Adan
I have elsewhere argued that contemporary philosophy of technology has arisen and grown out of the ‘ praxis ’ traditions, particularly those of a concretist orientation, and thus stand in contrast to the earlier, dominant strands of a theoretically biased philosophy of science. And, even if much contemporary philosophy of science has been late to arrive at such praxis phenomena as experiment, instrumentation and technologization, in science, it, too, has begun to take a similar direction. This has some implication for the role of the philosopher of technology or of as current coin would have it.
First, there is some degree to which the philosopher of technology must ≪ go native ≫, by this I mean become more than a distant observer, to become an informed . Without this participant-observation, the philosopher could never deal with the developmental phases of technologies, which I have argued are as, if not more, important than the response phases which deal with already extant technologies and their effects.
Second, a praxis orientation is necessarily more ‘pragmatic’ and area or regionally focused than a high altitude and general theory might be. I see nothing wrong with focused specialization directed towards the various areas of the technologies of the times.
Third, as indicated above, a classical role for philosophers of technology remains conceptual in the sense of re-conceiving or redescribing phenomena. In this sense one positive feature arising from postmodern sensibility is the appreciation for alternative frameworks and the ≪ fusing of horizons ≫ in a Gadamerian fashion.
Finally, philosophy of technology is necessarily concretist or ‘ materially ’ oriented insofar as the technologies operate materially at whatever level. Such material operations display patterned, structured, and while multistable, sets of possibilities. It is this structure that philosophers may examine and analyse.
All of this characterizes a certain style of philosophical approach which is beginning to show itself in the new sub-field of the philosophies of technology.
Pp. 203-230
Neuropsychopharmacogenetics: 'stimulating' rationale therapy in attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD): pharmacogenetics of psychostimulants in ADHD
Mario Masellis; Vincenzo S. Basile; James L. Kennedy
I have elsewhere argued that contemporary philosophy of technology has arisen and grown out of the ‘ praxis ’ traditions, particularly those of a concretist orientation, and thus stand in contrast to the earlier, dominant strands of a theoretically biased philosophy of science. And, even if much contemporary philosophy of science has been late to arrive at such praxis phenomena as experiment, instrumentation and technologization, in science, it, too, has begun to take a similar direction. This has some implication for the role of the philosopher of technology or of as current coin would have it.
First, there is some degree to which the philosopher of technology must ≪ go native ≫, by this I mean become more than a distant observer, to become an informed . Without this participant-observation, the philosopher could never deal with the developmental phases of technologies, which I have argued are as, if not more, important than the response phases which deal with already extant technologies and their effects.
Second, a praxis orientation is necessarily more ‘pragmatic’ and area or regionally focused than a high altitude and general theory might be. I see nothing wrong with focused specialization directed towards the various areas of the technologies of the times.
Third, as indicated above, a classical role for philosophers of technology remains conceptual in the sense of re-conceiving or redescribing phenomena. In this sense one positive feature arising from postmodern sensibility is the appreciation for alternative frameworks and the ≪ fusing of horizons ≫ in a Gadamerian fashion.
Finally, philosophy of technology is necessarily concretist or ‘ materially ’ oriented insofar as the technologies operate materially at whatever level. Such material operations display patterned, structured, and while multistable, sets of possibilities. It is this structure that philosophers may examine and analyse.
All of this characterizes a certain style of philosophical approach which is beginning to show itself in the new sub-field of the philosophies of technology.
Pp. 231-248
Autism and autistics disorders
Stéphane Jamain; Marion Leboyer
I have elsewhere argued that contemporary philosophy of technology has arisen and grown out of the ‘ praxis ’ traditions, particularly those of a concretist orientation, and thus stand in contrast to the earlier, dominant strands of a theoretically biased philosophy of science. And, even if much contemporary philosophy of science has been late to arrive at such praxis phenomena as experiment, instrumentation and technologization, in science, it, too, has begun to take a similar direction. This has some implication for the role of the philosopher of technology or of as current coin would have it.
First, there is some degree to which the philosopher of technology must ≪ go native ≫, by this I mean become more than a distant observer, to become an informed . Without this participant-observation, the philosopher could never deal with the developmental phases of technologies, which I have argued are as, if not more, important than the response phases which deal with already extant technologies and their effects.
Second, a praxis orientation is necessarily more ‘pragmatic’ and area or regionally focused than a high altitude and general theory might be. I see nothing wrong with focused specialization directed towards the various areas of the technologies of the times.
Third, as indicated above, a classical role for philosophers of technology remains conceptual in the sense of re-conceiving or redescribing phenomena. In this sense one positive feature arising from postmodern sensibility is the appreciation for alternative frameworks and the ≪ fusing of horizons ≫ in a Gadamerian fashion.
Finally, philosophy of technology is necessarily concretist or ‘ materially ’ oriented insofar as the technologies operate materially at whatever level. Such material operations display patterned, structured, and while multistable, sets of possibilities. It is this structure that philosophers may examine and analyse.
All of this characterizes a certain style of philosophical approach which is beginning to show itself in the new sub-field of the philosophies of technology.
Pp. 249-263