Catálogo de publicaciones - libros
The Agulhas Current
Johann R. E. Lutjeharms
Resumen/Descripción – provisto por la editorial
No disponible.
Palabras clave – provistas por la editorial
Oceanography; Ecotoxicology; Geophysics/Geodesy; Atmospheric Sciences
Disponibilidad
| Institución detectada | Año de publicación | Navegá | Descargá | Solicitá |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| No detectada | 2006 | SpringerLink |
Información
Tipo de recurso:
libros
ISBN impreso
978-3-540-42392-8
ISBN electrónico
978-3-540-37212-7
Editor responsable
Springer Nature
País de edición
Reino Unido
Fecha de publicación
2006
Información sobre derechos de publicación
© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2006
Cobertura temática
Tabla de contenidos
Introduction
Johann R. E. Lutjeharms
We study the conditions for the emergence of cooperation in a spatial common-pool resource (CPR) game.We consider three types of agents: cooperators, defectors and enforcers. The role of enforcers is to punish defectors for overharvesting the resource. Agents are located on a circle and they only observe the actions of their two nearest neighbors. Their payoffs are determined by both local and global interactions and they modify their actions by imitating the strategy in their neighborhood with the highest payoffs on average. Using theoretical and numerical analysis, we find a large diversity of equilibria to be the outcome of the game. In particular, we find conditions for the occurrence of equilibria in which the three strategies coexist.We also derive the stability of these equilibria. Finally, we show that introducing resource dynamics in the system favors the occurrence of cooperative equilibria. Key words: common property, cooperation, evolutionary game theory, local and global interaction game, self-organization
Pp. 1-16
Large-scale circulation of the South West Indian Ocean
Johann R. E. Lutjeharms
We study the conditions for the emergence of cooperation in a spatial common-pool resource (CPR) game.We consider three types of agents: cooperators, defectors and enforcers. The role of enforcers is to punish defectors for overharvesting the resource. Agents are located on a circle and they only observe the actions of their two nearest neighbors. Their payoffs are determined by both local and global interactions and they modify their actions by imitating the strategy in their neighborhood with the highest payoffs on average. Using theoretical and numerical analysis, we find a large diversity of equilibria to be the outcome of the game. In particular, we find conditions for the occurrence of equilibria in which the three strategies coexist.We also derive the stability of these equilibria. Finally, we show that introducing resource dynamics in the system favors the occurrence of cooperative equilibria. Key words: common property, cooperation, evolutionary game theory, local and global interaction game, self-organization
Pp. 17-51
Sources of the Agulhas Current
Johann R. E. Lutjeharms
We study the conditions for the emergence of cooperation in a spatial common-pool resource (CPR) game.We consider three types of agents: cooperators, defectors and enforcers. The role of enforcers is to punish defectors for overharvesting the resource. Agents are located on a circle and they only observe the actions of their two nearest neighbors. Their payoffs are determined by both local and global interactions and they modify their actions by imitating the strategy in their neighborhood with the highest payoffs on average. Using theoretical and numerical analysis, we find a large diversity of equilibria to be the outcome of the game. In particular, we find conditions for the occurrence of equilibria in which the three strategies coexist.We also derive the stability of these equilibria. Finally, we show that introducing resource dynamics in the system favors the occurrence of cooperative equilibria. Key words: common property, cooperation, evolutionary game theory, local and global interaction game, self-organization
Pp. 53-90
The northern Agulhas Current
Johann R. E. Lutjeharms
We study the conditions for the emergence of cooperation in a spatial common-pool resource (CPR) game.We consider three types of agents: cooperators, defectors and enforcers. The role of enforcers is to punish defectors for overharvesting the resource. Agents are located on a circle and they only observe the actions of their two nearest neighbors. Their payoffs are determined by both local and global interactions and they modify their actions by imitating the strategy in their neighborhood with the highest payoffs on average. Using theoretical and numerical analysis, we find a large diversity of equilibria to be the outcome of the game. In particular, we find conditions for the occurrence of equilibria in which the three strategies coexist.We also derive the stability of these equilibria. Finally, we show that introducing resource dynamics in the system favors the occurrence of cooperative equilibria. Key words: common property, cooperation, evolutionary game theory, local and global interaction game, self-organization
Pp. 91-120
The southern Agulhas Current
Johann R. E. Lutjeharms
We study the conditions for the emergence of cooperation in a spatial common-pool resource (CPR) game.We consider three types of agents: cooperators, defectors and enforcers. The role of enforcers is to punish defectors for overharvesting the resource. Agents are located on a circle and they only observe the actions of their two nearest neighbors. Their payoffs are determined by both local and global interactions and they modify their actions by imitating the strategy in their neighborhood with the highest payoffs on average. Using theoretical and numerical analysis, we find a large diversity of equilibria to be the outcome of the game. In particular, we find conditions for the occurrence of equilibria in which the three strategies coexist.We also derive the stability of these equilibria. Finally, we show that introducing resource dynamics in the system favors the occurrence of cooperative equilibria. Key words: common property, cooperation, evolutionary game theory, local and global interaction game, self-organization
Pp. 121-150
The Agulhas Current retroflection
Johann R. E. Lutjeharms
We study the conditions for the emergence of cooperation in a spatial common-pool resource (CPR) game.We consider three types of agents: cooperators, defectors and enforcers. The role of enforcers is to punish defectors for overharvesting the resource. Agents are located on a circle and they only observe the actions of their two nearest neighbors. Their payoffs are determined by both local and global interactions and they modify their actions by imitating the strategy in their neighborhood with the highest payoffs on average. Using theoretical and numerical analysis, we find a large diversity of equilibria to be the outcome of the game. In particular, we find conditions for the occurrence of equilibria in which the three strategies coexist.We also derive the stability of these equilibria. Finally, we show that introducing resource dynamics in the system favors the occurrence of cooperative equilibria. Key words: common property, cooperation, evolutionary game theory, local and global interaction game, self-organization
Pp. 151-207
The Agulhas return flow
Johann R. E. Lutjeharms
We study the conditions for the emergence of cooperation in a spatial common-pool resource (CPR) game.We consider three types of agents: cooperators, defectors and enforcers. The role of enforcers is to punish defectors for overharvesting the resource. Agents are located on a circle and they only observe the actions of their two nearest neighbors. Their payoffs are determined by both local and global interactions and they modify their actions by imitating the strategy in their neighborhood with the highest payoffs on average. Using theoretical and numerical analysis, we find a large diversity of equilibria to be the outcome of the game. In particular, we find conditions for the occurrence of equilibria in which the three strategies coexist.We also derive the stability of these equilibria. Finally, we show that introducing resource dynamics in the system favors the occurrence of cooperative equilibria. Key words: common property, cooperation, evolutionary game theory, local and global interaction game, self-organization
Pp. 209-231
The greater Agulhas Current: some reflections
Johann R. E. Lutjeharms
We study the conditions for the emergence of cooperation in a spatial common-pool resource (CPR) game.We consider three types of agents: cooperators, defectors and enforcers. The role of enforcers is to punish defectors for overharvesting the resource. Agents are located on a circle and they only observe the actions of their two nearest neighbors. Their payoffs are determined by both local and global interactions and they modify their actions by imitating the strategy in their neighborhood with the highest payoffs on average. Using theoretical and numerical analysis, we find a large diversity of equilibria to be the outcome of the game. In particular, we find conditions for the occurrence of equilibria in which the three strategies coexist.We also derive the stability of these equilibria. Finally, we show that introducing resource dynamics in the system favors the occurrence of cooperative equilibria. Key words: common property, cooperation, evolutionary game theory, local and global interaction game, self-organization
Pp. 233-238