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In this chapter we shall apply our model of practical reasoning to the analysis of legal thinking and decision-making. In particular, we shall attempt to map the notion of , in the sense of , into the idea of , or cognitive bindingness that we have introduced in Section 3.1.1 on page 88. This will be a significant test for the soundness of the approach we have developed, given the ubiquity of the idea of validity and the central role it plays, not only in legal theory, but also in legal practice.

Let us summarise the results we have obtained in Chapter 12. First, we have stated the idea that the word , when applied to an instruction or to a normative propositions, often means : It expresses the idea of adoptionworthiness or bindingness, by which we mean the cognitive necessity to endorse that normative proposition. Such necessity is relative to the context and the purpose of the reasoning process in which the normative proposition is to be used. When collective adoption is at issue, the idea of adoption-worthiness is specified into the idea of in a shared norm or value.

The relation between law and logic has been governed, as many of the most intense relationships are, by both a strong attraction and persistent strife. Let us consider first the reciprocal attraction between the two disciplines, then the reasons for their strife, and finally a way to find a possible accommodation.

Under the heading “classical logic and the law,” we shall consider the application to the law of the fundamental core of logic, namely . This is the most well-known and widely-used logical formalism. It has represented for more than a century the gravity centre of logic. Though various alternatives and innumerable extensions to classical logic have been proposed, none has yet succeeded in questioning its domination. Thus, it is no surprise that many attempts to apply formal methods to the law have been centred upon using first-order classical logic.

Now that we possess the basic toolkit for logical analysis, namely, first-order classical logic, we can move forward, and approach the logical notions that are specific to practical reasoning. The notion of an will provide our starting point, since legal reasoning (as practical reasoning in general) is concerned with governing action.

In this chapter we shall focus on the basic building blocks of normative knowledge: obligations, prohibitions and permissions. Being obligatory, being forbidden and being permitted are indeed the three fundamental of an action, upon which we shall build more articulate normative concepts.

In this chapter we shall address an important and still very controversial issue of deontic logic: the . In particular, we need to understand the connection between the negation of the forbiddenness of action (which we express as NON ) and the permission of (which we express as ).

The basic deontic qualification—obligatory, forbidden, permitted and facultative—need to be integrated with further components to capture the fundamental normative notions of legal language, such as, in particular, the notion of a right.

In Section 15.2.1 on page 418 we have seen that material conditionals, as provided by classical propositional logic, are inappropriate, under various regards, to express conditional normative propositions. Here, we shall provide an alternative formalisation, which hopefully will help us in understanding the logical structure of normative conditionals and their function in legal reasoning.

In this chapter we shall analyse different kinds of normative conditionals, which will enable us to address some issues concerning legal language and the structures of legal knowledge.