Catálogo de publicaciones - libros

In a dynamic coalition environment, it is essential to allow automatic sharing of resources among coalition members. The challenge is to facilitate such sharing while adhering to the security policies of each coalition. To accomplish this, a (DCBAC) has been proposed earlier, where security policies enforced by each coalition member are published in a centralized (CSR). In this paper, we propose a (DCSR) system. In the DCSR system, several service registry agents cooperate to provide controlled access to resources. Distribution of the registries results in improved availability, higher concurrency, better response times to user queries, and enhanced flexibility. We employ secure group multicasting to communicate among the DCSR agents. The paper outlines the DCSR system, the supported functionalities and its underlying infrastructure.

While it is difficult to apply conventional security services to a system without a central authority, trust management offers a solution for information assurance in such a system. In this paper, we have developed a policy-oriented decision model based on object trust management to assist users in selecting reliable and secure information in an open system. In the proposed model, an object represents a topic or issue under discussion, and it may have multiple versions, each of which represents a subject’s opinion towards the characteristics of that object. The developed trust-based decision model assists a user to select one object version with desired level of quality and security features from available versions of a given object. The model balances both positive and negative aspects of an object version, and an evaluator can explicitly specify, in form of a policy specification, which features of an object version are not acceptable and which features are favorable. A high-level policy language, called , expresses the policy specification in an unambiguous way. consists of primary and residual policy statements. It supports recursive function calls, and the invoked external functions are defined separately from the language itself. The proposed decision model doesn’t guarantee to select the “best” version for a given object. Rather it ensures that the selected version meets a user’s requirement for information integrity.

The emerging world of large, loosely coupled information systems requires major changes to the way we approach security research. For many years, we have proposed construct after construct to enhance the power and scope of policy languages. Unfortunately, this focus has led to models whose complexity is unmanageable, to reinventing technologies that other subdisciplines have done better, and to assumptions that large enterprises simply do not satisfy. We argue that it is time to emphasize a different challenge: radical scale-up. To achieve this, it will be crucial to emphasize simplicity, integration with (non-security) enterprise knowledge, and modularity for both models and administration. This position paper will illustrate the problems, and describe possible ways to achieve the desired capabilities.

The information infrastructure, consisting of the Internet and numerous intranets, extranets, and other networks, is a key national critical infrastructure, interwoven with other critical infrastructures. Protecting the information infrastructure is important in its own right, and also because of the steadily increasing interdependence of other critical infrastructures on the information infrastructure. This paper describes an approach to information infrastructure protection that was developed as part of the semantic hacking project. Attacks on computer and other networked systems can be categorized as physical, syntactic and semantic. Autonomous agents being fed misinformation in the battlespace is a primary example of a semantic attack. Physical attacks seek to destroy hardware, while syntactic attacks, such as worms and viruses target the network infrastructure. Attacks specifically against a human user of system are also referred to as cognitive attacks. Because misinformation and deception play a much more significant role in intelligence and security informatics than in other informatics disciplines, such as science, medicine, and the law, such an emerging discipline must concern itself with semantic attacks and countermeasures.