Catálogo de publicaciones - revistas

<jats:title>Abstract</jats:title><jats:p>Both the commonsensical and the philosophical understanding of curiosity as the desire to know display similar ambiguities. In philosophy, such ambiguities have further repercussions, inasmuch as inquiries into curiosity, in addition to being a field of philosophical research in itself, also have meta-theoretical implications concerning the idea of philosophy one embraces. This holds true for Edmund Husserl’s discussion of curiosity: his phenomenological analysis of curiosity as an object of inquiry is crucially connected with a specific meta-theoretical understanding of philosophy as an exploratory endeavor. This article analyses the relevance of the phenomenological analyses of curiosity against the background of the discussion of a polarization in the appreciation of the role of curiosity for philosophy and of the tasks Husserl assigns to philosophy. It focuses on how Husserl’s appraisal of curiosity in philosophy is tied to his concrete analyses of the intentional structure of ordinary curiosity. Crucial for this appraisal and for its meta-theoretical implications is the analysis of the relation between curiosity and the basic structure of intentionality as tendency.</jats:p>

<jats:title>Abstract</jats:title><jats:p>Persons with visual impairments (hereafter PVI) detect and discover obstacles and road conditions by touching with a white cane when walking on the streets. In one training session, an Orientation and Mobility specialist (hereafter SPT) guided a PVI by grasping and moving the cane that the PVI was holding. We conducted a multimodal analysis of two instruction sequences, one a "proving and achieving" demonstration (Sacks in Lectures on conversation, Blackwell, 1992) and the other a "learnable" (Zemel and Koschmann, in Discourse Stud 16:163–183, 2014) demonstration. The achieving demonstration proved the assessment of the PVI's performance. In the "learnable" demonstration, the PVI was able to receive and perform the most critical part of the "learnable" of the long contact touch without the aid of talk. Sharing a single cane touch is an efficient way for both the guiding SPT and the guided PVI to jointly experience and understand the environmental features. The SPT did not need to verbally confirm that the guided touch was accountable to the PVI and seemed confident that intersubjectivity with the PVI had been established. A unique form of being with others and achieving intersubjectivity in society was identified. In traditional learning instruction, it has been assumed that the learnable is presented and communicated visually and audibly. However, through guided touch learnable is presented and conveyed effectively in the cases of this paper. It seems that the sense of touch has been considered to be just for the occasion, but this is an example of something that is not just for the occasion but is consequential, that is, usable for further occasions. The data is in Japanese.</jats:p>

<jats:title>Abstract</jats:title><jats:p>The reassessment of intentionality as “tendency” or “drive,” already important when the intentionality at stake designates the directedness of lived experiences toward a particular object, might be even more crucial when the orientation toward others is concerned. How do drives and affects intermingle within our intersubjective life and fashion our relations to others? The present paper will address this question by focusing on a particular or even primary kind of intersubjectivity: the mother–child relationship, that received a particular, yet still insufficiently noticed attention in early phenomenology. Scheler and Husserl both analyse this relationship, indeed, in terms that imply drive intentionality as well as affective intentionality (that is, for what concerns the mother, maternal instinct and maternal love). In their view, this relation also has a crucial ethical significance, and may even be taken to be paradigmatic for ethical relationships as such. Accordingly, drive intentionality is understood as an instinctive orientation toward others, that love takes up and develops, thus providing an affective and even instinctive ground for ethical behaviour. All this imples the depart from an ethics grounded on the primacy and sufficiency of reason.</jats:p>