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Título de Acceso Abierto
A Practical Guide to TPM 2.0: Using the New Trusted Platform Module in the New Age of Security
Resumen/Descripción – provisto por la editorial
No disponible.
Palabras clave – provistas por la editorial
Computer science
Disponibilidad
Institución detectada | Año de publicación | Navegá | Descargá | Solicitá |
---|---|---|---|---|
No requiere | 2015 | Directory of Open access Books | ||
No requiere | 2015 | SpringerLink |
Información
Tipo de recurso:
libros
ISBN impreso
978-1-4302-6583-2
ISBN electrónico
978-1-4302-6584-9
Editor responsable
Springer Nature
País de edición
Reino Unido
Fecha de publicación
2015
Cobertura temática
Tabla de contenidos
NV Indexes
Will Arthur; David Challener; Kenneth Goldman
The TPM requires the use of nonvolatile memory for two general classes of data:
Pp. 137-150
Platform Configuration Registers
Will Arthur; David Challener; Kenneth Goldman
Platform Configuration Registers (PCRs) are one of the essential features of a TPM. Their prime use case is to provide a method to cryptographically record (measure) software state: both the software running on a platform and configuration data used by that software. The PCR update calculation, called an , is a one-way hash so that measurements can’t be removed. These PCRs can then be read to report their state. They can also be signed to return a more secure report, called an (or ). PCRs can also be used in an extended authorization policy to restrict the use of other objects.
Pp. 151-161
Authorizations and Sessions
Will Arthur; David Challener; Kenneth Goldman
and are among the most important concepts in TPM 2.0. Authorizations control access to entities in the TPM, providing many of the security guarantees of the TPM. are the vehicle for and maintain state between subsequent commands; additionally, configure some per-command attributes such as encryption and decryption of command and response parameters and auditing. This chapter describes sessions as they relate to authorization of actions on entities. Chapters 16 and 17 describe details of the per-command session use modifiers.
Pp. 163-216
Extended Authorization (EA) Policies
Will Arthur; David Challener; Kenneth Goldman
TPM 2.0 has unified the way that all entities controlled by the TPM may be authorized. Earlier chapters have discussed authorization data used for passwords and HMAC authorization. This chapter goes into detail about one of the most useful new forms of authorization in the TPM, starting with a description of why this feature was added to the TPM and then describing in broad brushstrokes the multifaceted approach that was taken.
Pp. 217-248
Key Management
Will Arthur; David Challener; Kenneth Goldman
There are many considerations when designing a key-management system with a TPM. If keys are going to be used for critical operations, such as encryption or identification, it’s vital that an architecture be used to provide a standard means of managing the key’s lifetime and prepare for problems if hardware breaks. Such an architecture must be able to handle key generation, key distribution, key backup, and key destruction. The design of the TPM was architected with these things in mind. This chapter describes the various options possible for these steps in a key’s life.
Pp. 249-261
Auditing TPM Commands
Will Arthur; David Challener; Kenneth Goldman
As used in the TPM, is the process of logging TPM command and response parameters that pass between the host and the TPM. The host is responsible for maintaining the log, which may be in host memory or on disk. An auditor can later use the TPM to attest to the log’s integrity (that it has not been altered) and authenticity (that it was logging TPM transactions).
Pp. 263-269
Decrypt/Encrypt Sessions
Will Arthur; David Challener; Kenneth Goldman
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Pp. 271-287
Context Management
Will Arthur; David Challener; Kenneth Goldman
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Pp. 289-299
Startup, Shutdown, and Provisioning
Will Arthur; David Challener; Kenneth Goldman
here is defined as software operations that occur each time a platform boots. The boot can be a cold boot, or it can be what in PC terms is called a or a . The TPM holds several classes of volatile state, including PCR values, loaded sessions and keys, enables, authorization and policy values, hybrid NV indexes, and clock state. Based on the type of power cycle, this volatile state must either persist or be initialized. The TPM provides two commands that, in various combinations, permit external software to manage the power-cycle requirements.
Pp. 301-309
Debugging
Will Arthur; David Challener; Kenneth Goldman
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Pp. 311-321