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This edited book is about participation in fisheries governance, which is an issue that has become fashionable during the last decade, partly because of dissatisfaction with the performance of fisheries management systems across the world; partly because of the increasing interest in the notion of ‘governance’ as a substitute for ‘government’ in a variety of policy sectors; and partly because of the growing popularity of the concept of stakeholder participation in all areas of decision-making. The purpose of this introductory chapter is to establish a theoretical framework within which the participatory mode of governance may be best understood. First, I explore the conceptual issues raised by the notion of governance. Second, I analyse and discuss the three main ways in which the notion of governance has been applied to fisheries management — the hierarchical mode; the market mode; and the participatory mode — focusing especially on the four sub-types of the participatory mode: industry self-governance; co-management; community partnership; and environmental stewardship. Third, I discuss the wider implications of the three different modes. Finally, I provide a synopsis of the chapters in the book, showing how they all focus in one way or another on the central imperative of contemporary fisheries governance — how to make greater use of participation in order to improve the quality of decision-making.

Public participation is a key ingredient of good governance, aimed at a) engaging the public, b) resolving conflicts and supporting implementation, and c) improving decision quality. It is useful to consider ways of analysing the effectiveness of public participation by reference to these three aims: the level of public satisfaction through ongoing engagement of sections of the public; the degree to which conflicts are resolved and compliance with decisions is achieved; and the extent to which public views are reflected in the outputs and outcomes of decisions. I examine the 2002 Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) reform process for insights into the European Commission’s use of public participation to achieve these aims. I note how the Commission’s public participation efforts were reinforced during this process, but I conclude that more innovative efforts could be used in future, particularly to engage new ‘publics’, and that finding a balance between the three aims within the newly formed Regional Advisory Councils will be particularly important.

The question of how the preferences of a broad range of stakeholders can be effectively brought into the process of fisheries governance is one that has yet to be resolved in the North Sea context. To date, a top-down style of fisheries governance, exemplified by the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP), has failed to meet the expectations of all those involved in North Sea fisheries — from the science community to the fishing industry and from environmentalists to politicians. Part of this failure has been attributed, by stakeholders, to three democratic deficiencies of the CFP — its centralisation, its politicisation and its externalisation — which have collectively caused the exclusion of the majority of stakeholders from the process of fisheries governance This chapter considers what prospects two models of democracy — representative (currently in operation in North Sea fisheries governance) and deliberative (unexplored in North Sea fisheries governance) — offer for successfully engaging a broad range of stakeholders. I argue that the current governance framework is characterised by both ‘thin’ (electoral) and ‘thick’ (corporatist) types of representative democracy, but that knowledge of stakeholder preferences obtained by a process of deliberative democracy offers a better way of strengthening the legitimacy and effectiveness of North Sea fisheries governance. Research conducted using iterative stakeholder engagement (ISE) — derived from the deliberative model — to develop a framework for ecosystem-based fisheries management in the North Sea is employed to support this claim.

There is a lack of confidence in the ability of the European Union (EU) to solve outstanding and urgent problems, and there is criticism of its institutions and distrust of the way power is exercised. The loss of faith is especially strong over the management of fisheries. After 30 years of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP), those fisheries are in a state of crisis. Emergency measures have been imposed following years of management failure. One of the most obvious flaws has been the failure of the Commission to involve stakeholders in shaping fisheries policy and delivering fisheries management measures. Yet people often give of their best when they are brought together to resolve problems and take decisions themselves, with experts serving as advisers and facilitators. Within the North Sea Commission Fisheries Partnership (NSCFP), fishers have recently been working together with scientists and technical experts to resolve some of the difficulties in assessing the state of the North Sea fish stocks. Soon, a new organisation — the North Sea Regional Advisory Council (NSRAC) — will be formed to take this initiative further and provide advice on fisheries management directly to the Commission. The new Council will require a significant change in working culture on the part of all those involved, and especially by the European Commission.

In May 2004 the Council of Ministers gave its final approval to the establishment of Regional Advisory Councils (RACs) to assist the Commission in developing appropriate policies for sustainable fisheries. The extent to which RACs are successful in giving fisheries policy a stronger sense of regional direction will depend on a range of factors including their structures, terms of reference, financial support, internal relations and the extent to which the Commission is willing and able to act upon their advice. Different interpretations of the role of RACs are beginning to emerge. Are they to act as technical committees dealing specifically with detailed fisheries regulation? Or should they serve as a wider point of reference for implementing the Commission’s commitment to environmental integration and an ecosystem-based approach to fisheries management under the revised Common Fisheries Policy (CFP)? The chapter concludes that RACs could prove instrumental in transforming the style of fisheries management in Europe but that the path ahead is likely to be challenging and potentially difficult.

Controversies over distribution of access rights are a distinctive feature of fisheries management. Who should be the beneficiaries and what are the relevant criteria for awarding such benefits? We find it rather surprising that principled fisheries management debates on social justice are so rare. We are equally perplexed that so little attention is paid to issues of justice within social science fisheries research. In this article we try to remedy this, first by outlining some of the arguments in the justice literature to demonstrate their relevance for fisheries governance. Second, the establishment of a particular allocative mechanism — the so-called quota ladders - in Norwegian fisheries is used as an example of how different conceptions of justice can be applied in concrete management settings. We argue that much would be gained if a principled debate among involved stakeholders occurred prior to the actual allocation process; that is if stakeholders would agree on some general rules with regard to what constitute socially just distribution of access rights. In fact, we believe that the issue of participatory decision-making through devolvement of authority and responsibility to stakeholder groups, which is now on the agenda in many countries, would be much easier to realise if a social contract for just fisheries were established at the root.

Since 1993, the prime goal of Dutch fisheries policy has been to enhance a responsible way of fishing and a sustainable exploitation of fish stocks. That is, economic and ecological interests should be balanced in a viable way so as to achieve both economic and ecological sustainability. This policy, which encouraged new forms of cooperation, was superimposed on a system of individual transferable quotas that was officially introduced in 1985. To arrive at devolution of specific management responsibilities to fishermen, they had to organise themselves in co-management groups, the so-called ’Biesheuvel groups’. Individual fishermen bring their catching rights or quotas into these groups, and these groups are responsible for establishing fishing plans to achieve a better distribution of sea days and quota transfers within a group. The state’s aim is to enhance fishermen’s responsibility and social control through self-management. This chapter will address the experiences over the past ten years with this governance system, focussing especially on the conflicting views of fishermen, biologists and state representatives regarding its efficacy. Special attention will also be devoted to the perceptions of the beam trawl fishermen concerning the benefits and pitfalls of the present governance system.

The process that led to the adoption of the latest amendment to the New England Fishery Management Council’s (NEFMC) Multispecies (groundfish) Fishery Management Plan (FMP) provides an excellent case study of the movement from primarily top-down management to a variation on adaptive co-management. The contributions of a policy entrepreneur and institutional leader to this process are noted as critical. Factors constraining the participation of fishing industry members in the development of groundfish regulations, a brief history of groundfish regulations, and the various combinations of rules offered as options by the Council are reviewed. In response to the harsh criticism and controversy over the degree to which those options would restrict fishing and be likely to devastate communities, the Council offered fishing industry members a last chance to recommend a different combination of management tools — as long as they adhered to the tools that had been discussed at public hearings. Three fishing organisations offered plans that were considered. The Council ultimately selected a plan from the Northeast Seafood Coalition, a broad-based industry group, which emphasises flexible or adaptive mechanisms and optimism for the future. This case suggests that the negotiation of power and authority is important in the context of management in a complex setting with a diverse constituency, and, equally important, communication and outreach are essential elements for change.

First established in 1888, the Sea Fisheries Committees (SFCs) of England and Wales predate the concept of modern inshore fisheries management. However, their organisational structure, function and working practices are closely aligned with principles that are now commonly advocated and associated with good governance, not least because of the extent of participation that they provide to the fishing industry in a largely co-management system. In this chapter, I provide an outline of the institutional framework within which SFCs operate; explain their structures and functions; evaluate their governance credentials and, using my first hand experience of working at a senior level within a SFC, offer a critique of the effectiveness of SFCs as an inshore fisheries co-management model.

European aquaculture governance contains elements of the three main modes of governance: 1) hierarchical; 2) market; and 3) participative. This chapter focuses on the participative mode, both because it is the dominant mode, and because it offers a better prospect for the future of the aquaculture industry than either of the other two modes. There are two distinct forms of stakeholder participation: a) self-regulation, where participation is largely confined to the industry; and b) Integrated Coastal Zone Management (ICZM), where participation is (ideally) shared by all stakeholders. In this chapter, both forms of stakeholder participation are explained and evaluated, and the conclusion is drawn that the future of European aquaculture governance lies in strengthening the element of ICZM relative to the element of self-regulation.