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A Software Process Model Handbook for Incorporating People's Capabilities
Silvia Teresita Acuña Natalia Juristo Ana María Moreno Alicia Mon
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No disponible.
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Disponibilidad
Institución detectada | Año de publicación | Navegá | Descargá | Solicitá |
---|---|---|---|---|
No detectada | 2005 | SpringerLink |
Información
Tipo de recurso:
libros
ISBN impreso
978-0-387-24432-7
ISBN electrónico
978-0-387-25489-0
Editor responsable
Springer Nature
País de edición
Reino Unido
Fecha de publicación
2005
Información sobre derechos de publicación
© Springer Science+Business Media, Inc. 2005
Cobertura temática
Tabla de contenidos
Software Process and Peopleware Basics
Silvia Teresita Acuña; Natalia Juristo; Ana María Moreno; Alicia Mon
There is a growing need for systems whose survivability in a specified use and/or attack environment can be assured with confidence. Many techniques have been proposed to validate individual components (e.g., formal methods) or a system as a whole (e.g., red teaming). However, no single technique can provide the breadth of evidence needed to validate a system with respect to high-level survivability requirements. To accomplish this, we propose an integrated validation procedure (IVP) that begins with the formulation of a specific survivability requirement R and determines whether a system is valid with respect to R. The IVP employs a top-down approach that methodically breaks the task of validation into manageable tasks, and for each task, applies techniques best suited to its accomplishment. These efforts can be largely independent, and the results, which complement and supplement each other, are integrated to provide a convincing assurance argument. We then illustrate the IVP by applying it to an intrusion-tolerant information system being developed by the U.S. Department of Defense. In addition to validating the system against high-level survivability requirements, we demonstrate the use of model-based validation techniques, as a part of the overall validation procedure, to guide the system’s design by exploring different configurations and evaluating tradeoffs.
- Software Process and Peopleware Basics | Pp. 1-23
Overview of Software Process Models and Descriptive Criteria for their Analysis
Silvia Teresita Acuña; Natalia Juristo; Ana María Moreno; Alicia Mon
There is a growing need for systems whose survivability in a specified use and/or attack environment can be assured with confidence. Many techniques have been proposed to validate individual components (e.g., formal methods) or a system as a whole (e.g., red teaming). However, no single technique can provide the breadth of evidence needed to validate a system with respect to high-level survivability requirements. To accomplish this, we propose an integrated validation procedure (IVP) that begins with the formulation of a specific survivability requirement R and determines whether a system is valid with respect to R. The IVP employs a top-down approach that methodically breaks the task of validation into manageable tasks, and for each task, applies techniques best suited to its accomplishment. These efforts can be largely independent, and the results, which complement and supplement each other, are integrated to provide a convincing assurance argument. We then illustrate the IVP by applying it to an intrusion-tolerant information system being developed by the U.S. Department of Defense. In addition to validating the system against high-level survivability requirements, we demonstrate the use of model-based validation techniques, as a part of the overall validation procedure, to guide the system’s design by exploring different configurations and evaluating tradeoffs.
Part I - Software Process Models | Pp. 27-36
Activity-Oriented Models
Silvia Teresita Acuña; Natalia Juristo; Ana María Moreno; Alicia Mon
There is a growing need for systems whose survivability in a specified use and/or attack environment can be assured with confidence. Many techniques have been proposed to validate individual components (e.g., formal methods) or a system as a whole (e.g., red teaming). However, no single technique can provide the breadth of evidence needed to validate a system with respect to high-level survivability requirements. To accomplish this, we propose an integrated validation procedure (IVP) that begins with the formulation of a specific survivability requirement R and determines whether a system is valid with respect to R. The IVP employs a top-down approach that methodically breaks the task of validation into manageable tasks, and for each task, applies techniques best suited to its accomplishment. These efforts can be largely independent, and the results, which complement and supplement each other, are integrated to provide a convincing assurance argument. We then illustrate the IVP by applying it to an intrusion-tolerant information system being developed by the U.S. Department of Defense. In addition to validating the system against high-level survivability requirements, we demonstrate the use of model-based validation techniques, as a part of the overall validation procedure, to guide the system’s design by exploring different configurations and evaluating tradeoffs.
Part I - Software Process Models | Pp. 37-91
People-Oriented Models
Silvia Teresita Acuña; Natalia Juristo; Ana María Moreno; Alicia Mon
There is a growing need for systems whose survivability in a specified use and/or attack environment can be assured with confidence. Many techniques have been proposed to validate individual components (e.g., formal methods) or a system as a whole (e.g., red teaming). However, no single technique can provide the breadth of evidence needed to validate a system with respect to high-level survivability requirements. To accomplish this, we propose an integrated validation procedure (IVP) that begins with the formulation of a specific survivability requirement R and determines whether a system is valid with respect to R. The IVP employs a top-down approach that methodically breaks the task of validation into manageable tasks, and for each task, applies techniques best suited to its accomplishment. These efforts can be largely independent, and the results, which complement and supplement each other, are integrated to provide a convincing assurance argument. We then illustrate the IVP by applying it to an intrusion-tolerant information system being developed by the U.S. Department of Defense. In addition to validating the system against high-level survivability requirements, we demonstrate the use of model-based validation techniques, as a part of the overall validation procedure, to guide the system’s design by exploring different configurations and evaluating tradeoffs.
Part I - Software Process Models | Pp. 93-127
Summary of the Overview of Software Process Models
Silvia Teresita Acuña; Natalia Juristo; Ana María Moreno; Alicia Mon
There is a growing need for systems whose survivability in a specified use and/or attack environment can be assured with confidence. Many techniques have been proposed to validate individual components (e.g., formal methods) or a system as a whole (e.g., red teaming). However, no single technique can provide the breadth of evidence needed to validate a system with respect to high-level survivability requirements. To accomplish this, we propose an integrated validation procedure (IVP) that begins with the formulation of a specific survivability requirement R and determines whether a system is valid with respect to R. The IVP employs a top-down approach that methodically breaks the task of validation into manageable tasks, and for each task, applies techniques best suited to its accomplishment. These efforts can be largely independent, and the results, which complement and supplement each other, are integrated to provide a convincing assurance argument. We then illustrate the IVP by applying it to an intrusion-tolerant information system being developed by the U.S. Department of Defense. In addition to validating the system against high-level survivability requirements, we demonstrate the use of model-based validation techniques, as a part of the overall validation procedure, to guide the system’s design by exploring different configurations and evaluating tradeoffs.
Part I - Software Process Models | Pp. 129-134
Adding Capabilities to the Software Process Model
Silvia Teresita Acuña; Natalia Juristo; Ana María Moreno; Alicia Mon
There is a growing need for systems whose survivability in a specified use and/or attack environment can be assured with confidence. Many techniques have been proposed to validate individual components (e.g., formal methods) or a system as a whole (e.g., red teaming). However, no single technique can provide the breadth of evidence needed to validate a system with respect to high-level survivability requirements. To accomplish this, we propose an integrated validation procedure (IVP) that begins with the formulation of a specific survivability requirement R and determines whether a system is valid with respect to R. The IVP employs a top-down approach that methodically breaks the task of validation into manageable tasks, and for each task, applies techniques best suited to its accomplishment. These efforts can be largely independent, and the results, which complement and supplement each other, are integrated to provide a convincing assurance argument. We then illustrate the IVP by applying it to an intrusion-tolerant information system being developed by the U.S. Department of Defense. In addition to validating the system against high-level survivability requirements, we demonstrate the use of model-based validation techniques, as a part of the overall validation procedure, to guide the system’s design by exploring different configurations and evaluating tradeoffs.
Part II - Capabilities-Oriented Software Process Model | Pp. 137-146
People Dimension
Silvia Teresita Acuña; Natalia Juristo; Ana María Moreno; Alicia Mon
There is a growing need for systems whose survivability in a specified use and/or attack environment can be assured with confidence. Many techniques have been proposed to validate individual components (e.g., formal methods) or a system as a whole (e.g., red teaming). However, no single technique can provide the breadth of evidence needed to validate a system with respect to high-level survivability requirements. To accomplish this, we propose an integrated validation procedure (IVP) that begins with the formulation of a specific survivability requirement R and determines whether a system is valid with respect to R. The IVP employs a top-down approach that methodically breaks the task of validation into manageable tasks, and for each task, applies techniques best suited to its accomplishment. These efforts can be largely independent, and the results, which complement and supplement each other, are integrated to provide a convincing assurance argument. We then illustrate the IVP by applying it to an intrusion-tolerant information system being developed by the U.S. Department of Defense. In addition to validating the system against high-level survivability requirements, we demonstrate the use of model-based validation techniques, as a part of the overall validation procedure, to guide the system’s design by exploring different configurations and evaluating tradeoffs.
Part II - Capabilities-Oriented Software Process Model | Pp. 147-165
Roles Dimension
Silvia Teresita Acuña; Natalia Juristo; Ana María Moreno; Alicia Mon
There is a growing need for systems whose survivability in a specified use and/or attack environment can be assured with confidence. Many techniques have been proposed to validate individual components (e.g., formal methods) or a system as a whole (e.g., red teaming). However, no single technique can provide the breadth of evidence needed to validate a system with respect to high-level survivability requirements. To accomplish this, we propose an integrated validation procedure (IVP) that begins with the formulation of a specific survivability requirement R and determines whether a system is valid with respect to R. The IVP employs a top-down approach that methodically breaks the task of validation into manageable tasks, and for each task, applies techniques best suited to its accomplishment. These efforts can be largely independent, and the results, which complement and supplement each other, are integrated to provide a convincing assurance argument. We then illustrate the IVP by applying it to an intrusion-tolerant information system being developed by the U.S. Department of Defense. In addition to validating the system against high-level survivability requirements, we demonstrate the use of model-based validation techniques, as a part of the overall validation procedure, to guide the system’s design by exploring different configurations and evaluating tradeoffs.
Part II - Capabilities-Oriented Software Process Model | Pp. 167-181
Production Dimension
Silvia Teresita Acuña; Natalia Juristo; Ana María Moreno; Alicia Mon
There is a growing need for systems whose survivability in a specified use and/or attack environment can be assured with confidence. Many techniques have been proposed to validate individual components (e.g., formal methods) or a system as a whole (e.g., red teaming). However, no single technique can provide the breadth of evidence needed to validate a system with respect to high-level survivability requirements. To accomplish this, we propose an integrated validation procedure (IVP) that begins with the formulation of a specific survivability requirement R and determines whether a system is valid with respect to R. The IVP employs a top-down approach that methodically breaks the task of validation into manageable tasks, and for each task, applies techniques best suited to its accomplishment. These efforts can be largely independent, and the results, which complement and supplement each other, are integrated to provide a convincing assurance argument. We then illustrate the IVP by applying it to an intrusion-tolerant information system being developed by the U.S. Department of Defense. In addition to validating the system against high-level survivability requirements, we demonstrate the use of model-based validation techniques, as a part of the overall validation procedure, to guide the system’s design by exploring different configurations and evaluating tradeoffs.
Part II - Capabilities-Oriented Software Process Model | Pp. 183-191
The Capabilities-Based Assignation Method in Action
Silvia Teresita Acuña; Natalia Juristo; Ana María Moreno; Alicia Mon
There is a growing need for systems whose survivability in a specified use and/or attack environment can be assured with confidence. Many techniques have been proposed to validate individual components (e.g., formal methods) or a system as a whole (e.g., red teaming). However, no single technique can provide the breadth of evidence needed to validate a system with respect to high-level survivability requirements. To accomplish this, we propose an integrated validation procedure (IVP) that begins with the formulation of a specific survivability requirement R and determines whether a system is valid with respect to R. The IVP employs a top-down approach that methodically breaks the task of validation into manageable tasks, and for each task, applies techniques best suited to its accomplishment. These efforts can be largely independent, and the results, which complement and supplement each other, are integrated to provide a convincing assurance argument. We then illustrate the IVP by applying it to an intrusion-tolerant information system being developed by the U.S. Department of Defense. In addition to validating the system against high-level survivability requirements, we demonstrate the use of model-based validation techniques, as a part of the overall validation procedure, to guide the system’s design by exploring different configurations and evaluating tradeoffs.
Part II - Capabilities-Oriented Software Process Model | Pp. 193-209