Catálogo de publicaciones - revistas

<jats:p>Biological species have been treated traditionally as spatiotemporally unrestricted classes. If they are to perform the function which they do in the evolutionary process, they must be spatiotemporally localized individuals, historical entities. Reinterpreting biological species as historical entities solves several important anomalies in biology, in philosophy of biology, and within philosophy itself. It also has important implications for any attempt to present an “evolutionary” analysis of science and for sciences such as anthropology which are devoted to the study of single species.</jats:p>

<jats:p>An introduction to the model-theoretic approach in the philosophy of science is given and it is argued that this program is further enhanced by the introduction of<jats:italic>partial</jats:italic>structures. It is then shown that this leads to a natural and intuitive account of both “iconic” and mathematical models and of the role of the former in science itself.</jats:p>

<jats:p>I consider the relationship between scientific practice and the philosophical debate surrounding biological individuality. I argue for the sensitivity account, on which biologists do not require a resolution to the individuality debate. This view puts me in disagreement with much of the literature on biological individuality, where it has become common to claim that there is a relationship of dependence between biologists’ conceptions of individuality and the quality of their empirical work.</jats:p>