Catálogo de publicaciones - revistas
American Journal of Political Science
Resumen/Descripción – provisto por la editorial en inglés
The American Journal of Political Science (AJPS), published four times each year, is one of the most widely-read political science journals in the United States. AJPS is a general journal of political science open to all members of the profession and to all areas of the discipline of political science.Palabras clave – provistas por la editorial
No disponibles.
Disponibilidad
Institución detectada | Período | Navegá | Descargá | Solicitá |
---|---|---|---|---|
No detectada | desde feb. 1973 / hasta oct. 2012 | JSTOR | ||
No detectada | desde ene. 2003 / hasta dic. 2023 | Wiley Online Library |
Información
Tipo de recurso:
revistas
ISSN impreso
0092-5853
ISSN electrónico
1540-5907
Editor responsable
John Wiley & Sons, Inc. (WILEY)
País de edición
Estados Unidos
Fecha de publicación
1973-2012
Cobertura temática
Tabla de contenidos
doi: 10.2307/2111399
Hannah Arendt on Judgment
Peter J. Steinberger
Palabras clave: Political Science and International Relations; Sociology and Political Science.
Pp. 803
doi: 10.1111/ajps.12112
Rethinking the Comparative Perspective on Class and Representation: Evidence from Latin America
Nicholas Carnes; Noam Lupu
Palabras clave: Political Science and International Relations; Sociology and Political Science.
Pp. 1-18
doi: 10.1111/ajps.12475
Why Underachievers Dominate Secret Police Organizations: Evidence from Autocratic Argentina
Adam Scharpf; Christian Gläßel
<jats:title>Abstract</jats:title><jats:p>Autocrats depend on a capable secret police. Anecdotal evidence, however, often characterizes agents as surprisingly mediocre in skill and intellect. To explain this puzzle, this article focuses on the career incentives underachieving individuals face in the regular security apparatus. Low‐performing officials in hierarchical organizations have little chance of being promoted or filling lucrative positions. To salvage their careers, these officials are willing to undertake burdensome secret police work. Using data on all 4,287 officers who served in autocratic Argentina (1975–83), we study biographic differences between secret police agents and the entire recruitment pool. We find that low‐achieving officers were stuck within the regime hierarchy, threatened with discharge, and thus more likely to join the secret police for future benefits. The study demonstrates how state bureaucracies breed mundane career concerns that produce willing enforcers and cement violent regimes. This has implications for the understanding of autocratic consolidation and democratic breakdown.</jats:p>
Palabras clave: Political Science and International Relations; Sociology and Political Science.
Pp. 791-806