Catálogo de publicaciones - revistas

<jats:p>As common markets, free trade associations, and limited-purpose regional arrangements continue to proliferate in many corners of the globe, the basic question of the relevance of these efforts to the process of building political communities also continues to be posed for theorist and practitioner alike. One approach for linking these two phenomena is the intensive and comparative study of common markets and free trade associations in terms of their capacity to transform member states into a political union. In principle, at least, the careful and comparative study of key variables in the process of achieving and perfecting economic unity at the regional level could yield propositions which might have predictive value for assessing the chances of success of various discrete efforts at regional unification. In methodological terms such an approach would combine case studies with the use of aggregate data.</jats:p>

<jats:p>I view international political integration as a distinctive aspect of the more inclusive process (international integration, generally) whereby larger groupings emerge or are created among nations without the use of violence. Such groupings can be said to exist at a variety of different analytical levels. At each level we can conceive of a number of nations linked to each other in certain salient ways. For example, their populations may be linked by<jats:italic>feelings</jats:italic>of mutual amity, confidence, and identification. Or their leaders may hold more or less reliable<jats:italic>expectations</jats:italic>, which may or may not be shared by the populations, that common problems will be resolved without recourse to large-scale violence. Or a grouping might be defined as an area which is characterized by intense concentrations of economic<jats:italic>exchange</jats:italic>or the free<jats:italic>circulation</jats:italic>of productive factors (labor, capital, services). In describing these phenomena we speak of social community, security community, and of economic union. Political integration can be said to occur when the linkage consists of joint participation in regularized, ongoing decisionmaking. The perspective taken here is that international political integration involves a group of nations coming to regularly make and implement binding public decisions by means of collective institutions and/or processes rather than by formally autonomous national means. Political integration implies that a number of governments begin to create and to use common resources to be committed in the pursuit of certain common objectives and that they do so by foregoing some of the factual attributes of sovereignty and decisionmaking autonomy, in contrast to more classical modes of cooperation such as alliances or international organizations.</jats:p>

<jats:p>Theories of regional integration are becoming obsolescent because three core assumptions on which these theories have been based are becoming less and less relevant to the behavior patterns actually displayed by governments active in regional organizations. These three assumptions are (1) that a definable institutional pattern must mark the outcome of the process of integration, (2) that conflicts of interests involving trade-offs between ties with regional partners and ties with nonmembers should be resolved in favor of regional partners, and (3) that decisions be made on the basis of disjointed incrementalism. The history of the European Communities since 1968 shows that most governments no longer behave in accordance with these assumptions, although they did earlier. The explanation for the new trend is to be found in awareness of the various novel kinds and dimensions of interdependence between countries, issues, and objectives, particularly with reference to policies involving those aspects of highly industrial societies which do not respond readily to the incentives of a customs union. A new decision-making rationality–labelled “fragmented issue linkage”–seems to be competing with incremental habits, suggesting that efforts are being made to cope with “turbulence” in the industrial environment so as to avoid piecemeal solutions. The effort to cope with turbulence, in turn, is unlikely to lead to any “final” set of regional institutions.</jats:p>

<jats:p>The debate between realists and liberals has reemerged as an axis of contention in international relations theory. Revolving in the past around competing theories of human nature, the debate is more concerned today with the extent to which state action is influenced by “structure” (anarchy and the distribution of power) versus “process” (interaction and learning) and institutions. Does the absence of centralized political authority force states to play competitive power politics? Can international regimes overcome this logic, and under what conditions? What in anarchy is given and immutable, and what is amenable to change?</jats:p>

<jats:p>As the world moves away from the familiar bipolar cold war era, many international relations theorists have renewed an old debate about which is more stable: a world with two great powers or a world with many great powers. Based on the chief assumptions of structural realism—namely, that the international system is characterized by anarchy and that states are unitary actors seeking to survive in this anarchic system—some security analysts are predicting that a world of several great powers will lead to a return to the shifting alliances and instabilities of the multipolar era that existed prior to World War II. For instance, John Mearsheimer argues that “prediction[s] of peace in a multipolar Europe [are] flawed.” Thomas Christensen and Jack Snyder argue that states in a multipolar world can follow either the pre-World War I or the pre-World War II alliance pattern, thus implying that a third course is improbable. They further assert that “the fundamental, invariant structural feature, international anarchy, generally selects and socializes states to form balancing alignments in order to survive in the face of threats from aggressive competitors.” The realist argument predicts that great powers in a self-help international system will balance one another through arms races and alliance formations.</jats:p>

<jats:p>Although it is widely acknowledged that economic interests influence the politics of trade policy, most research on international relations treats security issues differently. Do conflicting economic interests shape political debate over foreign policy even when security issues are highly salient? To answer this question, I test a range of hypotheses about conflicting interests in the economic stakes of U.S. foreign policy during the early Cold War era. I present evidence that economic interests in their home states were closely related to senators' voting patterns on foreign policy issues. These patterns hold across economic and security issues. I also find that political parties play an important mediating role, making senators more or less receptive to various economic interests.</jats:p>

<jats:p>In recent research on the 1934 Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act (RTAA), there has been no examination of the reaction of private actors to the RTAA. Did producer groups and investors in 1934 believe the Democratic RTAA was the solution to Republican protectionism, as institutional analyses of the RTAA claim, or did they realize the RTAA was no “magic bullet” against a return of protectionism, as skeptics argue? Archival data suggests that many producer groups believed the RTAA would result in durable liberalization, but that fewer understood the likely effects of its specific features. An event study of investor reaction to the RTAA reveals that export-dependent firms experienced a significant, positive stock return increase on news of the RTAA, while heavily tariff-protected firms experienced a significant stock decline, albeit several months later.</jats:p>