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In recent years, there has been a considerable increase in the number of states in which politically active citizens have a direct involvement in political decision-making by means of direct-democratic procedures. At the same time, the use of direct-democratic instruments has also intensified (Marxer 2004, p. 29f.). Within political science, a number of different factors are held responsible for this ‘renaissance’: in the wake of the “third wave of democratisation”, direct-democratic procedures were incorporated into the constitutions of most of the new democracies of Latin America and of those countries in central and eastern Europe which had undergone democratic reform. (Matsusaka 2004). Within the established democracies, the resurgence of direct democracy - which resulted in an extension to the arsenal of direct-democratic tools - came about not least as a response to growing criticism of the shortcomings of representative democracy, as well as to the increasing domination of political life by the political parties (Abromeit 2002). Last but not least, the process of European integration, with referendums on EU accession, on a series of treaties (Maastricht, Nice, Amsterdam), and on a common currency (the Euro), has also contributed to an increase in the number of referendums.

A great number of the new democracies which emerged after the last “wave” of the early 1990s are characterized by strong ethno-linguistic, religious or similarly strong regional cleavages (see also Huntington 1991, Linz/Stepan 1996). In part, this is due to their late formation as states and the often artificial nature of the boundaries drawn by the former colonial or imperial powers (see, e.g., Dahl 1989, Berg-Schlosser 1999). One possible institutional solution for such situations, which has been mainly propagated by Arend Lijphart (1977, 1999), is the model of a “consociational democracy”. This is based on four major elements: a grand coalition of the major ‘plural’ forces in society and the respective parties to ensure a comprehensive and balanced representation in government; a mutual veto for each group on important issues to protect basic minority rights; proportionality in sharing important public positions and resources; a high degree of autonomy of each group for its internal affairs in a federal or a similar subsidiary structure.

For a number of years now, a slow but steady trend towards more direct democracy has emerged in many countries of the world.^1 In Europe, this development was often triggered by developments at the supranational, as well as at the sub-national level. After the end of the Cold War, Europeanization and regionalization were the forces which pushed the formerly divided Europe of often highly centralized nation states into the direction of a single multi-level polity. The relatively rapid and powerful dynamics of federalization in the two decades between 1985 and 2005 thus coincided with the still sluggish trend towards more direct democracy.

In democratic theory and practice, direct democracy always marks a basic contrast to representative democracy, offering citizens greater opportunities for participation and “more democracy”. Both in theory and practice, major justifications for direct democracy are derived from deficits in representative systems and from the theoretical limitations of liberal democracy. The more general attempts at criticizing liberal-representative democracy have been provided by authors who developed theories of participatory democracy (Pateman 1970; Bachrach dt. 1970). When the debate on expanding democratic participation began in the late 1960s and early 1970s, many contributions to the theory of participatory democracy did not elaborate on direct democracy as a form of extended participation. Nevertheless, there can be no doubt that theories of participatory democracy, in which the main general normative justifications which also apply to direct democracy have been put forward, should be the natural ‘home base’ of direct democracy. It is not, however, the purpose of this paper to repeat these patterns of justifications, which are well known (summaries in Butler/Ranney 1994: 11 ff.; Schmidt 2000: 358 ff.). Neither will the literature with a primary focus on direct democracy be discussed here (overviews of the subject: Möckli 1994; Schiller 2002). I will, rather, look at more general theories of participatory democracy and ask how they deal with direct democracy. Do we find considerations of functions, institutional structures and models of direct democracy as instruments of participation? And what can be learnt about qualitative aspects and in relation to possible designs of qualified institutions of direct democracy? It will not be possible to present a full picture of these aspects, but rather some representative observations, including attempts to explain why approaches to democratic participation are surprisingly hesitant about direct democracy. One general reason may be that direct democracy is often perceived only as a mechanism for a popular decisive vote with a majoritarian character. We will examine whether, on the other hand, direct democracy is or can be also viewed in a broader perspective as an institution covering a complete decision-making process, from setting the agenda for an issue to the final referendum vote. In the paper, some basic conceptual elements of participatory democracy will first be recalled. Secondly, we will look at the principles of democracy in the version of Robert Dahl and James Fishkin. A third section will give a short account of Barber’s “strong democracy”. Section four looks into different segments of theory deriving from the concept of participatory democracy, in particular the deliberative democracy approach, leading to some conclusions about the relations and distances of such theories to direct democracy as a participatory institution.

One of the main goals of those who fought for the incorporation of direct-democratic elements in contemporary democracies was pedagogical. The leaders of the democratic movement in the Swiss cantons of the late 1860’s and the reformers of the progressive movement in the US west-coast states in the early 20th century, or those who have been engaged in the democracy initiative in the province of Southern Tyrol in the northern part of Italy during the 1990’s and in the first decade of the 21st century: their common aim in fighting for direct democracy was to educate people better, to bring more discussion and debate into public politics, to achieve decisions which derive from better-informed decision-makers. They all saw this as a contribution to a society which learned more and better in the interests of all.^1

Are the relations between citizens and politicians in a strictly representative democracy (RD, e.g. Finland) different from those in a democracy which combines representative and well-designed direct democracy (DD, e.g. Switzerland)? In which ways do the two political systems contribute to the formation of the personality structure (habitus) and of the collective ideas and images of the two groups? What influence do RD and DD have on the self-esteem and political competence, as well as on the representations of political competence, of politicians and citizens? On what kind of image of the human being are they based?

This chapter contends that the political elite plays a crucial role in the democratic process—not only in representative systems, but also in the direct- democratic process. As Schattschneider ((1960)1988) has already pointed out, the classic definition of democracy as government by the people is not adapted to modern democratic experience. It does not take into account the role of leadership and organization in the democratic process. Democracy, as defined by Schattschneider^1, is “a competitive political system in which competing leaders and organizations define the alternatives of public policy in such a way that the public can participate in the decision-making process… Conflict, competition, organization, leadership and responsibility are the ingredients of a working definition of democracy”. This definition was intended for representative democracy, but it also applies to direct-democratic processes. Direct democracy is also likely to be mediated by political organizations and their representatives. Under conditions of contemporary “party democracies”, direct-democratic procedures are likely to be guided and controlled by political parties and related political organizations. Budge proposes a kind of intermediary form of “party-based direct democracy”, where the representative institutions do not disappear but are only modified by combining them with direct-democratic elements.^2

There is considerable speculation, but not a great deal of solid knowledge, about the importance of public communication - and especially about the influence of the media - in the referendum process. This applies not only to the way the subject is dealt with in the press and by politicians, but also to the field of academic research. The deficiency affects not only political systems in which the primary decision-making process is a parliamentary-representative one, but even Switzerland, which is second to none in the world in its regular use of initiatives and referendums at the national level. Here, as elsewhere, research on referendums is primarily based on data from representative public opinion polls. However, the focus is rarely on the role of the media and public communication, and even when it is, the relevant reports are based on data about the use of the various information media, while little light is shed on the actual content of the latter (cf. Kriesi 1994). Data on the scope of political advertising has occasionally been evaluated and used as an indicator of the intensity of the campaign and of the broad spectrum of expressions of political opinion (cf. Kriesi 2005). Other studies draw retrospective conclusions from observable swings in voting behavior about the possible course of the campaign and influences on it (cf. Longchamp 2003). To date, no study has yet appeared in Switzerland which systematically links data on the structure and content of public communication (data acquired from an analysis of the content) with data from surveys on voting behavior. And it is only very recently that such a study has appeared in the international literature.^1

Fifteen years ago North (1990, [1992]) commented on the role of institutions in society as follows: “They are the underlying determinant of the long-run performance of economies. If we are ever to construct a dynamic theory of change, …, it must be built on a model of institutional change.” (p. 107). North’s assertions sparked an intense debate about the role of political and economic freedoms in the economic development of states, which reached its (interim) peak in the so-called MIT-Harvard controversy. Whereas Acemoglu et al (2005) emphasize the direct positive influence of democratic constitutions on economic performance, Glaeser et al (2004) attribute only an indirect effect to the institutional factors and see the formation of human capital as the decisive factor in the prosperity of states.

In the Netherlands, the government opposed a referendum about the European Constitution in 2005 arguing that the constitution would be too complex for the citizens to understand and to decide upon. This opinion was not shared by a majority of the Dutch Parliament, but it describes a common criticism about direct democratic decision-making. The reasoning that citizens are not informed enough to vote on substantive political issues can be seen as an understandable reaction of politicians to the widespread political alienation in the citizenry of Western democracies. It also echoes the sceptical assessment of Public Choice theorists about the rationally ignorant voter who is aware of his low probability of changing the outcome of a vote in his preferred direction and decides to abstain from the voting process altogether.