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The Economics of Casino Gambling

Douglas M. Walker

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Institución detectada Año de publicación Navegá Descargá Solicitá
No detectada 2007 SpringerLink

Información

Tipo de recurso:

libros

ISBN impreso

978-3-540-35102-3

ISBN electrónico

978-3-540-35104-7

Editor responsable

Springer Nature

País de edición

Reino Unido

Fecha de publicación

Información sobre derechos de publicación

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2007

Tabla de contenidos

Introduction

Douglas M. Walker

The recent large interest in endogenous coalition formation theory was boosted by several factors.International agreements among nations are more and more important in the globalizing economy. Examples of transnational issues range from economic cooperation, migration liberalization, technological cooperation and so on, to environmental protection. Especially studies on this last issue delivered very interesting developments in the endogenous coalition formation theory.1 The common characteristic of all these problems is that welfare of each country depends not only on its own actions but also on actions of other nations. In other words, actions of each agent induce externalities, which can (but does not have to) deliver strong incentives to cooperate. Apart from international agreements, endogenous coalition formation theory has been utilized in various other important research fields, such as R&D, creation of oligopolies, etc. Again, the common feature of all these settings are externalities from coalition formation, which make a coalitional approach relevant for players, welfare.

Pp. 1-3

Casino gambling and economic growth

Douglas M. Walker

The recent large interest in endogenous coalition formation theory was boosted by several factors.International agreements among nations are more and more important in the globalizing economy. Examples of transnational issues range from economic cooperation, migration liberalization, technological cooperation and so on, to environmental protection. Especially studies on this last issue delivered very interesting developments in the endogenous coalition formation theory.1 The common characteristic of all these problems is that welfare of each country depends not only on its own actions but also on actions of other nations. In other words, actions of each agent induce externalities, which can (but does not have to) deliver strong incentives to cooperate. Apart from international agreements, endogenous coalition formation theory has been utilized in various other important research fields, such as R&D, creation of oligopolies, etc. Again, the common feature of all these settings are externalities from coalition formation, which make a coalitional approach relevant for players, welfare.

Pp. 5-18

Misconceptions about casinos and growth

Douglas M. Walker

The recent large interest in endogenous coalition formation theory was boosted by several factors.International agreements among nations are more and more important in the globalizing economy. Examples of transnational issues range from economic cooperation, migration liberalization, technological cooperation and so on, to environmental protection. Especially studies on this last issue delivered very interesting developments in the endogenous coalition formation theory.1 The common characteristic of all these problems is that welfare of each country depends not only on its own actions but also on actions of other nations. In other words, actions of each agent induce externalities, which can (but does not have to) deliver strong incentives to cooperate. Apart from international agreements, endogenous coalition formation theory has been utilized in various other important research fields, such as R&D, creation of oligopolies, etc. Again, the common feature of all these settings are externalities from coalition formation, which make a coalitional approach relevant for players, welfare.

Pp. 19-33

Evidence on the growth effects of gambling

Douglas M. Walker

The recent large interest in endogenous coalition formation theory was boosted by several factors.International agreements among nations are more and more important in the globalizing economy. Examples of transnational issues range from economic cooperation, migration liberalization, technological cooperation and so on, to environmental protection. Especially studies on this last issue delivered very interesting developments in the endogenous coalition formation theory.1 The common characteristic of all these problems is that welfare of each country depends not only on its own actions but also on actions of other nations. In other words, actions of each agent induce externalities, which can (but does not have to) deliver strong incentives to cooperate. Apart from international agreements, endogenous coalition formation theory has been utilized in various other important research fields, such as R&D, creation of oligopolies, etc. Again, the common feature of all these settings are externalities from coalition formation, which make a coalitional approach relevant for players, welfare.

Pp. 35-57

Relationships among U.S. gambling industries

Douglas M. Walker

The recent large interest in endogenous coalition formation theory was boosted by several factors.International agreements among nations are more and more important in the globalizing economy. Examples of transnational issues range from economic cooperation, migration liberalization, technological cooperation and so on, to environmental protection. Especially studies on this last issue delivered very interesting developments in the endogenous coalition formation theory.1 The common characteristic of all these problems is that welfare of each country depends not only on its own actions but also on actions of other nations. In other words, actions of each agent induce externalities, which can (but does not have to) deliver strong incentives to cooperate. Apart from international agreements, endogenous coalition formation theory has been utilized in various other important research fields, such as R&D, creation of oligopolies, etc. Again, the common feature of all these settings are externalities from coalition formation, which make a coalitional approach relevant for players, welfare.

Pp. 59-83

The social costs of gambling

Douglas M. Walker

The recent large interest in endogenous coalition formation theory was boosted by several factors.International agreements among nations are more and more important in the globalizing economy. Examples of transnational issues range from economic cooperation, migration liberalization, technological cooperation and so on, to environmental protection. Especially studies on this last issue delivered very interesting developments in the endogenous coalition formation theory.1 The common characteristic of all these problems is that welfare of each country depends not only on its own actions but also on actions of other nations. In other words, actions of each agent induce externalities, which can (but does not have to) deliver strong incentives to cooperate. Apart from international agreements, endogenous coalition formation theory has been utilized in various other important research fields, such as R&D, creation of oligopolies, etc. Again, the common feature of all these settings are externalities from coalition formation, which make a coalitional approach relevant for players, welfare.

Pp. 85-111

Miscellaneous social cost issues

Douglas M. Walker

The recent large interest in endogenous coalition formation theory was boosted by several factors.International agreements among nations are more and more important in the globalizing economy. Examples of transnational issues range from economic cooperation, migration liberalization, technological cooperation and so on, to environmental protection. Especially studies on this last issue delivered very interesting developments in the endogenous coalition formation theory.1 The common characteristic of all these problems is that welfare of each country depends not only on its own actions but also on actions of other nations. In other words, actions of each agent induce externalities, which can (but does not have to) deliver strong incentives to cooperate. Apart from international agreements, endogenous coalition formation theory has been utilized in various other important research fields, such as R&D, creation of oligopolies, etc. Again, the common feature of all these settings are externalities from coalition formation, which make a coalitional approach relevant for players, welfare.

Pp. 113-137

Problems in gambling research

Douglas M. Walker

The recent large interest in endogenous coalition formation theory was boosted by several factors.International agreements among nations are more and more important in the globalizing economy. Examples of transnational issues range from economic cooperation, migration liberalization, technological cooperation and so on, to environmental protection. Especially studies on this last issue delivered very interesting developments in the endogenous coalition formation theory.1 The common characteristic of all these problems is that welfare of each country depends not only on its own actions but also on actions of other nations. In other words, actions of each agent induce externalities, which can (but does not have to) deliver strong incentives to cooperate. Apart from international agreements, endogenous coalition formation theory has been utilized in various other important research fields, such as R&D, creation of oligopolies, etc. Again, the common feature of all these settings are externalities from coalition formation, which make a coalitional approach relevant for players, welfare.

Pp. 139-164

Conclusion

Douglas M. Walker

The recent large interest in endogenous coalition formation theory was boosted by several factors.International agreements among nations are more and more important in the globalizing economy. Examples of transnational issues range from economic cooperation, migration liberalization, technological cooperation and so on, to environmental protection. Especially studies on this last issue delivered very interesting developments in the endogenous coalition formation theory.1 The common characteristic of all these problems is that welfare of each country depends not only on its own actions but also on actions of other nations. In other words, actions of each agent induce externalities, which can (but does not have to) deliver strong incentives to cooperate. Apart from international agreements, endogenous coalition formation theory has been utilized in various other important research fields, such as R&D, creation of oligopolies, etc. Again, the common feature of all these settings are externalities from coalition formation, which make a coalitional approach relevant for players, welfare.

Pp. 165-174