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The Economics of Casino Gambling
Douglas M. Walker
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Institución detectada | Año de publicación | Navegá | Descargá | Solicitá |
---|---|---|---|---|
No detectada | 2007 | SpringerLink |
Información
Tipo de recurso:
libros
ISBN impreso
978-3-540-35102-3
ISBN electrónico
978-3-540-35104-7
Editor responsable
Springer Nature
País de edición
Reino Unido
Fecha de publicación
2007
Información sobre derechos de publicación
© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2007
Cobertura temática
Tabla de contenidos
Introduction
Douglas M. Walker
The recent large interest in endogenous coalition formation theory was boosted by several factors.International agreements among nations are more and more important in the globalizing economy. Examples of transnational issues range from economic cooperation, migration liberalization, technological cooperation and so on, to environmental protection. Especially studies on this last issue delivered very interesting developments in the endogenous coalition formation theory.1 The common characteristic of all these problems is that welfare of each country depends not only on its own actions but also on actions of other nations. In other words, actions of each agent induce externalities, which can (but does not have to) deliver strong incentives to cooperate. Apart from international agreements, endogenous coalition formation theory has been utilized in various other important research fields, such as R&D, creation of oligopolies, etc. Again, the common feature of all these settings are externalities from coalition formation, which make a coalitional approach relevant for players, welfare.
Pp. 1-3
Casino gambling and economic growth
Douglas M. Walker
The recent large interest in endogenous coalition formation theory was boosted by several factors.International agreements among nations are more and more important in the globalizing economy. Examples of transnational issues range from economic cooperation, migration liberalization, technological cooperation and so on, to environmental protection. Especially studies on this last issue delivered very interesting developments in the endogenous coalition formation theory.1 The common characteristic of all these problems is that welfare of each country depends not only on its own actions but also on actions of other nations. In other words, actions of each agent induce externalities, which can (but does not have to) deliver strong incentives to cooperate. Apart from international agreements, endogenous coalition formation theory has been utilized in various other important research fields, such as R&D, creation of oligopolies, etc. Again, the common feature of all these settings are externalities from coalition formation, which make a coalitional approach relevant for players, welfare.
Pp. 5-18
Misconceptions about casinos and growth
Douglas M. Walker
The recent large interest in endogenous coalition formation theory was boosted by several factors.International agreements among nations are more and more important in the globalizing economy. Examples of transnational issues range from economic cooperation, migration liberalization, technological cooperation and so on, to environmental protection. Especially studies on this last issue delivered very interesting developments in the endogenous coalition formation theory.1 The common characteristic of all these problems is that welfare of each country depends not only on its own actions but also on actions of other nations. In other words, actions of each agent induce externalities, which can (but does not have to) deliver strong incentives to cooperate. Apart from international agreements, endogenous coalition formation theory has been utilized in various other important research fields, such as R&D, creation of oligopolies, etc. Again, the common feature of all these settings are externalities from coalition formation, which make a coalitional approach relevant for players, welfare.
Pp. 19-33
Evidence on the growth effects of gambling
Douglas M. Walker
The recent large interest in endogenous coalition formation theory was boosted by several factors.International agreements among nations are more and more important in the globalizing economy. Examples of transnational issues range from economic cooperation, migration liberalization, technological cooperation and so on, to environmental protection. Especially studies on this last issue delivered very interesting developments in the endogenous coalition formation theory.1 The common characteristic of all these problems is that welfare of each country depends not only on its own actions but also on actions of other nations. In other words, actions of each agent induce externalities, which can (but does not have to) deliver strong incentives to cooperate. Apart from international agreements, endogenous coalition formation theory has been utilized in various other important research fields, such as R&D, creation of oligopolies, etc. Again, the common feature of all these settings are externalities from coalition formation, which make a coalitional approach relevant for players, welfare.
Pp. 35-57
Relationships among U.S. gambling industries
Douglas M. Walker
The recent large interest in endogenous coalition formation theory was boosted by several factors.International agreements among nations are more and more important in the globalizing economy. Examples of transnational issues range from economic cooperation, migration liberalization, technological cooperation and so on, to environmental protection. Especially studies on this last issue delivered very interesting developments in the endogenous coalition formation theory.1 The common characteristic of all these problems is that welfare of each country depends not only on its own actions but also on actions of other nations. In other words, actions of each agent induce externalities, which can (but does not have to) deliver strong incentives to cooperate. Apart from international agreements, endogenous coalition formation theory has been utilized in various other important research fields, such as R&D, creation of oligopolies, etc. Again, the common feature of all these settings are externalities from coalition formation, which make a coalitional approach relevant for players, welfare.
Pp. 59-83
The social costs of gambling
Douglas M. Walker
The recent large interest in endogenous coalition formation theory was boosted by several factors.International agreements among nations are more and more important in the globalizing economy. Examples of transnational issues range from economic cooperation, migration liberalization, technological cooperation and so on, to environmental protection. Especially studies on this last issue delivered very interesting developments in the endogenous coalition formation theory.1 The common characteristic of all these problems is that welfare of each country depends not only on its own actions but also on actions of other nations. In other words, actions of each agent induce externalities, which can (but does not have to) deliver strong incentives to cooperate. Apart from international agreements, endogenous coalition formation theory has been utilized in various other important research fields, such as R&D, creation of oligopolies, etc. Again, the common feature of all these settings are externalities from coalition formation, which make a coalitional approach relevant for players, welfare.
Pp. 85-111
Miscellaneous social cost issues
Douglas M. Walker
The recent large interest in endogenous coalition formation theory was boosted by several factors.International agreements among nations are more and more important in the globalizing economy. Examples of transnational issues range from economic cooperation, migration liberalization, technological cooperation and so on, to environmental protection. Especially studies on this last issue delivered very interesting developments in the endogenous coalition formation theory.1 The common characteristic of all these problems is that welfare of each country depends not only on its own actions but also on actions of other nations. In other words, actions of each agent induce externalities, which can (but does not have to) deliver strong incentives to cooperate. Apart from international agreements, endogenous coalition formation theory has been utilized in various other important research fields, such as R&D, creation of oligopolies, etc. Again, the common feature of all these settings are externalities from coalition formation, which make a coalitional approach relevant for players, welfare.
Pp. 113-137
Problems in gambling research
Douglas M. Walker
The recent large interest in endogenous coalition formation theory was boosted by several factors.International agreements among nations are more and more important in the globalizing economy. Examples of transnational issues range from economic cooperation, migration liberalization, technological cooperation and so on, to environmental protection. Especially studies on this last issue delivered very interesting developments in the endogenous coalition formation theory.1 The common characteristic of all these problems is that welfare of each country depends not only on its own actions but also on actions of other nations. In other words, actions of each agent induce externalities, which can (but does not have to) deliver strong incentives to cooperate. Apart from international agreements, endogenous coalition formation theory has been utilized in various other important research fields, such as R&D, creation of oligopolies, etc. Again, the common feature of all these settings are externalities from coalition formation, which make a coalitional approach relevant for players, welfare.
Pp. 139-164
Conclusion
Douglas M. Walker
The recent large interest in endogenous coalition formation theory was boosted by several factors.International agreements among nations are more and more important in the globalizing economy. Examples of transnational issues range from economic cooperation, migration liberalization, technological cooperation and so on, to environmental protection. Especially studies on this last issue delivered very interesting developments in the endogenous coalition formation theory.1 The common characteristic of all these problems is that welfare of each country depends not only on its own actions but also on actions of other nations. In other words, actions of each agent induce externalities, which can (but does not have to) deliver strong incentives to cooperate. Apart from international agreements, endogenous coalition formation theory has been utilized in various other important research fields, such as R&D, creation of oligopolies, etc. Again, the common feature of all these settings are externalities from coalition formation, which make a coalitional approach relevant for players, welfare.
Pp. 165-174