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Since the analysis in this book would seem far removed from work in any of the standard disciplines, I would like, in this introduction, to suggest some linkages that might not be apparent at first glance. This not only serves the purpose of establishing ties to relevant research in different fields but also helps to embed the present work in a research tradition, somewhat in eclipse, that I think still deserves to be part of the intellectual landscape.

In this chapter I shall consider the question of whether it is rational to believe in a Superior Being (SB), who may be thought of as God, or some other religious figure, or a secular force. I shall not stress the religiosity of SB, but I shall allude to religious works, particularly the Bible, to try to ferret out and understand what the goals of SB might be in games I postulate he plays with Person (P), the human player who must decide whether or not to believe in SB’s existence. A few technical terms will be introduced in this chapter, but all will be illustrated in the games and decisions that are analyzed.

The picture presented in Chapter 2 is a bleak one, at least for the questing agnostic searching for more than straws in the wind to ward off doubt and uncertainty and justify his beliefs/expectations. If the Revelation Game accurately represents his preferences as well as SB’s (or a possible God’s), the strategy choices are clear: SB would not reveal himself; or establish his existence, and P, anticipating SB’s dominant strategy choice, would not believe in his existence. Hence, P would presumably remain an agnostic, which reverses the rationalistic faith argument Küng sets forth in : it is in fact rational, if one is playing the Revelation Game, not to believe in SB’s existence. Recall, though, that this strategy choice does not imply that it is rational for the agnostic to believe in SB’s nonexistence, a strategy choice not available to P in the Revelation Game as I interpreted it, because SB could exist without revealing himself.

In Chapter 3 I indicated how one can calculate, from players’ payoffs, probabilities that indicate thresholds at which the cooperative solution in Prisoners’ Dilemma can be rendered stable and the dilemma thereby circumvented. In the fourth Knowability Game, this resolution depended on the predictive abilities of P as well as SB, which it may be unreasonable to assume. On the other hand, in the less ethereal world of international politics, the presumption that the superpower arms race is a Prisoners’ Dilemma, and that both sides have these predictive abilities—based on their intelligence capabilities, supported by reconnaissance satellites and other detection equipment-seems quite reasonable.

The resolution of the first paradox of omniscience in Chapter 4, via the theory of moves, was thoroughly secular. It generally favored the stronger or quicker player, in a particular sense, and thus could be viewed as unfair to the other player, though he always obtained at least his security level in a game.

The moving and staying power that, as I suggested in Chapter 5, may distinguish SB from P can also be used to differentiate more powerful from less powerful actors in the secular world. There is nothing sacrosanct about these attributes, though I think that the indefatigability required of a player with M-power, and the suspension of choice required of a player with S-power, may well characterize aspects of omnipotence that a supernatural figure, who embodies the sacred and mysterious in a religion, may possess.

It is now time to summarize the copious results that game theory yields when superior beings confront ordinary beings in games (see Appendix). I wish to reiterate that these theoretical results are just that—conceptual guides for thinking about certain religious-theological-philosophical questions but not scientific findings supported by any kind of empirical evidence, even if couched in mathematical language. As I recapitulate the effects of SB’s powers in games, I shall use them as a springboard to discuss what I identified as the “central question” in the first sentence of the Preface of this book: “If there existed a superior being who possessed the supernatural qualities of omniscience, omnipotence, immortality, and incomprehensibility, how would he/she act differently from us, and would these differences be knowable?”