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The right to privacy has become one of the most fundamental rights of the individual within society, and it has been widely acknowledged—both among legal systems in liberal states and among theorists of rights—ever since 1890, when Louis Brandeis and Samuel Warren wrote their famous article “The Right to Privacy.” There, they laid down “one’s right to be let alone” as an essential part of one’s autonomy, and insisted that one’s private life, habits, acts, relations, etc. should be respected and immunized against external invasion or interference.We think of this right as having a special role in modern life and assume that, as Greg Pence puts it, “some rights of non-interference and some liberties are necessary to the minimally smooth functioning of modern society as we know it.” Since 1890, it has increasingly become an important task for Human Rights activists and organizations to protect this right of the individual both from governmental invasion and (even more) from the curiosity of the press and the public.

This chapter examines some of the very sensitive questions about the obligation of the state toward individuals within it, particularly the very weak and deprived sectors of society. With regard to these sectors there is always the fear of either overprotecting their rights on the one hand, or of arbitrary, invasive, and even offensive treatment by the state, on the other. The state, per the Parens Patriae1 doctrine is supposed to guarantee not only the freedoms and negative rights of its residents, but also their positive rights. However, occasionally it appears that the desire to fulfill this duty and protect certain rights and freedom of a particular individual, may cause harm or violate some other rights. This chapter will deal with certain issues where the proper extent of the state’s obligations (if there are any) is not very clear, and will try to suggest limits and restrictions to this obligation. The specific cases to be examined are those of fetuses, minors, and mentally retarded people: three vulnerable sectors in society. In each case the examined rights will be different, but they illustrate the complexity of the general question about the general obligation of the state toward individuals within it— particularly the weak and the vulnerable. At times the principle obligation of the state is to provide its residents with certain capabilities and skills, but there are instances where this obligation requires the state simply to abstain (ensuring that others will abstain as well) from any interference with one’s liberty, and to respect the individual’s freedom.

Issues of public or national security have spawned many questionable needs such as establishing new information banks and expanding existing databases that collect and retrieve private information about individuals. Such demands are usually based on two grounds: the need to fight criminality on the one hand, and the need to fight terrorism on the other. With regard to these needs, new ideas and suggestions arise on almost a daily basis. This chapter will examine two examples of such demands and reflect on possible implications and consequences of complying with them. The first example is the desire for a comprehensive collection of information about an individual, thus constituting a clear invasion of the private domain. I take the strict rejectionist position on this issue and bring several arguments to support my view. The second example concerns the limited need for access to specific personal information about individuals; in this case I argue for qualified compliance with the iron-clad proviso that close surveillance and control must be maintained over the access to such a database.

Freedom of expression has become “a highly regarded concept around theworld.” Its value has become so common and acknowledged in the western liberal countries, that Robert Trager and Donna Dickerson even argue that “Americans have a tendency to believe that the freedom to express their beliefs is a basic part of what it means to be an American.” Even though its breadth and depth differ from country to country, more than 60 countries have freedom-of-expression provisions in their constitutions. The fact that freedom of expression is included in so many constitutions and in every universal or international document on human rights, “says that there is some level of consensus about its value.” However, its content, boundaries, and practice are not very clear, and sometimes even vague and disputable. There is always tension between our desire to maximize freedom of expression and between other considerations, some of which are moral or normative. The tension between social and political desires to intensify freedom of expression and aesthetical and ethical considerations become very complicated vis-à-vis the media and academia. Both domains usually enjoy some extent of immunity against censorship, and we are very careful to avoid limiting the range of their freedoms and particularly the freedom to broadcast things that we basically loathe.We believe that the independence of editors, reporters, and university professors is beneficial for society, and their autonomy is a significant part of their journalistic mission and their creative activity. In college campuses, academic freedom has became almost sacred and we will not tolerate the possibility that political or economical interests or considerations would affect the curricula or the contents of courses given in academic institutions. We think that academic freedom is crucially important for the progress and creativity of scientific work, and hence ascribe full autonomy to research teams in the universities as well as to the lecturers.

One of the most acute issues in current medical ethics is the problem of euthanasia. This term originally comes from the Greek word that originally meant “a good death” (—well, —death). Needless to say that in every discussion about life and death we hold the a priori assumption that “life is good and that existing life should be preserved as a matter of course, unless some overriding principle supersedes the innate value of an ongoing life.” This assumption is one of the reasons for the immense difficulties of the discussion about “good death.” The issue of euthanasia became extremely complicated during the 20th century due to rapid technological progress that enabled maintaining the lives of terminal patients, even unconscious terminal patients, for extended periods of time. However, while we may possess powerful life-prolonging medical technology, on the ethical level “we are unable to find meaning in death or to bring our lives to a meaningful close.” Thus, death as a whole, and euthanasia in particular, have become complex and painful issues in modern society.

The idea of legalizing the buying and selling of human organs for transplantation is frequently raised in the contemporary era, mainly in theWestern world which has the financial resources for buying organs. The proponents of this idea claim that legalization could reduce the problem of the scarcity of donors and donations, leading to the saving of human life or at least, significant improvement of the quality of life of those who receive the organs. Another claim made in favor of the legalization of the trade of human organs is that it may actually assist povertystricken individuals, or individuals in debt, to ameliorate their economic distress by allowing them to sell their organs.

The field of genetic engineering encompasses the seemingly insurmountable gap between technological progress and the inability of the ethics dictionary to respond to issues that arise in the wake of these developments in technology. The immense implications of genetic engineering on our moral thinking is so intense that according to Jurgen Habermas, it “changes the overall structure of our moral experience.” Habermas cites Ronald Dworkin’s explanation for this change, as “the change of perspective which genetic engineering has brought about for conditions of moral judgment and actions that we had previously considered unalterable.” The quotation he brings from Ronald Dworkin stresses the dramatic implications that genetic engineering has for our traditional moral thinking.

The traditional extended family encompasses different generations (such as children, parents, grandparents), and different forms of kinship (such as children, parents, brothers, uncles, aunts, grandparents) and relations that are usually based on affection, love, support, and mutuality. However, relations even in the traditional family structure are not always typified by affection and love, but by exploitation, conflict, and hostility. In cases of a family unit gone awry, different members of the family may present conflicting claims for rights and the resolution of such conflicts may be left to the courts. Sometimes the disputes revolve around the right to keep contact with children, and frequently the children are the primary victims of the intrafamilial conflict. Sometimes the conflicts involve extended family members. This chapter examines cases of conflicts within the family, sometimes as a result of family crisis, and in other cases as the result of unusual circumstances that require creative and innovative solutions.

In the previous chapter we saw that not only that there are several legitimate forms of a family in modern society, but also that the newforms of family create different claims for familial relations. In addition, we have seen that the new procreation technologies that enable various forms of familial relations—such as IVF from donated sperm—bring also new options for having family members.

The dimensions of global trade between rich and poor countries—certainly a direct consequence of current globalization—have both transcended traditional state boundaries as well as transformed anything and everything into objects of trade and commerce. That human beings have been used as commodities is familiar in human history: witness slavery and prostitution. However, the extension of this regrettable phenomenon to babies is one of the most objectionable aspects of our new global form of life and thought. What started as a generous movement of international adoptions, with well-meaning motivation and intentions, has deteriorated into a capitalistic profit-making venture in which babies are no more than the means of maximizing profits. In this chapter we endeavor to pose, and answer, queries about the ethical implications of the tragic move from adoption to baby commerce.