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Whether and how China’s engagement in Africa affects the EU’s attempts to support governance reforms is a much-debated issue in research and policy. In contrast to widespread assumptions that the rise of China has made it more difficult for the EU to support governance reforms, this book finds little evidence to support this claim. The main argument of the book is that the survival strategies of governments in dominant party systems are the most important factor that influences African governments’ willingness to engage in governance reforms. The survival strategies define a government’s basic preferences for cooperating with the EU, or not. Other factors such as the specific good governance strategy the EU uses, African countries’ dependence on the EU as well as access to cooperation with China set additional incentives that make cooperation more beneficial or less costly.

The analysis adopts a basic, rationalist framework for interaction. African governments face some tough choices when deciding whether or not they want to engage with the EU in governance reforms. Building on a research on EU good governance support and authoritarian regimes, the chapter argues that African governments’ decisions are affected by four factors: first, the EU’s good governance strategies (the content or substance of what the EU seeks to promote as part of its good governance agenda and the instruments the EU uses); second, African governments’ survival strategies; third, African countries’ economic dependence on the EU (e.g. in terms of aid and trade); and fourth, access to cooperation with China. The empirical case studies assess the relative explanatory power and interaction effects of these four factors.

Why has the Rwandan government been increasingly active in cooperating with the EU on governance reforms between 2000 and 2014? Rwanda is an example of a country where the EU’s good governance strategies largely converge with the preferences of the target government. The Rwandan government has a strong interest in building an effective state to improve public goods provision to increase its chances of remaining in power. EU support for governance reforms that focused on building effective state institutions largely converged with the government’s preferences, particularly between 2006 and 2012. In contrast, Rwanda had little access to economic cooperation from China. This period of relative convergence between the EU and Rwanda’s preferences has probably come to an end. Kagame’s decision to run for a third term during the 2017 elections seems to herald the start of a new era in Rwanda’s relations with the EU and other donors.

Why has Ethiopia reluctantly started to engage with the EU in governance reforms in the early 2000s and why has it been very reluctant to engage between 2006 and 2010 but has then become more open? Ethiopia is an example, where the EU’s good governance strategies only partly converge with the government’s preferences. The government has a strong interest in building an effective state. However, it also used high-intensity coercion in response to the 2005 election crisis and has strongly controlled political spaces since then. In this context, the EU’s good governance strategies entailed some costs in the early 2000s and substantial costs after 2005. Ethiopia’s aid dependency explains why the government continued to, at least reluctantly, engage with the EU after 2005. Since 2005, China has become an alternative partner for the Ethiopian government, one as important as the EU. Yet, despite China’s presence, the government has continued to reluctantly engage with the EU, suggesting that China’s presence only had a small effect on the willingness of African governments to engage with the EU in governance reforms between 2000 and 2014.

Why has Angola hesitantly started to engage with the EU in governance reforms in the early 2000s, but has become increasingly indifferent over time? In the case of Angola, the EU’s good governance strategies mostly produce costs for the government. The government has very little interest in building effective state institutions but uses easy revenues (from oil) to coopt opponents through the state and party institutions. Since 2008, the government has further closed political spaces. In this context, EU governance support mostly entailed costs and produced almost no benefits. The government’s decision to reluctantly start engaging in the early 2000s can be explained by its interest in receiving EU support for the reconstruction process. However, in 2004 when China appeared on the horizon as an alternative economic cooperation partner, the EU was left with no ‘carrots or sticks’ to persuade Angola to address governance issues. The example of Angola thus shows the limitations of the EU’s good governance strategies in cases where the government has no genuine interest in cooperation and where it is not dependent on EU aid.

This book builds bridges between research on authoritarian regimes and external governance promotion; it contributes to research on authoritarian regimes as a sub-field of comparative politics; and it adds to debates on the influence of authoritarian powers on political reforms. Support for governance reforms is still high on the EU’s agenda. Yet, the EU’s good governance policies have recently come under considerable pressure. In particular, three trends—related to EU development policy, the domestic context in African dominant party regimes and China’s Africa policy—suggest that the EU will face considerably more challenges to implement its agenda in the future. In this context, the EU would need to strengthen instruments to support governance reforms ‘beyond’ the field of development policy, and it would need to more strongly differentiate its strategies for engaging with different types of authoritarian dominant party systems.