Catálogo de publicaciones - revistas

<jats:title>Abstract</jats:title><jats:p>An individual's political attitudes have been documented as the most important predictor of acceptance of government measures against the COVID‐19 pandemic. Their effect, however, is somewhat unclear and cannot be reduced to one dimension. In this article, we test whether general attitudes toward policy instruments might, together with left–right orientation, authoritarianism, social liberalism, and attitudes to state intervention, explain attitudes to policy instruments used to combat COVID‐19. The predictiveness of models of attitudes toward three different types of policy instruments to address the COVID‐19 pandemic was tested using a study of Czech university students). We found that individuals' general attitudes toward policy instruments are best measured by posing direct survey questions. Structural equation modeling was used to estimate the independent effects of general attitudes toward three different types of policy instruments on attitudes toward specific policy instruments for combating COVID‐19. We found that an individuals' general tendency to prefer an information, regulatory, or economic instrument significantly affects their attitude toward specific policy solutions, even after controlling for political orientation. These results provide novel empirical evidence for the autonomy of policy instruments attitudes (APIA) theory. The general attitudes toward policy instrument types are reflected in individuals' attitudes toward specific policy instruments, such as those used to combat COVID‐19.</jats:p>

<jats:title>Abstract</jats:title><jats:p>With heated political and public debate over government vaccine mandates, COVID‐19 offers an opportunity to better understand the role of policy justifications on people's perceptions towards a policy. Through this study, we aim to move beyond the partisan and ideological arguments for and against vaccine mandates to illustrate how individuals' worldviews, based on Cultural Theory, can better explain why people have different perceptions towards vaccine mandates. Using the judiciary and judicial reasoning as the setting, and controlling for individuals' preexisting opinion on COVID‐19 vaccines, we hypothesize that people who prefer vaccine mandates will agree with judicial reasoning that appeals towards individualistic and hierarchical statements. Additionally, we hypothesize that those who have confidence in the judiciary will agree with individualistic and hierarchical statements. To test this hypothesis, we conducted a conjoint survey experiment through Amazon Mechanical Turk. The results confirm the hypotheses.</jats:p>

<jats:title>Abstract</jats:title><jats:p>Lobbying, and its role in the policy process, has been extensively studied in democratic states, but much less is known about similar practices in authoritarian political systems. Although a few studies have identified lobbying in China, most have focused on big businesses and national policy making, and some have argued that it is unaffected by differences in political institutions. Our paper challenges this portrayal of business lobbying in autocracies. Through a study of the lobbying activities of business associations based on documentary research and fieldwork in the northern Chinese city of Tianjin between 2011 and 2013, we show that although business associations have similar lobbying motivations to their counterparts in democracies, their specific practices are often shaped by authoritarian political institutions. While they are similar in seeking to build informal relationships with public officials, provide expertise to shape policies, and raise their profile through public relations activities and media engagement, they differ in focusing their relationship‐building efforts on helping officials with routine work, helping Communist Party organizations establish cells in businesses, and brokering between businesses and government. Rather than donating to political campaigns like their counterparts in democracies, they become legislators themselves, hire retired officials, and seek positions on advisory bodies. Rigged elections, an unreliable legal system, and restrictions on media and freedom of movement are key authoritarian institutions that shape these distinctive lobbying practices.</jats:p>

<jats:title>Abstract</jats:title><jats:p>Why do some governments subsidize gasoline consumption, despite its very high economic and environmental costs? We answer this question by examining how a state's political regime and level of institutional capacity jointly determine its level of fossil fuel price distortion. We find that, without sufficient institutional capacity, democratic regimes do not necessarily provide less fuel subsidies, as those governments are unable to pursue other more efficient welfare policies. Using data on monthly domestic gasoline prices from 2003 to 2015, we demonstrate that democratic governments with high institutional capacity are less likely to control domestic gasoline prices. Democratic institutions and strong institutional capacity jointly mitigate the effect of the benchmark oil price increases on the domestic price. These results suggest that the combination of motive (democratic accountability) and means (institutional capacity) can help countries avoid inefficient subsidy policies.</jats:p>

<jats:title>Abstract</jats:title><jats:p>The ongoing fight against the COVID‐19 pandemic has highlighted the importance of adaptive policy change and the critical role of policy learning in responding to public health crises. This study utilizes policy change and policy learning theories to investigate how instrumental and political learning intertwined to explain the policy change decisions made by six U.S. states from May to December 2020. By employing a multi‐value Qualitative Comparative Analysis, this study finds that the decision to impose stricter public gathering restrictions is primarily driven by instrumental learning, which is a response to the deteriorating pandemic situation. On the contrary, the decision to relax gathering restrictions is not only driven by the policymakers' perception of the improving pandemic situation but also influenced by the political motivations, such as the desire to suppress protests and address concerns for the decreased approval for the governor's handling of the crisis. The findings highlight the varied utilization of different policy learning types in response to different directions of policy change. Additionally, this study underscores the joint impact of instrumental and political learning in explaining changes in policy stringency. Overall, these findings contribute to a deeper understanding of policy change through learning activities in a complex and rapidly evolving policy landscape.</jats:p>

<jats:title>Abstract</jats:title><jats:p>To what extent can nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) communicate policy problems in an authoritarian country, and how limited are they in narrating policy alternatives? This article seeks to develop studies on the application of the Narrative Policy Framework (NPF) in Russia, extend our knowledge about the use of narrative strategies in centralized and authoritarian policy processes, highlight certain methodological peculiarities related to the devil–angel shift calculation, and test causal mechanism hypotheses that have not previously been applied to the analysis of policy debates in Russia. The study examines hypotheses based on the narrative strategies (devil–angel shift, scope of conflict, and causal mechanisms) that were used by government and NGO coalitions in the debate about “landscape fire” policies in Russia over the period 2019–2021. The results show that the differences between the coalition's narrative strategies were not as significant as had been shown previously. The government coalition uses a strong angel shift in its narratives and avoids conflict expansion. The NGO coalition demonstrates a moderate angel shift, but with the use of conflict expansion in parts of the narratives. Both coalitions use the intentional or inadvertent causal mechanism blaming the citizens for starting the fires, but differ in employing causal mechanisms when discussing the large scale of landscape fires.</jats:p>