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In conclusion, it is obvious that depending on avoidance behaviour and collision risk as well as on the proportions of populations affected, the impact of offshore wind farms in the German sector of the North Sea on seabird populations differs considerably. The example of Red-throated Divers and Common Guillemots shows that large parts of the German Bight would be excluded from use by these species. This has to be taken into account in the process of commissioning by authorities and should lead to the application of threshold levels in order to select wind farm sites which have least impact on seabird populations. The above examples demonstrate that in the assessment of the effects of a single wind farm, the habitat loss in addition to the habitat already lost before due to other wind farms must be considered. Therefore, this underscores the need for a cumulative approach when assessing impacts on seabird populations.

Due to the multitude of planned wind farms, the consequences on the flora and fauna cannot be ascertained by considering only a single wind farm. Instead, cumulative effects must be taken into account. A reasonable interval between the construction phases of separate wind farms could be a valuable measure to minimise impacts on the marine environment. Licences for German offshore wind farms therefore contain a condition which allows the licensing authority, the Federal Maritime and Hydrographic Agency (BSH), to coordinate the construction work. It is questionable whether there will be enough alternative and adequate low-noise areas for the animals if at least parts of their preferred habitats will be covered with windmills sometime. Another moot question is whether the animals will get used to the offshore wind farms or avoid them, presumably, that is a species specific matter. Even in theory it would be very difficult to assess the long-term impacts on reproduction and population status, and it cannot be done with our current state of knowledge. So we should have a close look at the future experience gained from the large existing and planned wind farms. Moreover, further studies on the sensory systems and on such environmental factors as oceanographic parameters are essential for a comprehensive picture of harbour seal and porpoise ecology, and for an understanding of how these animals react to changed conditions.

Due to the multitude of planned wind farms, the consequences on the flora and fauna cannot be ascertained by considering only a single wind farm. Instead, cumulative effects must be taken into account. A reasonable interval between the construction phases of separate wind farms could be a valuable measure to minimise impacts on the marine environment. Licences for German offshore wind farms therefore contain a condition which allows the licensing authority, the Federal Maritime and Hydrographic Agency (BSH), to coordinate the construction work. It is questionable whether there will be enough alternative and adequate low-noise areas for the animals if at least parts of their preferred habitats will be covered with windmills sometime. Another moot question is whether the animals will get used to the offshore wind farms or avoid them, presumably, that is a species specific matter. Even in theory it would be very difficult to assess the long-term impacts on reproduction and population status, and it cannot be done with our current state of knowledge. So we should have a close look at the future experience gained from the large existing and planned wind farms. Moreover, further studies on the sensory systems and on such environmental factors as oceanographic parameters are essential for a comprehensive picture of harbour seal and porpoise ecology, and for an understanding of how these animals react to changed conditions.

In conclusion, it is obvious that depending on avoidance behaviour and collision risk as well as on the proportions of populations affected, the impact of offshore wind farms in the German sector of the North Sea on seabird populations differs considerably. The example of Red-throated Divers and Common Guillemots shows that large parts of the German Bight would be excluded from use by these species. This has to be taken into account in the process of commissioning by authorities and should lead to the application of threshold levels in order to select wind farm sites which have least impact on seabird populations. The above examples demonstrate that in the assessment of the effects of a single wind farm, the habitat loss in addition to the habitat already lost before due to other wind farms must be considered. Therefore, this underscores the need for a cumulative approach when assessing impacts on seabird populations.

Pragmatist environmental philosophers have (erroneously) assumed that environmental ethics has made little impact on environmental policy because environmental ethics has been absorbed with arcane theoretical controversies, mostly centered on the question of intrinsic value in nature. Positions on this question generate the allegedly divisive categories of anthropocentrism/ nonanthropocentrism, shallow/ deep ecology, and individualism/ holism. The for the objectivist concept of intrinsic value is traceable to Kant, and modifications of the Kantian form of ethical theory terminate in biocentrism. A subjectivist approach to the affirmation of intrinsic value in nature has also been explored. Because of the academic debate about intrinsic value in nature, the concept of in trinsic value in nature has begun to penetrate and reshape the discourse of environmental activists and environmental agency personnel. In environmental ethics, the concept of intrinsic value in nature functions similarly to the way the concept of human rights functions in social ethics. Human rights has had enormous pragmatic efficacy in social ethics and policy. The prospective endorsement of the Earth Charter by the General Assembly of the United Nations may have an impact on governmental environmental policy and performance similar to the impact on governmental so cial policy and behavior of the adoption by the same body in 1948 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Belatedly, but at last, the most strident Pragmatist critics of the concept of intrinsic value in nature now acknowledge its pragmatic power and promise.

Pragmatist environmental philosophers have (erroneously) assumed that environmental ethics has made little impact on environmental policy because environmental ethics has been absorbed with arcane theoretical controversies, mostly centered on the question of intrinsic value in nature. Positions on this question generate the allegedly divisive categories of anthropocentrism/ nonanthropocentrism, shallow/ deep ecology, and individualism/ holism. The for the objectivist concept of intrinsic value is traceable to Kant, and modifications of the Kantian form of ethical theory terminate in biocentrism. A subjectivist approach to the affirmation of intrinsic value in nature has also been explored. Because of the academic debate about intrinsic value in nature, the concept of in trinsic value in nature has begun to penetrate and reshape the discourse of environmental activists and environmental agency personnel. In environmental ethics, the concept of intrinsic value in nature functions similarly to the way the concept of human rights functions in social ethics. Human rights has had enormous pragmatic efficacy in social ethics and policy. The prospective endorsement of the Earth Charter by the General Assembly of the United Nations may have an impact on governmental environmental policy and performance similar to the impact on governmental so cial policy and behavior of the adoption by the same body in 1948 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Belatedly, but at last, the most strident Pragmatist critics of the concept of intrinsic value in nature now acknowledge its pragmatic power and promise.

Due to the multitude of planned wind farms, the consequences on the flora and fauna cannot be ascertained by considering only a single wind farm. Instead, cumulative effects must be taken into account. A reasonable interval between the construction phases of separate wind farms could be a valuable measure to minimise impacts on the marine environment. Licences for German offshore wind farms therefore contain a condition which allows the licensing authority, the Federal Maritime and Hydrographic Agency (BSH), to coordinate the construction work. It is questionable whether there will be enough alternative and adequate low-noise areas for the animals if at least parts of their preferred habitats will be covered with windmills sometime. Another moot question is whether the animals will get used to the offshore wind farms or avoid them, presumably, that is a species specific matter. Even in theory it would be very difficult to assess the long-term impacts on reproduction and population status, and it cannot be done with our current state of knowledge. So we should have a close look at the future experience gained from the large existing and planned wind farms. Moreover, further studies on the sensory systems and on such environmental factors as oceanographic parameters are essential for a comprehensive picture of harbour seal and porpoise ecology, and for an understanding of how these animals react to changed conditions.

Pragmatist environmental philosophers have (erroneously) assumed that environmental ethics has made little impact on environmental policy because environmental ethics has been absorbed with arcane theoretical controversies, mostly centered on the question of intrinsic value in nature. Positions on this question generate the allegedly divisive categories of anthropocentrism/ nonanthropocentrism, shallow/ deep ecology, and individualism/ holism. The for the objectivist concept of intrinsic value is traceable to Kant, and modifications of the Kantian form of ethical theory terminate in biocentrism. A subjectivist approach to the affirmation of intrinsic value in nature has also been explored. Because of the academic debate about intrinsic value in nature, the concept of in trinsic value in nature has begun to penetrate and reshape the discourse of environmental activists and environmental agency personnel. In environmental ethics, the concept of intrinsic value in nature functions similarly to the way the concept of human rights functions in social ethics. Human rights has had enormous pragmatic efficacy in social ethics and policy. The prospective endorsement of the Earth Charter by the General Assembly of the United Nations may have an impact on governmental environmental policy and performance similar to the impact on governmental so cial policy and behavior of the adoption by the same body in 1948 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Belatedly, but at last, the most strident Pragmatist critics of the concept of intrinsic value in nature now acknowledge its pragmatic power and promise.

Pragmatist environmental philosophers have (erroneously) assumed that environmental ethics has made little impact on environmental policy because environmental ethics has been absorbed with arcane theoretical controversies, mostly centered on the question of intrinsic value in nature. Positions on this question generate the allegedly divisive categories of anthropocentrism/ nonanthropocentrism, shallow/ deep ecology, and individualism/ holism. The for the objectivist concept of intrinsic value is traceable to Kant, and modifications of the Kantian form of ethical theory terminate in biocentrism. A subjectivist approach to the affirmation of intrinsic value in nature has also been explored. Because of the academic debate about intrinsic value in nature, the concept of in trinsic value in nature has begun to penetrate and reshape the discourse of environmental activists and environmental agency personnel. In environmental ethics, the concept of intrinsic value in nature functions similarly to the way the concept of human rights functions in social ethics. Human rights has had enormous pragmatic efficacy in social ethics and policy. The prospective endorsement of the Earth Charter by the General Assembly of the United Nations may have an impact on governmental environmental policy and performance similar to the impact on governmental so cial policy and behavior of the adoption by the same body in 1948 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Belatedly, but at last, the most strident Pragmatist critics of the concept of intrinsic value in nature now acknowledge its pragmatic power and promise.

Pragmatist environmental philosophers have (erroneously) assumed that environmental ethics has made little impact on environmental policy because environmental ethics has been absorbed with arcane theoretical controversies, mostly centered on the question of intrinsic value in nature. Positions on this question generate the allegedly divisive categories of anthropocentrism/ nonanthropocentrism, shallow/ deep ecology, and individualism/ holism. The for the objectivist concept of intrinsic value is traceable to Kant, and modifications of the Kantian form of ethical theory terminate in biocentrism. A subjectivist approach to the affirmation of intrinsic value in nature has also been explored. Because of the academic debate about intrinsic value in nature, the concept of in trinsic value in nature has begun to penetrate and reshape the discourse of environmental activists and environmental agency personnel. In environmental ethics, the concept of intrinsic value in nature functions similarly to the way the concept of human rights functions in social ethics. Human rights has had enormous pragmatic efficacy in social ethics and policy. The prospective endorsement of the Earth Charter by the General Assembly of the United Nations may have an impact on governmental environmental policy and performance similar to the impact on governmental so cial policy and behavior of the adoption by the same body in 1948 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Belatedly, but at last, the most strident Pragmatist critics of the concept of intrinsic value in nature now acknowledge its pragmatic power and promise.