Catálogo de publicaciones - libros
Coordination, Organizations, Institutions, and Norms in Multi-Agent Systems: AAMAS 2005 International Workshops on Agents, Norms, and Institutions for Regulated Multiagent Systems, ANIREM 2005 and on Organizations in Multi-Agent Systems, OOOP 2005, U
Olivier Boissier ; Julian Padget ; Virginia Dignum ; Gabriela Lindemann ; Eric Matson ; Sascha Ossowski ; Jaime Simão Sichman ; Javier Vázquez-Salceda (eds.)
En conferencia: 4º International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS) . Utrecht, The Netherlands . July 25, 2005 - July 26, 2005
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Institución detectada | Año de publicación | Navegá | Descargá | Solicitá |
---|---|---|---|---|
No detectada | 2006 | SpringerLink |
Información
Tipo de recurso:
libros
ISBN impreso
978-3-540-35173-3
ISBN electrónico
978-3-540-35176-4
Editor responsable
Springer Nature
País de edición
Reino Unido
Fecha de publicación
2006
Información sobre derechos de publicación
© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2006
Tabla de contenidos
doi: 10.1007/11775331_11
Designing Normative Behaviour Via Landmarks
Huib Aldewereld; Davide Grossi; Javier Vázquez-Salceda; Frank Dignum
In highly regulated environments, where a set of norms defines accepted behaviour, protocols provide a way to reduce complexity by giving direct, step by step guidelines for behaviour, as long as the protocols comply with the norms. In this work we propose a formal framework to design a protocol from a normative specification. In order to be able to connect (descriptive) norms with (operational) protocols, an intermediate level is created by the use of landmarks.
III - Modelling Normative Designs | Pp. 157-169
doi: 10.1007/11775331_12
Design by Contract Deontic Design Language for Multiagent Systems
Christophe Garion; Leendert van der Torre
Design by contract is a well known theory that views software construction as based on contracts between clients (callers) and suppliers (routines), relying on mutual obligations and benefits made explicit by assertions. However, there is a gap between this theory and software engineering concepts and tools. For example, dealing with contract violations is realized by exception handlers, whereas it has been observed in the area of deontic logic in computer science that violations and exceptions are distinct concepts that should not be confused. To bridge this gap, we propose a software design language based on temporal deontic logic. Moreover, we show how preferences over the possible outcomes of a supplier can be added. We also discuss the relation between the normative stance toward systems implicit in the design by contract approach and the intentional or BDI stance popular in agent theory.
III - Modelling Normative Designs | Pp. 170-182
doi: 10.1007/11775331_13
Informed Deliberation During Norm-Governed Practical Reasoning
Martin J. Kollingbaum; Timothy J. Norman
A norm-governed agent takes social norms into account in its practical reasoning. Such norms characterise its role within a specific organisational context. By adopting a role, the agent commits to fulfil and adhere to the social norms associated with that role. These commitments require the agent to act in a way that does not violate any of its prohibitions or obligations. In adopting different sets of norms, an agent may experience conflicts between these norms as well as inconsistencies between possible actions for fulfilling its obligations and its currently adopted set of norms. In order to resolve such problems, it must be informed about conflicts and inconsistencies. The NoA architecture for norm-governed agents implements a computationally efficient mechanism for identifying and indicating such problems – possible candidates for action are assigned a specific label that contains cross-referenced information of actions and norms. As actions are indicated as problematic and not simply filtered out, the agent can still choose to either act according to its norms or against them. The labelling mechanism presented in this paper is therefore a critical step towards enabling an agent to reason about norm violations – the agent becomes norm-autonomous.
III - Modelling Normative Designs | Pp. 183-197
doi: 10.1007/11775331_14
Organizations in Artificial Social Systems
Guido Boella; Leendert van der Torre
In this paper we introduce organizations and roles in Shoham and Tennenholtz’ artificial social systems, using a normative system. We model how real agents determine the behavior of organizations by playing roles in the organization, and how the organization controls the behavior of agents playing a role in it. We consider the design of an organization in terms of roles and the assignment of agents to roles, and the evolution of organizations. We do not present a complete formalization of the computational problems, but we illustrate our approach by examples.
III - Modelling Normative Designs | Pp. 198-210
doi: 10.1007/11775331_15
Exploring Congruence Between Organizational Structure and Task Performance: A Simulation Approach
Frank Dignum; Virginia Dignum; Liz Sonenberg
Reorganization of the structure of an organization is a crucial issue in multi-agent systems that operate in an open, dynamic environment. Ideally, autonomous agents must be able to evaluate and decide the most appropriate organization given the environment conditions. That is, there is a need for dynamic reorganization of coordination structures. In this paper, we describe how simulation studies could help to determine whether and how reorganization should take place, and present a simulation scenario that can be used to evaluate the congruence, or fit, between organizational structure and task performance. Preliminary results using a simulation environment illustrate how one can explore triggers for reorganization and compare strategies.
IV - Evaluation and Regulation | Pp. 213-230
doi: 10.1007/11775331_16
Verifying Norm Compliancy of Protocols
Huib Aldewereld; Javier Vázquez-Salceda; Frank Dignum; John-Jules Ch. Meyer
There is a wide agreement on the use of norms in order to specify the expected behaviour of agents in open MAS. However, in highly regulated domains, where norms dictate what can and cannot be done, it can be hard to determine whether a desired goal can actually be achieved without violating the norms. To help the agents in this process, agents can make use of predefined (knowledge-based) protocols, which are designed to help reach a goal without violating any of the norms. But how can we guarantee that these protocols are actually norm-compliant? Can these protocols really realise results without violating the norms? In this paper we introduce a formal method, based on program verification, for checking the norm compliance of (knowledge-based) protocols.
IV - Evaluation and Regulation | Pp. 231-245
doi: 10.1007/11775331_17
A Rule Language for Modelling and Monitoring Social Expectations in Multi-agent Systems
Stephen Cranefield
This paper proposes a rule language for defining social expectations based on a metric interval temporal logic with past and future modalities and a current-time binding operator. An algorithm for run-time monitoring compliance of rules in this language based on formula progression is also presented.
IV - Evaluation and Regulation | Pp. 246-258