Catálogo de publicaciones - libros

The concept of vulnerability has been introduced in the bioethical debate recently. In philosophy, vulnerability has been a core notion particularly in Continental schools. In a sense every human being is vulnerable. In bioethics the concept has been introduced initially in the context of clinical research to demarcate groups of individuals or populations as ‘vulnerable’ and therefore entitled to special protections. With the globalization of bioethics, suffering and risk in the face of medical research, technologies and care have become global realities, so that the concept of vulnerability has emerged as one of the principles of global bioethics, for example in the UNESCO Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights. The principle of vulnerability is especially salient in the context of global disasters. It points the ethical discourse in specific directions that focus more on ameliorating the conditions that produce vulnerability, rather than on emergency actions focused on saving lives. In this connection, the human rights discourse might be helpful to focus attention and actions in connection to disasters. This discourse can complement the dominant ethical framework of humanitarianism in disaster prevention, relief, and recovery. Both ethical discourses are strongly connected with the notion of vulnerability. Human rights language presents the sufferers of disasters as bearers of rights rather than as victims. It also focuses attention at structural violence, economic injustice and global solidarity. However, this requires a critical reformulation of human rights discourse, since it often adopts a neoliberal approach. It assumes that globalization offers opportunities to strengthen human security and provide basic needs, rather than threatening them. In practice, human rights discourse is no longer used to protect the vulnerable but to legitimize the global practices of neoliberalism. It often shares the vision of progress, growth and development that underlies neoliberal approaches and policies, hardly questioning the negative relationships between social context, trade and human flourishing. Global bioethics, if taken seriously, can redirect human rights discourse to ways to prevent future disasters.

The work of Amartya Sen proved breakthrough in our understanding of disasters by shifting the emphasis from the hazard to societal causes of vulnerability. This chapter begins with an outline of Sen’s work on famines and its relation to the Disaster Risk Reduction literature. It then goes on to outline the capability approach the development of which Sen played a central role. The approach is contrasted with the view of income as development, utilitarianism and Rawls. Thereafter, taking the case of climate change, the chapter criticises Sen for his inattention to sustainability issues. It is argued that instead of seeing development as increasing people’s freedoms to live the lives they value, as Sen does, we should think of sustainable development as increasing legitimate freedoms. Legitimate freedoms are demarcated by drawing on Thomas Scanlon’s version of contractualism and the notion of reasonable rejection. As climate change is with us, it is argued that we are already living in an unsustainable world.

There has not been a sustained application of communitarian ethical theory to the topic of disasters, as far as I am aware. While there is an occasional reference to communitarian ethics in disaster management discussions, this does not amount to a philosophical treatment of either the contribution that communitarian ethics might make to the complex moral problem of disasters, nor does it amount to an examination of its philosophical difficulties and weaknesses. The aim of this chapter is to take a step towards filling this gap in the literature.

Virtue ethics studies the character traits of good persons. This includes analysis of how ordinary persons can emulate moral role models in order to improve their moral character. This chapter investigates the link between virtues and disasters by relating classic and contemporary virtue ethical thinking to the character traits of humanity and resilience. The article finds ample support for the claim that these two character traits can be analysed as virtues and that classical virtue theorists can help us articulate the content of these traits. The contemporary discourse about virtues and disasters includes the long-standing analysis of the role of reason and emotions in virtues but the discourse also considers what kind of virtues that are relevant in disaster situations. Two important examples of the latter are the virtues of humanitarian workers and the virtues of those who suffer disasters. The chapter conclude that that future research should consider how training can strengthen individual resilience and how the pursuit of moral excellence can be included in the humanitarian field as a complement to minimum standards.

Various disasters have been affecting our societies for the last few decades, ranging from earthquakes, floods and tsunamis to economic crises, terrorism and migration. When a disaster strikes, it upsets the normal way of life of the society and leaves behind hundreds of thousands of victims and casualties. The questions that arise automatically are first, how one is going to conceive and understand the disasters that occur and, secondly, in what way one is going to intervene, especially after these disasters have struck, and help those affected and injured. What obviously concerns us here is to track down the ethical account which will enable us to consider the disaster theoretically and will guide us to intervene on the field when the actual disaster has occurred. A number of different ethical approaches to dealing with disasters have been propounded by philosophers, among which are notably two, utilitarianism and Kant’s deontology. However, even though these two ethical theories seem to be the “ideal” theories for dealing with the problematic situations arising from disasters, it is argued that they are not ideal at all, as they overlook and do not take into account the particular features of the problematic situations and the feelings of both, the victims and the workers. However, on a more careful examination, it turns out that Kant’s deontological account is not just the formal distanced ethical theory that first appears to be. It also possesses an empirical account, the ethical account of virtues, which can be directly applied to the problems caused by disasters in the real world. Especially, by presenting us with an elaborate analysis of the duty of justice and the duty of beneficence, Kant succeeds in bringing out the practical relevance that his theory of virtues has for disasters.

Vulnerable groups, from contemporary homeless people to IVF embryos may fall between the cracks of otherwise good social values, such as government welfare programs and individual autonomy. These present and slow disasters are in principle no different from more immediate catastrophes resulting from natural events or wars that harm civilians. The failure to respond with indignation and demands for change constitutes apathy, which is also an absence of deontology. We begin with concrete examples of social apathy, in Part 1. Our examples are homelessness and IVF, neither of which are usually considered disasters but both of which are in fact ongoing disasters within normal society. Part 2. is a discussion of theoretical and practical deontology that is lacking in these examples.