Catálogo de publicaciones - libros

People, whole communities, and even nations express moral outrage. They often do so indiscriminately, simply reacting to the latest news of bombings of hospitals in Yemen, honor killings in Pakistan, gang rapes in India, and so on. These expressions are not without effect, but the United States would be better served to first consider where using this moral voice might have the most real impact, and hesitate to use it when the subject of censure has made an atypical offense. This chapter shows that moral capital that is not well-directed is devalued and squandered, and asserts that we need to choose where to focus our outrage just as doctors decide how to treat multiple victims who need attention at once. In other words, we need a moral triage.

The struggle against terrorism in the Middle East has led to a quest to find ways to counter the appeal of violent extremists. Thus far, US counter-messaging has failed to articulate a normative position that is responsive to the deeply-held beliefs of the majority of the world’s Muslims. To form a sounder approach, one must acknowledge that there are two fundamentally different interpretations of Islam, both of which are supported by a close reading of the Qur’an and major texts. This chapter shows that the promotion of secular liberal ideals—human rights, democracy, free markets, etc.—is not a suitable response to extremist messaging because while most Muslims are not extreme, they are also not liberal. It then explains the reasons behind the US’s previous failure to clearly articulate its message. The chapter finally raises the question of which messenger is best equipped to promote the normative message and what steps are required to lift the chosen agent to the needed scale.

In a globalizing world where transnational terrorism poses a serious threat to the security of many people, the Westphalian system of state sovereignty based on the sanctity of borders is increasingly obsolete. Today’s counterterrorism efforts have yielded to sovereignty rhetorically while routinely violating it in practice—this is unsustainable, and a new definition of sovereignty is called for. This chapter proposes building on the precedent of the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) paradigm, which redefined sovereignty as a form of citizenship that entails responsibilities as well as rights, and asserts that the international community should recognize a further responsibility of states to curb any transnational terrorism that emanates from within their borders. The chapter concludes by stipulating that coercive regime change should not factor into upholding the rehashed sovereignty norm, but that a failure to prevent transnational terrorism could result in partial loss of sovereignty as nations respond to the threats against them.

This chapter suggests that if the humanitarian goals of armed interventions are decoupled from coerced regime change and nation building, they can be carried out effectively and at rather low costs. In addition, it contends that the standard for justifying humanitarian interventions must be well-articulated and set at a high level, for normative reasons, not merely prudential ones. The thesis for narrowly crafted armed humanitarian interventions is supported in the following pages by showing that a mixture of idealism and hubris drives the West to assume that it can achieve much more than it is equipped to, and that its repeated failure to accomplish these expansive goals is leading to a consensus around avoiding armed humanitarian interventions altogether— tragically including those missions whose normative standing is strong and which can be carried out effectively. The observation that nations can employ nonlethal (normative and economic) means to promote human rights and democracy further supports the thesis that the use of force should be reserved to large-scale saving of life and not to be allowed to morph into coerced regime change, not to mention futile attempts at nation building.

This chapter reviews the reasons scholars hold that driverless cars and many other AI-equipped machines must be able to make ethical decisions, and the difficulties this approach faces. It then shows that cars have no moral agency, and that the term “autonomous,” commonly applied to these machines, is misleading, and leads to invalid conclusions about the ways these machines can be kept ethical. The chapter’s most important claim is that a significant part of the challenge posed by AI-equipped machines can be addressed by the kind of ethical choices human beings have made for millennia. In other words, there is little need to teach machines ethics even if this could be done in the first place. The chapter concludes with a general assertion for future discussions of ethics and AI: that one makes a grievous error by drawing on extreme outlier scenarios—such as the famous Trolley narratives—as a basis for conceptualizing the ethical issues at hand.

As technology progresses and autonomous weapons increasingly become a reality rather than mere science fiction, an ethical debate has developed surrounding the use of such weapons, which operate with little or no human oversight. Some view the use of autonomous weapons as morally preferable (not to mention strategically advantageous), as they can be used in place of human combatants. Others oppose their use for moral and legal reasons. This chapter analyzes arguments on both sides of the question and discusses challenges to limiting and defining autonomous weapons. The chapter acknowledges that some form of autonomy in weapon systems is here to stay, but seeks to limit potential catastrophes by recommending the adoption of an international agreement to ban fully autonomous weapons—those which cannot be recalled—as a first step toward addressing the issues raised.

As Artificial Intelligence technology seems poised for a major take-off and changing societal dynamics are creating a high demand for caregivers for elders, children, and those infirmed, AI-based robotic caregivers may well be used much more often. This chapter examines the ethical concerns raised by the use of AI caregivers and concludes that many of these concerns are avoided when AI caregivers operate as partners to human caregivers rather than substitutes. Furthermore, most of the remaining concerns are minor and are faced by human caregivers as well. The chapter then argues that because AI caregivers’ systems are learning systems that could therefore stray from their initial guidelines, a layer of AI-based oversight is necessary to protect patients. Such layers of oversight are already employed across many areas of human service provision, and a similar method could help to ensure that AI caregivers act in ways that are ethical, legal, and in accordance with predetermined guidelines.

Human beings accepted for centuries that nature, the social world, and the self were given. During the Modern era they assumed that all these realms can be re-engineered due to science and tech. But recent evidence reveals a growing gap between the ambitions of those seeking to re-engineer the world and our true capabilities. This chapter traces the history of passive orientation toward nature, from Aristotle, to Marx, to post-war liberal politics. It argues ultimately that some have been overly optimistic about the potential of technology to engender more expansive affluence, and calls for a reconsideration of values for a “post-affluence society.” This chapter recalls the discussion of happiness in Part I and holds that by mobilizing science and technology under newly-refined ambitions, we can steer toward a healthier, more contented society—one that is economically stable, provides for its citizens, reduces harm to the environment, and garners stronger communities.

A communitarian approach to bioethics adds a core value to a field that is often more concerned with considerations of individual autonomy than with the common good. Some interpretations of liberalism put the needs of the patient over those of the community; authoritarian communitarianism privileges the needs of society over those of the patient. This chapter argues for responsive communitarianism, which starts by asserting that we face two conflicting core values, autonomy and the common good, and that neither should be a priori privileged. Responsive communitarianism does not seek to eliminate this conflict in values; rather, as the chapter outlines, it recommends principles and procedures that can be used to work out such a conflict. This discussion uses the debate in the United States over social justice and funding for entitlements as a case study to apply the values of communitarian bioethics, and finally urges policymakers to incorporate concern for the common good.