Catálogo de publicaciones - libros

In this paper we asked ourselves a number of questions: who will benefit from the liberalization of the European postal market, what will the end game of the European postal market look like and how can smaller states secure an equitable share of the benefits given the current fact of asymmetrical liberalization and differences in sizes of home markets. We may assume, on the basis of the historical process of liberalization of markets, that in the long run the full liberalization of the European markets will positively contribute to the welfare of all member states. With economies of scale being so important for postal services, and its related markets of express and logistics, the companies with large home markets such as Deutsche Post and La Poste are in the advantage conform the Stolper-Samuelson theorem. We therefore believe that the future stable competitive configuration will more likely be one in which 2 or 3 powerful players lead the market, with perhaps some smaller players serving purely local markets (and which will be contained by the larger powers in their possibility to expand). The current practice of asymmetrical liberalization supports this development, as it limits the growth of postal operators from smaller companies, thereby deteriorating their future competitive position in a liberalized and integrated European postal market. To create a fair playing ground between larger and smaller countries, the European Commission should implement a -temporary- reciprocity rule, allowing national governments to block foreign companies operating from a non-liberalized home market, to enter (segments of) their national postal market, be it through an owned start-up or through mergers and acquisitions. However, in the end there needs to be a fully liberalized European postal market. The proposed reciprocity rule is a fair measure since companies from small countries are at a disadvantage, even in case of reciprocity, because of their small home markets. The rule should be used to allow the smaller member states to speed up the innovation in their economies in order to absorb the free-falling production factors in case their national postal and logistics clusters cannot compete in an integrated European market. Also, the European Commission needs to view the future development of the postal services no longer as a stand-alone business, but as an integral part of the business of logistic services, since the dynamics of that industry define the dynamics of the postal services.

The UPU should move away from a monopoly orientation, which perceives the proliferation of ETOEs only as a temporary aberration and a threat to universal service. Instead, the UPU should embrace a more economically efficient terminal dues structure that will correct non-cost-based discrimination, place the UPU in a position to lead the way to a competitive global postal market, and allow ETOEs to play a significant role in the growth of liberalized postal administrations.

Posts around the world have been confronted with arguments that they receive competitive advantages and better treatment under domestic law than private sector operators. Independent bodies in several industrialized countries have issued recommendations urging governments to promote competitive equality principles under domestic law. While many critics urge that the playing field be leveled, they often do not take account of the many costly public responsibilities that postal operators must fulfill. The opinion reaffirms that the USPS is a federal government entity and is not subject to competition laws applicable to private sector providers. As a governmental entity, the USPS must fulfill many social policies. Unlike private sector providers in the United States, it must execute universal service obligations. Postal rates must also reflect many noncommercial considerations, and product pricing is driven by social policy as opposed to economic principles. As an employer, the USPS must observe significant, costly restrictions on its ability to set wage and benefit policies. As a purchaser of billions of dollars of goods and services, the USPS must fulfill numerous socio-economic policies that make it less able to acquire goods and services efficiently and at the lowest possible cost. The “level playing field” debate cannot be fairly understood without recognizing the counterbalancing social policy responsibilities borne by postal operators.

The growing competitive threat to the Postal Service’s role as a medium for electronic bill presentment and payment (“EBPP”) is similar to the competitive challenges that other regulated network industries—including the transportation, energy, and telecommunications industries—have faced from intermodal competition. Unlike other regulated industries, however, the Postal Service has not tried to meet this threat by offering targeted rate reductions aimed at stemming the loss of this high-margin business. The inaction appears to stem from the belief, widely shared in the postal community, that volume-retention discounts constitute undue discrimination, or are otherwise inconsistent with the Postal Service’s common carrier status. This paper has argued that volume-retention discounts of this kind, if reasonably calibrated to the competitive threat from the Internet, would be consistent with established legal standards for price discrimination.

In this paper we asked ourselves a number of questions: who will benefit from the liberalization of the European postal market, what will the end game of the European postal market look like and how can smaller states secure an equitable share of the benefits given the current fact of asymmetrical liberalization and differences in sizes of home markets. We may assume, on the basis of the historical process of liberalization of markets, that in the long run the full liberalization of the European markets will positively contribute to the welfare of all member states. With economies of scale being so important for postal services, and its related markets of express and logistics, the companies with large home markets such as Deutsche Post and La Poste are in the advantage conform the Stolper-Samuelson theorem. We therefore believe that the future stable competitive configuration will more likely be one in which 2 or 3 powerful players lead the market, with perhaps some smaller players serving purely local markets (and which will be contained by the larger powers in their possibility to expand). The current practice of asymmetrical liberalization supports this development, as it limits the growth of postal operators from smaller companies, thereby deteriorating their future competitive position in a liberalized and integrated European postal market. To create a fair playing ground between larger and smaller countries, the European Commission should implement a -temporary- reciprocity rule, allowing national governments to block foreign companies operating from a non-liberalized home market, to enter (segments of) their national postal market, be it through an owned start-up or through mergers and acquisitions. However, in the end there needs to be a fully liberalized European postal market. The proposed reciprocity rule is a fair measure since companies from small countries are at a disadvantage, even in case of reciprocity, because of their small home markets. The rule should be used to allow the smaller member states to speed up the innovation in their economies in order to absorb the free-falling production factors in case their national postal and logistics clusters cannot compete in an integrated European market. Also, the European Commission needs to view the future development of the postal services no longer as a stand-alone business, but as an integral part of the business of logistic services, since the dynamics of that industry define the dynamics of the postal services.

In this paper we asked ourselves a number of questions: who will benefit from the liberalization of the European postal market, what will the end game of the European postal market look like and how can smaller states secure an equitable share of the benefits given the current fact of asymmetrical liberalization and differences in sizes of home markets. We may assume, on the basis of the historical process of liberalization of markets, that in the long run the full liberalization of the European markets will positively contribute to the welfare of all member states. With economies of scale being so important for postal services, and its related markets of express and logistics, the companies with large home markets such as Deutsche Post and La Poste are in the advantage conform the Stolper-Samuelson theorem. We therefore believe that the future stable competitive configuration will more likely be one in which 2 or 3 powerful players lead the market, with perhaps some smaller players serving purely local markets (and which will be contained by the larger powers in their possibility to expand). The current practice of asymmetrical liberalization supports this development, as it limits the growth of postal operators from smaller companies, thereby deteriorating their future competitive position in a liberalized and integrated European postal market. To create a fair playing ground between larger and smaller countries, the European Commission should implement a -temporary- reciprocity rule, allowing national governments to block foreign companies operating from a non-liberalized home market, to enter (segments of) their national postal market, be it through an owned start-up or through mergers and acquisitions. However, in the end there needs to be a fully liberalized European postal market. The proposed reciprocity rule is a fair measure since companies from small countries are at a disadvantage, even in case of reciprocity, because of their small home markets. The rule should be used to allow the smaller member states to speed up the innovation in their economies in order to absorb the free-falling production factors in case their national postal and logistics clusters cannot compete in an integrated European market. Also, the European Commission needs to view the future development of the postal services no longer as a stand-alone business, but as an integral part of the business of logistic services, since the dynamics of that industry define the dynamics of the postal services.

In this paper, we study the problem of maintaining metadata for open Web content. In digital libraries such as DLESE, NSDL and G-Portal, metadata records are created for some good quality Web content objects so as to make them more accessible. These Web objects are dynamic making it necessary to update their metadata records. As Web metadata maintenance involves manual efforts, we propose to reduce the efforts by introducing the () model to monitor only those changes made on Web page content regions that concern metadata attributes while ignoring other changes. We also develop evaluation metrics to measure the number of alerts and the amount of efforts in updating Web metadata records. KeC model has been experimented on metadata records defined for Wikipedia articles, and its performance with different settings is reported. The model is implemented in G-Portal as a metadata maintenance module.

A process that permits labour and management to test new work methods and new work rules can facilitate the introduction of changes and assist parties in resolving longstanding disputes.

The process must be truly jointly controlled with both parties having equal rights and input into all decisions. The process designed by the Canadian Union of Postal Workers and Canada Post Corporation was successful due to a number of factors:

The success of the Appendix AA process was due to the acknowledgement of both union and management that there is a need to improve working conditions with respect to health and safety while enhancing the quality of services and addressing the realities of increased competition and the threats posed by deregulation and privatization. This progress is a significant especially given the poor labor relations that existed for many years. Continuation of this approach promises further progress.

In this paper, we study the problem of maintaining metadata for open Web content. In digital libraries such as DLESE, NSDL and G-Portal, metadata records are created for some good quality Web content objects so as to make them more accessible. These Web objects are dynamic making it necessary to update their metadata records. As Web metadata maintenance involves manual efforts, we propose to reduce the efforts by introducing the () model to monitor only those changes made on Web page content regions that concern metadata attributes while ignoring other changes. We also develop evaluation metrics to measure the number of alerts and the amount of efforts in updating Web metadata records. KeC model has been experimented on metadata records defined for Wikipedia articles, and its performance with different settings is reported. The model is implemented in G-Portal as a metadata maintenance module.

Postal oversight ensures the efficiency and integrity of postal programs, which may be accomplished with complementary postal watchdogs; however, it is best to avoid redundancies in oversight functions unless there is a compelling reason. Intended redundancies in oversight roles allow for checks and balances in the process. In countries with few oversight organizations, it is important to assure that there is adequate coverage of oversight functions. When designing comprehensive oversight programs, governments would want as many strengths contained in the oversight process as possible, exploiting the positive and mitigating the possible negative aspects of oversight. To be effective at facilitating continuous improvement via oversight, postal watchdogs need to be mindful of their role in the oversight process, demonstrate their value to the postal operator, and have mechanisms in place to improve the quality of their own programs.

Traditional oversight of government-owned postal monopolies is valuable. Anticipating competition in postal markets, governments may have prematurely moved toward a private sector model. We recommend that postal organizations reconsider and adopt some of the traditional best practices of postal watchdogs. In this way, governments can improve the affordability and quality of postal services, a goal everyone, especially economists, can embrace.