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1) The output model. This chapter deals with competition between the European central bank, the German government, and the French government. The member countries are the same size and have the same behavioural functions. As a point of departure, take the output model. It can be represented by a system of two equations: Here Y denotes German output, Y is French output, M is European money supply, G is German government purchases, and G is French government purchases. The endogenous variables are German output and French output.

1) Introduction. For ease of exposition we make the following assumptions. The monetary union consists of three countries, say Germany, France and Italy. The member countries are the same size and have the same behavioural functions. An increase in European money supply raises German output, French output, and Italian output, to the same extent respectively. In the numerical example, an increase in European money supply of 100 raises German output, French output, and Italian output by 100 each.

1) Introduction. For ease of exposition we assume that the monetary union consists of three countries, say Germany, France and Italy. The member countries are the same size and have the same behavioural functions. An increase in German government purchases raises German output. Correspondingly, an increase in French government purchases raises French output. And an increase in Italian government purchases raises Italian output. For ease of exposition we assume that fiscal policy in one of the countries has no effect on output in the other countries. In the numerical example, an increase in German government purchases of 100 causes an increase in German output of 100. Correspondingly, an increase in French government purchases of 100 causes an increase in French output of 100. And an increase in Italian government purchases of 100 causes an increase in Italian output of 100.

1) The static model. This chapter deals with competition between the European central bank, the German government, the French government, and the Italian government. As a point of reference, consider the static model. It can be represented by a system of three equations: Y denotes German output, Y is French output, Y is Italian output, M is European money supply, G is German government purchases, G is French government purchases, G is Italian government purchases, α is the monetary policy multiplier, and β is the fiscal policy multiplier. The endogenous variables are German output, French output, and Italian output.

1) Introduction. This chapter deals with cooperation between the European central bank, the German government, the French government, and the Italian government. As a starting point, take the output model. It can be represented by a system of three equations: Here Y denotes German output, Y is French output, Y is Italian output, M is European money supply, G is German government purchases, G is French government purchases, G is Italian government purchases, α is the monetary policy multiplier, and β is the fiscal policy multiplier. The endogenous variables are German output, French output, and Italian output

1) Introduction. For ease of exposition we assume that the monetary union consists of two countries, say Germany and France. The member countries are the same size and have the same behavioural functions. An increase in German nominal wages lowers German output. Correspondingly, an increase in French nominal wages lowers French output. For ease of exposition we assume that wage policy in one of the countries has no effect on output in the other country. In the numerical example, an increase in German nominal wages of 100 causes a decline in German output of 100. Correspondingly, an increase in French nominal wages of 100 causes a decline in French output of 100. For ease of exposition we assume that the wage policy multiplier is 1. This assumption is consistent since the wage rate is defined in nominal terms while output is defined in real terms.

1) The static model. As a point of reference, consider the static model. It can be represented by a system of two equations: Of course this is a reduced form. Y denotes German output, Y is French output, M is European money supply, W is German nominal wages, W is French nominal wages, A is some other factors bearing on German output, A is some other factors bearing on French output, α is the monetary policy multiplier, and γ is the wage policy multiplier. The endogenous variables are German output and French output.

1) Introduction. As a starting point, take the output model. It can be represented by a system of two equations: Here Y denotes German output, Y is French output, M is European money supply, W is German nominal wages, W is French nominal wages, α is the monetary policy multiplier, and γ is the wage policy multiplier. The endogenous variables are German output and French output.

This chapter deals with competition between the European central bank, the German labour union, and the French labour union. So far we have assumed that the central bank and the labour unions decide sequentially. First the central bank decides, then the labour unions decide. Now we assume that the central bank and the labour unions decide simultaneously and independently.

This chapter deals with competition between the European central bank, the German labour union, and the French labour union. So far we have assumed that the central bank and the labour unions follow a cold-turkey strategy. Now we assume that the central bank and the labour unions follow a gradualist strategy. In addition, we assume that the central bank and the labour unions decide simultaneously and independently.