Catálogo de publicaciones - libros

The Avatamsaka game is investigated both analytically and using computer simulations. The Avatamsaka game is a in which each agent’s payoff depends completely not on her own decision but on the other players’. Consequently, any combination of mixed strategies is a Nash equilibrium.

Analysis and evolutionary simulations show that the socially optimal state becomes evolutionarily stable by a Pavlovian strategy in the repeated Avatamsaka game, and also in any kind of dependent game. The mechanism of the evolutionary process is investigated from the viewpoint of the agent’s memory and mutation of strategies.

When we analyze a game we want a full representation, i.e., we want to be able to look at a game and perceive all of its details. If it allows us to visualize the respective solution all the better. This aim was the reason for researching a new game representation which is described in this paper. The of a game consists mainly in a table containing all of the information with no suppression or “adulteration” with regards to the game. Initially presented at Fifth Spanish Meeting on Game Theory & European Voting Games (Seville 2002), based on examples, is put forth in this paper thoroughly. We begin by presenting , exemplifying it with four games. We finish proving the existence of Nash Equilibrium in games.

In this research, our aim is the increase of both each individual utility and social welfare in road transportation systems by decreasing traffic congestion. For the attainment of our purpose, we propose a simple route choice mechanism based on the concept of mass user support. Through multiagent simulation, we analyze the effect of our proposed mechanism on the improvement of traffic efficiency of individual drivers and the whole systems.