Catálogo de publicaciones - libros
Social Choice and Strategic Decisions: Essays in Honor of Jeffrey S. Banks
David Austen-Smith ; John Duggan (eds.)
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No disponible.
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Disponibilidad
Institución detectada | Año de publicación | Navegá | Descargá | Solicitá |
---|---|---|---|---|
No detectada | 2005 | SpringerLink |
Información
Tipo de recurso:
libros
ISBN impreso
978-3-540-22053-4
ISBN electrónico
978-3-540-27295-3
Editor responsable
Springer Nature
País de edición
Reino Unido
Fecha de publicación
2005
Información sobre derechos de publicación
© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2005
Cobertura temática
Tabla de contenidos
Deliberation and Voting Rules
David Austen-Smith; Timothy Feddersen
We analyze a formal model of decision-making by a deliberative committee. There is a given binary agenda. Individuals evaluate the two alternatives on both private and common interest grounds. Each individual has two sorts of private information going into committee: (a) perfect information about their personal bias and (b) noisy information about which alternative is best with respect to a (commonly held) normative criterion. Prior to a committee vote to choose an alternative, committee members engage in deliberation, modeled as a simultaneous cheap-talk game. We explore and compare equilibrium properties under majority and unanimity voting rules, paying particular attention to the character of debate (who influences who and how) and quality of the decision in each instance. On balance, majority rule induces more information sharing and fewer decision-making errors than unanimity. Furthermore, the influence and character of deliberation can vary more under majority rule than under unanimity.
Pp. 269-316