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Innovative Comparative Methods for Policy Analysis: Beyond the Quantitative-Qualitative Divide
Benoît Rihoux ; Heike Grimm (eds.)
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Disponibilidad
| Institución detectada | Año de publicación | Navegá | Descargá | Solicitá |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| No detectada | 2006 | SpringerLink |
Información
Tipo de recurso:
libros
ISBN impreso
978-0-387-28828-4
ISBN electrónico
978-0-387-28829-1
Editor responsable
Springer Nature
País de edición
Reino Unido
Fecha de publicación
2006
Información sobre derechos de publicación
© Springer Science+Business Media, Inc. 2006
Cobertura temática
Tabla de contenidos
Social Sustainability of Community Structures: A Systematic Comparative Analysis within the Oulu Region in Northern Finland
Pentti Luoma
Consider the following two (related) questions. In the Prisoners’ Dilemma, uncooperative behaviour was the predicted outcome although cooperative behaviour would lead to greater payoffs for all players if was cooperative. Interpreting the Prisoners’ Dilemma as a generalised social interaction, we can ask the question: Is external (e.g., governmental) force required in order to sustain cooperation or can such behaviour be induced in a liberal, individually rational way? In the Cournot duopoly, cartels were not stable. However, in many countries, substantial effort is expended in making and enforcing anticollusion laws. So it seems that, in reality, there is a risk of cartel formation. How can cartels be stable?
Part 3 - Innovative Comparative Methods for Policy Implementation and Evaluation: Applications | Pp. 237-262
QCA as a Tool for Realistic Evaluations
Barbara Befani; Fritz Sager
Consider the following two (related) questions. In the Prisoners’ Dilemma, uncooperative behaviour was the predicted outcome although cooperative behaviour would lead to greater payoffs for all players if was cooperative. Interpreting the Prisoners’ Dilemma as a generalised social interaction, we can ask the question: Is external (e.g., governmental) force required in order to sustain cooperation or can such behaviour be induced in a liberal, individually rational way? In the Cournot duopoly, cartels were not stable. However, in many countries, substantial effort is expended in making and enforcing anticollusion laws. So it seems that, in reality, there is a risk of cartel formation. How can cartels be stable?
Part 3 - Innovative Comparative Methods for Policy Implementation and Evaluation: Applications | Pp. 263-284
Conclusion
Benoît Rihoux; Heike Grimm
Consider the following two (related) questions. In the Prisoners’ Dilemma, uncooperative behaviour was the predicted outcome although cooperative behaviour would lead to greater payoffs for all players if was cooperative. Interpreting the Prisoners’ Dilemma as a generalised social interaction, we can ask the question: Is external (e.g., governmental) force required in order to sustain cooperation or can such behaviour be induced in a liberal, individually rational way? In the Cournot duopoly, cartels were not stable. However, in many countries, substantial effort is expended in making and enforcing anticollusion laws. So it seems that, in reality, there is a risk of cartel formation. How can cartels be stable?
Part 4 - Conclusion | Pp. 287-296