Catálogo de publicaciones - libros

Recent developments in organization theory about arrangements that are neither markets nor hierarchies provide an opportunity to reconsider the nature of cooperatives and their fundamental characteristics. The concept of “hybrids” developed by transaction cost economics to encapsulate the properties of these arrangements may be particularly relevant in that it provides a theoretical framework in which to embed cooperatives among other modes of governance. This paper goes in that direction and proposes a characterisation of different regimes among cooperatives, establishing a typology grounded in theory. An important result of this approach is that it challenges standard competition policies towards cooperatives.

Cooperative organizations may develop networks, in order to reduce transaction costs, to facilitate knowledge transfer and exchange of resources, and be competitive. The pork industry in Denmark evolved along a path of cooperation and networking. The evolution is path-dependent with roots in the Grundtvig and the movement in the late 1800s. Today, the Danish pork industry is characterized by three levels of networks, beyond the family farm: the primary cooperative, the federated structure and the policy network. All four levels are interlinked via a nexus of director interlocks.

This paper combines economics and economic sociology to assess the role of local inter-firm networks in innovation dynamics and economic performance in a cluster of cooperatives. Focusing on the exchanges of advice between managers, our study is based on 31 cooperatives in southern France. Using both sociometric and economic data, we find correlations between cooperatives’ relational, innovation and economic scores. The cooperatives’ specificity, however, questions the results obtained in different settings. The network analysis may thus ground a comprehensive interactionist approach to cooperatives, but may also offer tools to renew their governance strategies.

This paper discusses exit strategies in U.S. agricultural cooperatives. Compared to other mutual organizations, liquidations and conversions have not been common in U.S. agriculture. We attribute this phenomenon to the “stickiness” of the cooperative organizational form in agriculture. Hypothesized factors that lead to this conclusion include existence of considerable economic incentives for the continued role of cooperatives, low member pecuniary incentives to pursue an exit strategy, and lack of disruptive institutional and market changes. We conclude that if property right constraints continue to be ameliorated with selective incentives and innovative structures, producers will be more likely to invest in cooperatives.

This paper examines marketing cooperatives’ (MCs’) structure from a members’ perspective. We support the notion that the utility that members derive from the attributes of MC’s structure enhances our insight in members’ commitment. Using a conjoint experimental design, we elicit the utility that producers attach to attributes of a MC. These attributes are related to the cooperative’s internal organizational structure and strategic behavior. The results of 120 producers of a Dutch horticulture cooperative show that the selected cooperative attributes are significant drivers of members’ utility. In particular, members attach high importance to strategic attributes and prefer a more individualized cooperative structure.

The poor financial performance of a number of previously successful agricultural cooperatives appears to be connected to member commitment, which in turn is linked to the decisions made by the cooperatives’ leaders. While cooperative members should have an incentive to hire leaders that promote strong organizational commitment, the evidence suggests this incentive is weaker than imagined. This paper shows that cooperatives that believe they have a well-defined and loyal membership are less likely to hire leaders that will enhance member commitment. Thus, historical success is no guarantee of future success and may in fact contain the seeds of failure.

Structural changes in the agricultural set-up challenge the value of traditional practices in cooperatives. The major sector development causes a lock-in effect for individual farmers and gives rise to non-Pareto-optimal outcomes for individual farmer members. Constitutional economics may be a theoretical source for reviving the effect of exit by addressing potential adjustments to the traditional cooperative institutional set-up and, thereby, generating more stable equilibria in collective bargaining processes between farmers. The approach focuses on voting rules, investment levels as well as individual positive and negative rights in farmers’ collective actions and calls for adjustment of traditional practices in agricultural cooperatives.

This article addresses two observations regarding the board of directors in agricultural cooperatives. First, it is sometimes stated that cooperatives seem to behave like ordinary enterprises. Second, it is argued that cooperatives may have advantages compared to corporations with publicly exchanged shares. These observations are analyzed from complete as well as incomplete contracting theory.

Capital structure efficiency is viewed as contributing to good financial performance. According to the traditional arguments, cooperatives have difficulties in getting an optimal capital structure. This paper argues that may explain their less efficient performance. By combining the arguments of the political model of governance and the traditional theory of regulation, a unified approach is developed that makes the link between regulatory governance and capital structure explicit. It is argued that the heterogeneity of cooperatives’ members may result in powerful coalitions and in a sub optimal capital structure. The evidence gathered from the empirical literature confirms these results.

Abstract. A model of a two-stage vertical market structure consisting of producers, processors, and acooperative is developed to analyze the market incentives agricultural cooperatives may have forintegrating forward into processing activities and the comparative impacts of cooperative forwardintegration on producers and consumers when processors are alternately characterized by Cournot,competitive, and collusive behavior. Results suggest that cooperatives do not have an incentive tointegrate forward in competitive markets. In markets with some degree of market power, the potential forcooperative forward integration is linked to the cooperative’s ability to restrict the output of its membersto optimal levels.