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While it is difficult to disagree with most of the arguments against monetisation of citizenship, in my view they all aim at the wrong target. It is not the sale of citizenship per se which violates principles of justice and democracy; it is the existing international system of inclusion and exclusion of third country nationals which is deeply skewed and denigrates the value of citizenship. A condition under which anyone would give huge amounts of money for a travel document is deeply troubling. It is not membership but mobility which is at issue.

Lawyers and political scientists opposed to the idea of selling citizenship will not have any arguments to support their position, should rich misleading assumptions and selfless rhetorical pirouettes – priceless in fiction writing – useless in legal studies – be removed from their often passionate advocacy. I review the usual rotations lending such pirouettes appeal: of the intrinsic value of citizenship, of equality and nondiscrimination, of the arch-importance of the citizenship’s political components and, finally, of EU law concerns. I come to dismiss them all.

The state as a self-determining agent has a clear and well-established interest in structuring ‘access to citizenship’ in ways that support its goals, whether these goals concern economic development, health and social welfare, cultural standing or sporting glory. The legitimacy of the ways in which it pursues these goals is however another question. Practices that support the emergence of transnational class and status stratification in which mobility rights become radically unequally distributed are not compatible with the democratic legitimacy of states or of the EU. States whose policies are pushing to the neoliberal extreme, help bring into focus a wider range of policies that are hollowing out democratic citizenship from within.

‘Intervention’ is much too strong a word for whatever it is that the European Parliament could and should do on 15 January, when it debates the issue of EU citizenship for sale. But a first and wide-ranging reflection on some of the emerging consequences of EU citizenship for national democracies would at least be a start. 2013 was the year of the EU citizen. It did not do much to raise public awareness about EU citizenship and it ended with moves towards its commodification. Wouldn’t it be appropriate for the European Parliament to start the new year with a real debate on the relation between national and EU citizenship?

The decision by the Maltese Parliament to offer Maltese citizenship – and consequently – EU citizenship to third country nationals who can afford to pay € 650.000 comes as a closure of the EU year of citizens and reflects a worrying trend in the conception of all those rights related to EU citizenship, including above all freedom of movement. If we don’t want to leave a golden opportunity to Eurosceptics, nationalists and populists, we must seize the chance for a leap forward in the European process involving a much wider concept of citizenship than that defined in the letter of the EU Treaties.

The ‘selling of citizenship’ is indicative of larger and deeper transformations of our conception of political membership. Globally, it exacerbates inequality by securing privileged access to membership for the super-rich. Domestically, it runs the risk of straining civic bonds and democratic solidarity. Taken together, these developments reveal whom the contemporary market-friendly state prioritizes in the admission line and whom it most covets as future citizens.

The transmission of citizenship status from parents to children is a widespread modern practice that offers certain practical and normative advantages. It is relatively easy to distribute legal status to children according to parents’ citizenship, especially in the context of high mobility where the links between persons and their birthplace are becoming increasingly strained. Granting citizenship status to children of citizens may also be desirable as a way of avoiding statelessness, acknowledging special family links and fostering political links between children and the political community of their parents. These apparent advantages of ius sanguinis citizenship are, however, outweighed by a series of problems. In what follows I argue that ius sanguinis citizenship is (1) historically tainted, (2) increasingly inadequate and (3) normatively unnecessary. Ius sanguinis citizenship is historically tainted because it is rooted in practices and conceptions that rely on ethno-nationalist ideas about political membership. It is inadequate because it becomes increasingly unfit to deal with contemporary issues such as advances in assisted reproduction technologies and changes in family practices and norms. Lastly, ius sanguinis citizenship is normatively unnecessary because its alleged advantages are illusory and can be delivered by other means.

Costica Dumbrava runs three main attacks against ius sanguinis: It is tainted by its associations with ethnonationalism; it is inadequate because, in an age of new reproduction technologies, same sex marriage and patchwork families, biological descent no longer traces social parenthood; and it is unnecessary, since its protective effects can be achieved by other means. I will accept the first and second argument with some modifications, but reject the third.

Costica Dumbrava rejects ius sanguinis as 1) historically tainted, 2) increasingly inadequate and 3) normatively unnecessary. In my response, I mainly focus on the first, historical dimension. Drawing on examples from the case of Germany, often used as the prime example to show what is wrong with ius sanguinis, I will contest the idea that ius sanguinis as such has been discredited by history. Its supposed taintedness has to do with issues not intrinsic to this principle of transmitting citizenship, namely restrictive admission practices and racially based exclusion. Its use in certain problematic ways and contexts in the past does not mean it necessarily has to be used like that in the future. If complemented by other, inclusionary mechanisms of allocating citizenship in conjunction with increased tolerance for multiple citizenship it certainly remains a useful – and necessary – method of transmitting citizenship in the day and age of multiple transnational migrations.

I appreciate the ideas that Costica Dumbrava and others have introduced into this debate. States’ concerns about the quality and political consequences of their citizenship are important. But citizenship is a two-way street. Our discussion of ius sanguinis laws should extend beyond the concerns of states to also consider the serious practical consequences of citizenship laws on citizens, including the long-term unity and security of their families. Families facing instability or separation because children are denied their parents’ citizenship are unlikely to be satisfied with the explanation that ius sanguinis is inadequate or historically tainted; the resulting individual sense of injustice might even discourage the loyalty and identification states seek in citizens.