Catálogo de publicaciones - libros

While the last decades have seen a spectacular expansion in public-private partnerships (PPPs) in many high-income European countries, only two PPPs have been realized in Switzerland so far. In this chapter, we define what PPPs are and the optimal conditions under which they should be chosen. Our normative approach highlights that PPPs are not a panacea, and that the choice to use a PPP should be driven by the characteristics of the public service considered, according to transaction cost theory. We then consider the cultural and institutional differences that can explain the variations in the number of PPPs which are actually implemented accross countries with similar level of development. We point out that while there are probably too few PPPs in Switzerland, particularly due to the lack of a specific legal and institutional framework, there are clearly too many of them in some other countries.

Human resources management (HRM) is undoubtedly the area in the public sector which has evolved the most in the last 25 years, especially in Switzerland. This chapter summarizes the most important developments affecting HRM statutes, policies, and processes, and argues that HRM in Swiss public organizations is increasingly oriented to strategically managing human capital. Political and cultural factors are key enablers of this maturation process, one which has led to introducing human resource (HR) strategies, a professionalization of HR managers, and state-of-the-art HR practices and tools. The originality of a hybrid legal framework which uses a public law contract as the legal form of employment is typical for what we’ve called the “post-civil service” environment Switzerland now finds itself in.

Communication has become increasingly important within administrations. Compared to private companies, the communication of public organisations is much more varied: the range of functions is very wide (service delivery, maintenance of social cohesion, dialogue between institutions and citizens, etc.) and the types of communications are more extensive, ranging from communication about citizen’s rights and obligations, communication as instrument of public policy to communication about projects. In addition, public communication will become even more complex with increasing demands for information, increased participation of citizens in the debate and a growing number of media to consider.

This chapter discusses how financial management at the various Swiss government levels is governed by legislation and organized in practice. It presents the legal framework, the main institutional settings and the actors involved. Within the Swiss federalist system, the cantons exercise considerable autonomy in financial management; each canton has designed its own way to manage its public finances. The ‘standard’ financial management both at the federal and at the cantonal level is summarized here. Checks and balances in the system have led—particularly in the last two decades—to sound public budgets with relatively low debt levels. Two specifically Swiss institutions meant to ensure the government’s fiscal sustainability are presented: the fiscal rules and the financial referendum.

The goal of this chapter is to give the reader the keys to understanding the financial statements and budget plans as they are prepared and presented by Swiss governments at the three different levels. In Switzerland, as elsewhere, financial statements are a major element of governmental information systems, and must be organized so as to respond to the various expectations interested parties have of the government. These expectations have evolved over time as the country’s internal institutions have transformed, as well as due to technical, accounting, and computing changes. Swiss governments have achieved a high standard of quality in their financial statements with some of them fulfilling all the requirements formulated in the International Public Sector Accounting Standards (IPSASs). This is remarkable, considering the great autonomy the cantons have in this area, and remarkable in the absence of legal strictures obligating cantonal governments to use the proposed harmonized accounting model.

There are few domains as suited as taxation at expressing the particularities of the Swiss system. Various elements combine here: the smallness of the country and of its cantons (and thus their exposure to external political and economic context), the federal system, the country’s decentralization, and direct democracy. The tax system, seen as a whole, is not a rational, systematic, or even theoretical construction, and Swiss fiscality offers a diversity that likely does not exist anywhere else. Depending on the canton, revenue, wealth, profit, capital, and even inheritances are taxed differently. Municipalities can also choose the taxes they wish to levy and the tax rate. Two key elements explain why significant differences in the cantonal and municipal tax burdens exist: tax competition and the balance between direct and indirect taxes. Despite these differences, a large majority of the Swiss population continues to favor cantonal and municipal tax autonomy.

It is extremely rare for Swiss institutions to undergo a revolution. And yet for the last ten years, the financial transfer and equalization system between the federal and cantonal levels have been reformed so much that it can rightly be considered a revolution. Most cantons followed suit and transformed their own systems with their municipalities based on the federal model. This chapter briefly surveys how the systems are organized, and describes their benefits and shortcomings. Switzerland has established rules that guarantee a certain automatism and a regularity to equalization flows. By the same token, no discretionary decisions to grant subsidies to decentralized municipalities are now possible—and there is no way for the wealthiest jurisdictions to ignore those political entities worse off than them. These rules ensure that tax competition between both cantons and municipalities can continue to exist, but within acceptable and accepted limits.

The Swiss social security system seems rather successful. However, the fragmented nature of the system and the inability of the political system to deal with the challenges that lie ahead constitute serious problems. The social security system is fragmented along federalist lines as well as between institutions that cater to different groups. This makes coordination difficult and generates incentives for institutions to offload clients (and costs) onto other institutions. As in other European countries, the pension system needs to be adapted to an increasingly large population of the elderly. Doing so is politically difficult, and to date, opponents have managed to defeat governmental reform proposals.

This chapter summarizes the institutional foundations, actor conflicts, and main policy challenges for health policymaking in Switzerland. Federalism, liberalism, subsidiarity, and direct democracy have shaped long-term trends and current politics in Swiss health policymaking. Cantons and municipalities, as well as private actors that include health insurance funds and professional organizations, play an important role in financing and providing health care services and enjoy considerable influence in the policy process. Responsibilities are fragmented, all-encompassing national regulations are limited, and individual co-payments for patients are high. Therefore, policymakers face difficulties in coordinating national health policies, in reducing costs, and in putting comprehensive preventative health policies in place.

This chapter shows how public administrations, in order to maintain influence over the conduct of public policies, assume new roles, at least when compared to the tasks and sovereign competencies under an ideal-typical Weberian bureaucracy. Empirical evidence from Switzerland indicates that an administrative entity can cast itself in turn as a policy broker and mediator in political conflicts (during policy formulation) but also as a co-producer of administrative services and network facilitator (during policy implementation). The results of a formal social network analysis (SNA) suggest that these new roles do not entail a loss of public administration influence. On the contrary, it is by adapting and also abandoning a state-centric vision and hierarchical position, as well as finding a place within a policy network as a broker, facilitator, or co-producer, that public administrations are able to maintain their ability to significantly influence the content of public policies.