Catálogo de publicaciones - libros

In this essay, I examine the possible use of the distinction between discovery and justification for the analysis of research practice, and what we can learn, in turn, from this analysis for an assessment of the uses and limits of this distinction. First, I illustrate that nonstandard uses of experiments and processes of concept formation reveal the “process-interpretation” of the DJ distinction as inappropriate. Turning to what is often regarded as the core of the DJ distinction—the differentiation between genesis and validity—I shall focus on the role it plays within science. Moreover, by taking processes of concept formation seriously, new and hitherto unrecognized limits of justification become visible. In particular, justification turns out to be more genuinely bound to history than is usually assumed. To illustrate and flesh out my general claims, I shall first provide an analysis of a specific historical episode: the purported “discovery” of the two electricities in the 1730s.

The distinction between a context of discovery and one of justification with regard to scientific activities (hereafter: DJ distinction) has developed a remarkable life of its own in 20th century philosophy of science and beyond, eventually becoming an influential conceptual device. Hans Reichenbach’s exposition provided the major starting point for a broad discussion, within which several versions of the distinction emerged.^1 One can safely state that no such thing as one single proper DJ distinction exists. Rather, it implies a richness of different perspectives on the relation between historical and philosophical approaches to science.

Before the historicist turn in philosophy of science, it was generally regarded that scientific activity takes place within two distinct contexts, the context of discovery and the context of justification. The former consists in the processes of generation of scientific hypotheses and theories; the latter in their testing and validation. According to Reichenbach, who codified the distinction, the context of discovery was the province of historians, psychologists, and sociologists and was not susceptible to logical analysis: “The act of discovery escapes logical analysis; there are no logical rules in terms of which a “discovery machine” could be constructed that would take over the creative function of the genius” (Reichenbach 1951, p. 231). On the other hand, the context of justification was an area which could be rigorously explored and formalized and thus fell within the province of logic and philosophy.2 Popper introduced a very similar distinction in The Logic of Scientific Discovery (Popper 1968, p. 31). His notion of discovery, however, was different from Reichenbach’s (see note 12).